on certainty 313

313. So is that what makes us believe a proposition? Well – the grammar of “believe” just does hang together with the grammar of the proposition believed.

so does the fact that a proposition  –

connects up with another or other beliefs –

make us believe it?

the point is this –

if you want to make a connection –

you can – you will find a way –

connecting propositions –

is just a logical action

it really has nothing to do with belief

you will believe a proposition –

if it works for you –

and you won’t if it doesn’t –

but here we are talking about use –

and circumstance

so belief is always –

an uncertain matter

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 312

312. Here it strikes me as if doubt were hollow. But in that case – isn’t belief in history hollow too? No; there is so much that this connects up

connections can and will be made whether you believe or doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 311

311. Or imagine that the boy questioned the truth of history (and everything that connects up with it) – and even whether the earth had existed at all a hundred years before.

                                                                                                                                    

I imagine you would have before you an exceptional student

 

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 310

 310. A pupil and a teacher. The pupil will not let anything be explained to him, for he continually interrupts with doubts, for instance as to the existence of things, the meaning of words, etc. The teacher says “Stop interrupting me and do as I tell you. So far your doubts don’t make sense at all”.

if the teacher did stop and address the student’s concerns –

he might find the student learns something – beyond following meaningless commands – and bowing to an ‘authority’ – that has yet to be established

the student might find the same thing

and the teacher might also learn that he is valued for his teaching –

and not his authoritarianism

and the student that he is valued for his intelligence – his inquisitiveness – and his willingness to ask questions

and not his capacity to blindly accept authority like an idiot

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 309

309. Is it that rule and empirical proposition merge into one another?

as far as the ‘empirical proposition’ goes –

propositions about how the world is –

propositions about understanding –

and dealing with an uncertain reality –

there are no rules

the rule is a devise you use –

for game playing

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 308

308. ‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ belong to different categories. They are not two ‘mental states’ like, say ‘surmising’ and ‘being sure’. (Here I assume it is meaningful for me to say “ I know what (e.g.) the word ‘doubt’ means” and that this sentence indicates that the word “doubt” has a logical role.) What interests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one.

knowledge – is not a mental state –

knowledge is a proposal – a proposition –

open to question – open to doubt –

to claim certainty is to make a stand for ignorance

if when you say –

‘I know what the word ‘doubt ‘ means’ –

and you are claiming certainty –

then you misuse the word ’know’

to know is to recognize uncertainty –

and to deal in uncertainty

and so the meaning of ‘doubt’ –

as with meaning of any word –

is open to question –

is open to doubt

the logic of language –

is the logic of uncertainty

‘about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is possible at all’ –

judgment is only a possibility – given uncertainty –

if there is no doubt – there will be no judgment

a proposition – empirical or otherwise –is a proposal –

and as such – uncertain

how we characterize a proposition –

i.e. – as ‘empirical’ – as ‘non- empirical’ – or whatever –

is a question of usage –

a matter of circumstance

and any characterization itself –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 307

307. And here the strange thing is that when I am quite certain of how the words are used, have no doubt about it, I can still give no grounds for my way of going on. If I tried I could give a thousand, but none as certain as the very thing they were supposed to be grounds for.

here we have the argument –

that certainty is groundless

the next step is to see –

that the claim of certainty –

only has rhetorical function

which effectively means –

it is and exercise in deception –

if not delusion

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 306

306. “I don’t know if this is a hand.” But do you know what the word “hand” means? And don’t say “I know what it means now for me”. And isn’t it an empirical fact – that this word is used like this?

‘But do you know what the word hand means?’

