'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Thursday, October 30, 2014

Philosophical Grammar 13

13. When someone interprets, or understands, a sign in one sense or another, what he is doing is taking a step in a calculus. – “Thought” sometimes means a process which may accompany the utterance of a sentence and sometimes the sentence itself in the system of language.



when one interprets – one proposes –

when one understands – one engages with uncertainty

the proposition as thought –

is then the proposition made public



© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 12

12. When do we understand a sentence? – When we’ve uttered the whole of it? Or while uttering it?



any understanding of a sentence – either when we’ve uttered the whole of it – or while uttering it – will be uncertain



© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Philosophical Grammar 11

11. It is not a question of an instantaneous grasping. –

When a man who knows the game watches the game of chess, the experience he has when a move is made usually differs from that of someone else watching without understanding the game. But this experience is not the knowledge of the rules. – the understanding seems like a background; like the ability to multiply.



understanding just is the action of language – of language use –

it is propositional engagement –

and thus could be seen as ‘instantaneous’ –

however the real point here is that understanding – propositional engagement –

is essentially logical –

seeing the possibilities – possibilities of language use

what I would suggest is that exposure to language –

to propositional action

activates logical capacity



© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 10

10. “Understanding a word” – being able to apply it. –“when I said ‘I can play chess’ I really could.” How did I know that I could? My answer will show in what way I use the word “can”.

Being able is a state. “To describe a state” can mean various things. “After all I can’t have the whole mode of application of a word in my head all at once.”



understanding a word – is being able to see it as a possible of use

or if you like – to recognize its possibilities – possibilities of use

when I said ‘I can play chess’ – I really could.’ – how did I know I could?

my answer – may well show how I use the word ‘can’ – in this circumstance

and as for the ‘showing’ here – that will open to interpretation – to the interpretation of whoever I make this showing to

and their ‘interpretations’ will be open to question

‘Being able is a state. “To describe a state” can mean various things. “After all I can’t have the whole mode of application of a word in my head all at once.” ’  

what we are describing here is an action

and an action can be described in any number of way

description is propositional action

and any propositional action –

is open to question



© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 9

9. Isn’t there a gap between an order and its application? “I understand it but only because I add something to it, namely, the interpretation.” – But if one were to say “any sentence still stands in need of an interpretation”, that would mean, no sentence can be understood without a rider.


any sentence still stand in need of an interpretation?

if someone puts a sentence to me the meaning of which I am not familiar with

I will question it – and likely get a reply –

and this process may go on –

until some kind of satisfaction is reached –

or the endeavour is put aside for another day

what we have in such a process is propositional action –

propositional interaction

logically speaking there is no end to this –

in practise there is –

this process – this action of language – is understanding

where we are familiar with a sentence –

we recognise that familiarity –

but even this – this recognition of familiarity –  of familiar use –

is itself language use –

propositional action




© greg t.charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 8

8.  Must I understand a sentence to be able to act on it? If “to understand a sentence”
means somehow or other  to act on it, then understanding cannot be a precondition for our acting on it. – What goes on when I suddenly understand someone else?   There are many possibilities here.



must I understand a sentence to act on it?

understanding is the activity of language – of language use –

acting on language is language use –

acting on language is understanding language

the proposition –

is open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain –

and therefore any action with language –

any understanding – is open to question –

open to doubt – uncertain

understanding is not a precondition for action

understanding is the condition – the uncertain condition – of action –

what goes on when I suddenly understand someone? –

presumption




© greg t.charlton. 2014.

Tuesday, October 28, 2014

Philosophical Grammar 7


7. What is the criterion for an expression’s being meant thus? A question about the relationship between two linguistic expressions. Sometimes a translation into another mode of representation.



the criterion for an expression’s being meant thus?

the possibilities are endless –

what counts – if there is a question of criterion – is some statement of it

then the statement of criterion can be agreed to – or not –

and if not – there is room for discussion

the real thing here is – not criterion – i.e. explanation of – what an expression ‘being meant thus’ – amounts to –

it is rather that the expression is acted upon –

here in the action of an expression – or action in respect of an expression – we have meaning

just what that amounts to – will of course be open to question

‘An answer to the question ‘how is that meant?’ exhibits the relationship between two linguistic expressions. So the question too is a question about that relationship.’

yes there is this question about the relationship between the sentence – and the sentence given to explain it – between sentence and explanation –

sentence and sentence –

and the question – is about that relationship

we will have account – but no account – no explanation will ever catch up with use – with effect

explanation is always too late

‘Understanding a description means making oneself a picture of what is described. And the process is more or less like making a drawing to match a description’

understanding is the activity of language – of language use –

genuine understanding is – seeing and exploring propositional possibilities

this picture business – and making drawings –

is just imagery of no real consequence



© greg t. charlton. 2014

Philosophical Grammar 6

6. A sentence in a code: at what moment of translating does understanding begin?

The words of a sentence are arbitrary; so I replace them with letters. But now I cannot immediately think the sense of the sentence in the new expression.

The notion that we can only imperfectly exhibit our understanding: the expression of understanding has something that is essentially inexpressible. But in that case it makes no sense to speak of a more complete expression.


understanding begins with – is – inquiry

sense is interpretation –

if you cannot interpret a sentence – in any way – it has no sense for you

our understanding – just is the inquiry – if you like –the process of inquiry –

logically speaking there is no end to this –

and if we do stop the inquiry at some point –

our understanding stops at that point

a proposition is the focus of possibility – of possible interpretation

and the expression of propositional possibility –

is never exhausted



© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 5


5. “ I understand this gesture” – it says something.

