Philosophical Grammar 109

VIII

109. A description of language must achieve the same result as language itself.

Suppose some says that one can infer from a proposition the fact that verifies it. What can one infer from a proposition apart from itself?

The shadowy anticipation of a fact consists in our being able already to think that that very thing will happen which hasn’t yet happen.

‘must achieve the same result as language itself’?

what result is that?

in answer to this question there will be any number of proposals –

all of which will be open to question – to doubt

‘Suppose some says that one can infer from a proposition the fact that verifies it’?

the point is that inference – is proposal

yes you can play defined games of inference –

but the notion of inference is – is like any other logical notion – uncertain – even when given a specific definition

an inference from the proposition – to the fact – that verifies it?

any so called ‘fact’ – is a proposal – a description

the relation between proposition and fact is – whether you call it inference or not – up for grabs –

as to verification –

in practice verification is a decision to stop investigating –

it is a pragmatic decision – a rhetorical move –

it has no basis in logic

‘What can one infer from a proposition apart from itself?’

in the broadest sense – to infer is to expand – to expand a proposition –

which amounts to – a new proposal

the original proposal has led to a another proposal –

and because P1 led – in the course of things to P2 – there is a relation – a contingent relation –

in certain defined contexts – this move from P1 to P2 is termed ‘inference’

any account of how you get from P1 to P2 – will be most interesting –

as interesting and as questionable – as any other proposition

a proposition that ‘infers’ itself – is no more than a restatement of the proposition

‘The shadowy anticipation of a fact consists in our being able already to think that that very thing will happen which hasn’t yet happen’

this ‘shadowy anticipation of fact’ –

when you drop the poetry – is uncertainty –

and yes we propose –

propose descriptions – propose states of affairs – we propose realities

and the ‘fact’ – the description – anticipated – will – like any other proposal –

be open to question – open to doubt –

will be uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 108

108. Fulfillment of expectation doesn’t consist in some third thing’s happening, such as a feeling of satisfaction.

‘fulfillment of expectation’?

an expectation is a proposal –

and any description of what occurs – with respect to a proposal –

will be open to question – open to doubt

fulfillment – is in the same boat  –

any genuine fulfillment is uncertain

and you ask – what sort of fulfillment is that?

well it’s as good as it gets –

and if you think you can have complete fulfillment –

then you are simply – denying logical reality –

and opting for delusion

I have no argument with this –

there is much to be said for delusion

however I think one should be clear about what is what

as to ‘feelings of satisfaction’ –

well the short answer is –

feelings come and go

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 107

107. We said “one cannot recognize intention as intention from the outside” – i.e. that it is not something that happens, or happens to us, but something we do. It is almost as if we said: we cannot see ourselves going to a place, because it is we who are doing the going. One does have a particular experience if one is doing the going oneself.

‘intention’ – is an explanation of action –

it is a proposal –

what ‘we do’ – is describe –

and any description is open to question – open to doubt

yes – you can say we do not stand outside ourselves – and observe ourselves –

as to ‘having a particular experience’ –

this is a description – a proposal – that we can put forward –

to explain ourselves

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 106

106. When I think of what will happen tomorrow  I am mentally already in the future.” – Similarly people think that endless series if cardinal numbers is somehow before our mind’s eye, whenever we can use that expression significantly.

A thought experiment is like a drawing of an experiment that is not carried out.

when I think of what will happen tomorrow – what I do is propose a future specific state of affairs

as to an endless series of cardinal numbers – I propose a mathematical theory

a thought experiment is a detailed proposal for an experiment

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 105

105. “This queer thing, thought.” – It strikes us as queer when we say that it connects objects in the mind. – We are all ready to pass from it to reality. – How was it possible for thought to deal with the very person himself? Here I am being astonished by my own linguistic expression and momentarily misunderstanding it.