I know that it has various uses

and yes –

however it’s used –

is an empirical fact

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 305

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory

who’s to say what is needed?

if a step is taken –

it’s taken –

and if it’s not taken –

there you go

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 304

304. But nor am I making a mistake about twelve times twelve being a hundred and forty-four. I may say later that I was confused just now, but not that I was making a mistake.

calculating –

playing a game of sign substitution –

is just that –

playing a game –

and you either play the game –

or you don’t

there is no question of being mistaken or not

there is no question of you being right or wrong here –

it’s just a matter of whether you want to play –

or not –

if you follow the rules –

you play the game –

if you don’t follow the rules –

you don’t play

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 303

303. If, for example we have always been miscalculating, and twelve times twelve isn’t a hundred and forty-four, why should we trust any other calculation? And of course that is wrongly put.

to calculate – is to play a game –

a game of sign substitution

if you play the game –

you accept the rules of the game –

there is no question of a mistake –

you either play the game –

according to it’s rules –

or you don’t play the game –

and if you don’t play the game –

you don’t – calculate –

simple as that

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 302

302.  It’s no good saying “Perhaps we were wrong” when, if no evidence is trustworthy, trust is excluded in the case of the present evidence.

yes – exactly 

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 301

301.  Supposing it wasn’t true that the earth had already existed long before I was born – how should we imagine the mistake being discovered?

there would be no mistake discovered –

just the domination of an alternative view

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 300

10.3.51

300. Not all corrections of our views are on the same level.

any ‘correction’ is a response to uncertainty

© greg t. charlton.2010.

on certainty 299

299. We are satisfied that the earth is round.

‘we are satisfied that the earth is round’ – 1950

‘we are satisfied that the earth is flat’ –  1542

© greg t. charlton.2010.

on certainty 298

298. ‘We are quite sure of it’ does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

what occurs –

in science –

and more generally –

in education –

is the exploration –

and the study of –

uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010

on certainty 297

297. For we learn, not just that such and such experiments had those and those results, but also the conclusion which is drawn. And of course there is nothing wrong in our doing so. For this inferred proposition is an instrument for a definite use.

definite as its use may be –

this does not detract from its uncertainty –

as proposition –

as a proposal

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 296

296. This is what we call an “empirical foundation” for our assumptions.

that the same thing has happened again –

is not proof – but it gives us the right to assume it

and this then is what we call –

the ‘empirical foundation’ of our assumptions –

‘a right to assume’?

as if there is some authority –

behind assumption –

the authority of a right

the point of assumption is that there is no authority –

we assume –

in the absence of authority –

and any assumption –

is uncertain –

which is to say –

without foundation

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 295

295. So hasn’t one, in this sense, a proof of the proposition? But that the same thing has happened again is not proof of it; though we do say it gives us the right to assume it.

if you assume proof –

where there is none –

then what you are involved in –

is pretense –

and deception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 294

294.  This is how we acquire conviction, this is called ‘being rightly convinced’.

if by ‘this’ – Wittgenstein means –

performing experiments –

quite the opposite is the case –

experiment dispels conviction

for what experiment reveals –

is uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 293

293. Similarly with the sentence “water boils at 100 degrees centigrade.”

‘water boils at 100 degrees centigrade’ –

is a proposal

if tested – it will be questioned –

and if the questioning is successful –

the proposal – functional as it may be –

useful as it may be –

will be shown to be –

uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 292

292. Further experiments cannot give the lie to our earlier ones, at most they may change our whole way of looking at things. 

the experiment is a demonstration of uncertainty –

and who can say where that will lead? 

                                                                                                                                          

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 291

291. We know that the earth is round. We have definitely ascertained that it is round.

We shall stick to this opinion, unless our whole way of seeing things changes. “How do you know that?” – I believe it.

if it is the case that we will stick to this opinion –

unless our whole way of seeing things changes –

then what we are dealing with is just an  opinion –

an opinion that is fashionable

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 290

290.  I myself wrote in my book that children learn to understand a word in such and such a way. Do I know that, or do I believe it? Why in such a case do I write not “I believe etc.” but simply the indicative sentence?

