on certainty 677*

677. A proposition is a proposal. A proposal is open to question, open to doubt, is uncertain. A proposition is true if assented to. A proposition is false if dissented from. Assent and dissent are open to question, open to doubt. If you are certain there can be no mistake. In an uncertain reality there are no mistakes; what you face is uncertainties. The notion of the mistake has no role to play in epistemology. The  claim of knowledge is a claim to an authority for a proposition. The only authority is authorship. The authorship of a proposition is logically irrelevant. Any claim to an authority other than authorship is rhetorical.

*There is no 677 in Wittgenstein’s text. Wittgenstein ends with 676.

© greg t. charlton. 2011.

on certainty 676

676. “But even if such cases can’t be mistaken, isn’t it possible that I am drugged?” If I am and if the drug has taken away my consciousness, then I am not now really talking and thinking. I cannot seriously suppose that I am at this moment dreaming. Someone who, dreaming says “I am dreaming”, even if he speaks audibly in doing so, is no more right than if he said in his dream “it is raining”, while it was in fact raining. Even if his dream was actually connected with the noise of the rain.   
 

drugged or dreaming –

what you say –

is open to question –

open doubt –

whether you are –

or not                                                                                                                              

© greg t. charlton. 2010.