In a sentence a word can be felt as belonging first with one word and then with another.

A ‘proposition’ may be what is conceived in different ways or the way of conceiving itself.

A sentence from the middle of a story I have not read.

The concept of understanding is a fluid one.



“ I understand this gesture” – it says something –

here the gesture is a proposed – takes the form of a proposal – a proposition –

open to question – open to doubt

the claim to understand – is to state that an interpretation has been and settled on

‘In a sentence a word can be felt as belonging first with one word and then with another.’

yes in any arrangement of words there is uncertainty

‘A ‘proposition’ may be what is conceived in different ways or the way of conceiving itself.’

yes – a proposition can be conceived in any number of ways

‘A sentence from the middle of a story I have not read.’ –

is open to question – open to interpretation

‘The concept of understanding is a fluid one.’

understanding is propositional engagement – and that can take any number of forms



© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Monday, October 27, 2014

Philosophical Grammar 4


4. Comparison with understanding a piece of music: for explanation I can only translate the musical picture into a picture in another medium – and why just that picture? Comparison with understanding a picture. Perhaps we see only patches and lines – “we do not understand the picture”. Seeing a genre-picture in different ways.



it may be that translating the musical  picture into another medium – does throw light on the other –

however this not the only possible account – the only possible explanation of a piece of music – and it may not be a very good one – it will depend on the circumstance

in any case – what you have with explanation – is not this picture business – but rather propositional action

an explanation of anything is a proposal – and like that which it is ‘explaining’ – or in effect replacing –

open to question – open to doubt –

perhaps we see patches and lines – all very well –

but yes – a picture like a piece of music – like a sentence – can be interpreted – in any number of ways

and with any interpretation – understanding



© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 3


3. One can say that meaning drops out of language.

In contrast: “Did you mean that seriously or as a joke?”

When we mean (and don’t just sat) words it seems to us as if there were something coupled to the words.



“One can say that meaning drops out of language; because what a proposition means is told by another proposition.”

yes – what a proposition means is told by another proposition – etc. etc.

the meaning of one proposition is to be found in its replacement

and so – on this view meaning is never fixed –

i.e. “Did you mean that seriously or as a joke?”

what we mean is not something coupled to the words –

meaning just is this activity of language

if the question is – ‘what does so and so mean?’ –

the answer involves you in question and speculation –

and so at any point in this activity – meaning is indeterminate –

(and if you are looking for an final answer to the question –

then meaning is – unknown)

in practice at some point in this language activity –

for purely practical human reasons –

we opt out of the logical game –

and decide for – go for –

what is at hand



© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Sunday, October 26, 2014

Philosophical Grammar 2



2. Understanding and signs. Frege against the formalists. Understanding like seeing a picture that makes all the rules clear; in that case the picture is itself a sign, a calculus.

“To understand a language” – to take a symbolism as a whole.

Language must speak for itself.



seeing a picture that makes all the rules clear – is not seeing the possibilities of the picture

seeing the possibilities of a picture – is understanding the picture

yes – the picture is a sign – and as with any sign – open to question – open to doubt

to understand a language is to engage with it – to recognize its possibilities

language must speak for itself –

and what language says – when language speaks for itself – is whatever it is said to say



© greg t. charlton. 2014.






Saturday, October 25, 2014

Philosophical Grammar 1


Part 1

The proposition and its sense



1.‘How can one talk of ‘understanding’ and ‘not understanding’ a proposition?

Surely it is not a proposition until it’s understood?



a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt

open to interpretation

to engage with a proposition is to interpret it –

and any interpretation – is open to question – open to doubt

this engagement – is understanding

there is no understanding if there is no engagement –

if a proposition is put in an active context –

there will be engagement –

there will be interpretation –

there will be understanding



© greg t. charlton. 2014.

NOTICE: WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR



What follows in this blog will be a critical exploration of Ludwig Wittgenstein's book: Philosophical Grammar. I will present Wittgenstein's propositions and arguments propositions and follow these with my own thoughts. My reference for the propositions and the summaries will be the Rees / Kenny edition of Philosophical Grammar.

Wednesday, October 01, 2014

propositional realities

‘The sign ( the sentence) gets its signification from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language.

As part of the system of language, one my say the sentence has life. But one is tempted to imagine that that which gives the sentence life as something in an occult sphere, accompanying the sentence. But whatever accompanied it would for us just be another sign.'

- Wittgenstein: The Blue Book.


when we make statements – about the world –

in general – we operate within accepted propositional practise –

in terms of propositional categories that are in use –

that it is assumed are understood

you may ask –

well surely our propositions refer to a non-propositional reality?

i.e. – a world of objects –

the notion of an ‘objective reality’ – is a proposal –

a proposal that is virtually universally accepted –

which is to say – in just about all contexts of use –

it has proved to be very useful

still it is – when all is said and done – a proposal –

subjective reality – is in the same boat

what we have with such propositional use –

is not non-propositional realities –

but rather propositional constructs

constructs upon constructs –

and constructs within constructs

the object of all propositional action –

of all propositional construct –

is the unknown

in response to the unknown we propose –

and in response to what is proposed – we propose

and so it goes – we make – we construct –

and any propositional action we take –

any construct we make – or operate within –

is open to question –

open to doubt



© greg t. charlton. 2014.