strange as it may sound – ‘thought’ is a proposal – ‘object’ – a proposal – ‘mind’ – a proposal

what we have here is the ‘interconnectedness’ of proposals – proposal in relation to proposals

it is not that we pass from ‘it’ – thought or mind – to reality –

we pass from proposal to proposal

granted these proposals and their interconnectedness is entrenched –  so entrenched that in common and indeed specialized parlance  – they have been – they are reified –

perhaps that is just the mark of success – as in useful propositional action

be that as it may – what we deal with is proposals – propositions – open to question – open to doubt - uncertain

‘How was it possible for thought to deal with the very person himself?’ –

what we have here is propositions dealing with propositions

‘Here I am being astonished by my own linguistic expression and momentarily misunderstanding it.’

there will be no misunderstanding here –

any ‘linguistic expression’ – is open to question – to doubt – is uncertain –

different understandings – conflicting understandings – yes

any understanding – any proposal –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 104

104.  “A proposition isn’t a mere series of sounds, it’s something more.” Don’t I see a sentence as part of a system of consequences

a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

a mere series of sounds may well be a proposition – i.e. modern jazz

a sentence can well be viewed as part of a system of consequences – but it can also be viewed as not

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 103

103. It is only considering the linguistic manifestation of a wish that makes it appear that my whish prefigures the fulfillment. – Because it is the wish that just that were the case. It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet.

the basic logic of it is that a state of affairs is proposed –

that you may wish for – or want – that state of affairs –

is logically uninteresting

and whether or not it comes about –

is logically irrelevant

the proposal – regardless of what occurs –

is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 102

102. In the gesture we don’t see the real shadow of the fulfillment, the unambiguous shadow that admits of no further interpretation.

the gesture as with any proposal – from a logical point of view – is open to question – to doubt – it’s meaning and it’s interpretation – uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 101

101. Doesn’t the system of language provide me with a medium in which the proposition is no longer dead? – “Even if the expression of the wish is the wish, still the whole language isn’t present during this expression.” But that is not necessary.

the idea here is that the proposition standing alone – is in some sense dead?

the proposition – the proposal – is live 

relative to the proposition – it’s ‘the whole language’ that is dead –

this ‘whole language’ – is finally a theory – if you like – of the proposition – of the proposal –

and I would suggest in the act of proposing – the act of expression – quite irrelevant to it

it’s a back story

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 100

100. We want to say: “Meaning is essentially a mental process, not a process in dead matter.” – What we are dissatisfied with here is the grammar of process, not the specific kind of process.

meaning is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt –

open to description – interpretation –

uncertain

and as far as I know –

dead matter doesn’t question – doubt – describe – interpret –

but I try and keep an open mind

and as for ‘mental’ – and ‘mental process’ –

these are descriptions – proposals to account for – among other things – ‘meaning’ –

that’s all – just proposals

yes – you’ll say – ‘I have a mental life – and it’s real’ –

don’t wish to burst your bubble –

but all we have there is a proposal – common enough – yes –

universally endorsed? – most likely –

just a proposal –

and if you put it to critical attention – you will see –

it is indeed – open to question – open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 99

99. What happens is that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, but: I do no interpreting.

I imagine N. No interpretation accompanies this image; what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies.

‘but: I do no interpreting’?

yes – logically any proposition is open to interpretation –

however for a good many – perhaps even for the majority of the propositions that come our way – we do no interpreting

and the reason?

a question has not been put – a doubt has not been raised

‘I imagine N. No interpretation accompanies this image; what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies’?

yes fair enough

just what that path is – will be open to question – open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 98

98. The intention seems to interpret, to give final interpretation.

Imagine an ‘abstract’ sign-language translated into an unambiguous picture language. Here there seems to be no further possibilities of interpretation. – We might say we didn’t enter into the sign-language – but did enter into the painted picture. Examples: picture, cinema, dream.

‘The intention seems to interpret, to give final interpretation’?

one could say that the point of proposing intention – is to ground a proposition –

and even to locate it’s grounding

logically speaking though – this is no more than propositional packaging –

with or without any supposed grounding – a proposition is open to question – open to doubt – open to interpretation

there is no final interpretation

‘Imagine an ‘abstract’ sign-language translated into an unambiguous picture language’?

any translation is up for questioning – so let’s drop this talk of the unambiguous

‘no further possibilities of interpretation’? – this is just rubbish

yes – we might say we didn’t enter the sign-language – but did enter the painted picture

no big surprise here – the painted picture – we can recognize and understand – whereas the sign language – no

that was the point of the translation –

yes

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 97

97. This is connected with the question whether a machine could think. This is like when we say: “The will can’t be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you take is something that simply happens, not something we do.” But there is no doubt that you also have experiences when you move your arm voluntarily, although the phenomena of doing are indeed different from the phenomena of observing. But there are very different cases here

‘This is connected with the question whether a machine could think’?

the proposition – the proposal – is that which is put –

I think there is an argument for saying that a machine can propose

what we deal with logically speaking is propositions – that which is proposed –

how you explain the origin of the proposal – what account you give of how it came about – i.e. man or machine – is logically irrelevant –

that is to say that who or what puts the proposal – is irrelevant – and who or what deals with the proposal – is irrelevant

even if you accept that a machine can or does propose – you might ask – how could a proposal put by a machine – be held open to question – to doubt – by the machine?

an interesting question –

and your answer here will depend on just what you think counts as questioning – and how you understand doubt

in relation to the machine perhaps it’s a hardware – if not a software problem?

that might be the case with humans too

“The will can’t be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you take is something that simply happens, not something we do.” But there is no doubt that you also have experiences when you move your arm voluntarily, although the phenomena of doing are indeed different from the phenomena of observing. But there are very different cases here

no doubt that you have experiences?

well what happens is what happens – the question is how best to describe?

and yes the common description is ‘experience’ –

but just what that amounts to could be anything –

and the term ‘experience’ – in certain propositional contexts – may not be used at all

‘although the phenomena of doing are indeed different from the phenomena of observing’?

logically speaking no –

whether doing or observing – we propose –

we put forward proposals – propositions –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 96

96. It is beginning to look as if intention would be never recognized as intention from the outside. But the point is that one has to read off from a thought that is the thought that such and such is the case.

intention is a description – really an explanation of a proposal – be that in relation to  language or action

what we have – what we deal with is proposals – propositions –

a ‘thought’ is an explanation of a proposition

a common one – and a very useful one –

however when all is said and done – a proposal in relation to proposals

the logic of it – without any packaging –

is that it is the proposal – the proposition – that is put –

yes – you can assert that such and such is the case –

fair enough – but any proposal put – any assertion –

is open to question – open to doubt

what is the case – is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 95

95. Intention and intentionality. –

“The thought that p is the case doesn’t presuppose that it is the case: yet I can’t think that something is red if the colour red does not exist.” Here we mean the existence of a red sample as part of our language.

‘The thought that p is the case doesn’t presuppose that it is the case’?

the thought that p is the proposal that p –

the proposal that p is the case – obviously doesn’t presuppose that it is the case

a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘that p’ – is uncertain

‘yet I can’t think that something is red if the colour red does not exist’?

what exists is what is proposed –

if the color red is proposed – the colour red exists

and there will be any number of proposals – propositions –

to account for – to explain – the colour red

in the absence of any description – what exists is the unknown

our world is propositional

‘Here we mean the existence of a red sample as part of our language’ ?

yes – we can propose a ‘red sample’ –

and if we do – the proposal – the proposition – is ‘part of our language’

and then the question – what does the proposal – the proposition amount to?

in response to this we can have any number of proposals

and any proposal – any proposition –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2014.

Philosophical Grammar 94

94. When I expect someone, – what happens?

What does the process of wanting to eat an apple consist in?

when you expect someone – what will happen?

you don’t know

what does the process of wanting to eat an apple consist in?

to want to eat an apple is to propose to eat an apple

now what does that proposal consist in – amount to?

well – there will be – there can be – various accounts given –

and any such account will be open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2014.