yes –

just the indicative sentence is all that is required

prefacing any proposition with ‘I know’ or ‘I believe’ –

adds nothing to the proposition –

but unnecessary and irrelevant baggage –

which if it is not identified for what it is-

will corrupt the proposition –

and its bearer

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 289

289. I am firmly convinced that others believe, believe they know, that all that is in fact so.

if you are ‘firmly convinced’ here –

it can’t be on the basis of what you see and hear –

or how you interpret what you see and hear

for there is nothing to guarantee

your perceptions –

or your interpretations

so any view you have –

must be regarded as uncertain –

open to question –

open to doubt

and if that is the case –

your being ‘firmly convinced’ –

is pretense –

and /or delusion

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 288

288. I know, not just that the earth existed long before my birth, but also that it is a large body, that this has been established, that I and the rest of mankind have forebears, that there are books about all this, that such books don’t lie, etc. etc. etc. And I know all this? I believe it. This body of knowledge has been handed on to me and I have no grounds for doubting it, but on the contrary all sorts of confirmation.

And why shouldn’t I say I know all this? Isn’t that what one does say?

But not only I know, or believe, all that, but the others do too. Or rather I believe that they believe it.  

this body of assertions has been handed on to me

and if I don’t question it – I don’t doubt it

to say I know this is to underwrite these assertions –

with some authority –

the only authority here –

is authorship

yes – not only do I make these assertions –

others do too

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 287

23.9.50

287. The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions.

correct

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 286

286. What we believe depends on what we learn. We all believe it is impossible to get to the moon; but there might be people who believe that it is possible and that it sometimes happens. We say: these people do not know a lot that we know. And, let them never be so sure of their belief – they are wrong and we know it.

If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer one by far.

what we believe –

depends on what we learn –

and what we learn –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

no one is in a position to say –

‘we all believe …’

anyone who says such a thing –

is pretending support –

for their own view –

or is just plain ignorant

if you understand –

that all knowledge –

is uncertain –

then you will be tolerant –

of different beliefs –

different systems of knowledge –

different ways –

of seeing the world

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 285

285. If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows that he believes that what he is looking for is there.

if he believed what he is looking for is there – he would have no reason to be rooting around –

the reason that he is rooting around is that he doesn’t know where it is

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 284

284. People have killed animals since the earliest of times, used the fur, bones etc. etc. for various purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.

They have always learnt from experience; and we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not. By this I naturally do not want to say that men should behave like this, but only that they do behave like this.

who’s to know whether ‘they counted definitely’ or not?

might there not have been people who regarded –

‘finding similar parts in any similar beast’ –

a gift from the gods –

something not guaranteed –

or indeed to be expected?

and what is it to say –

‘they have always learnt from experience?

who’s idea of ‘learning’ –

and who’s idea of ‘experience’ –

are we talking about here?

we don’t see –

‘that they believe certain things definitively’ –

we hoist this interpretation onto their actions –

with the idea that it will suit our purposes

the point is this –

any behaviour –

in the absence of interpretation –

is unknown –

yes we interpret behaviour –

to make it known

and any interpretation that we but forward –

is no more than a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 283

283. For how can a child immediately doubt what it is taught? That could mean only that he was incapable of learning certain language games.

no – what it means is that the child can question –

and this ability to question – this natural ability –

has not been compromised

if by ‘learning’ Wittgenstein means – not questioning –

not doubting –

then Wittgenstein mistakes learning –

for indoctrination

 

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 282

282.  I cannot say that I have good grounds for the opinion that cats do not grow in trees or that I had a father and a mother.

If someone has doubts about it – how is that supposed to have come about? By his never, from the beginning, having believed that he had parents? But then, is that conceivable, unless he has been taught it?

Wittgenstein admits that he has no good grounds for the opinion that he had a father and a mother –

so why does he believe it?

because he was taught it

and he is likely to continue to believe it –

until doubts are raised

the same would be true if had been taught that he didn’t have parents –

and everyone he came in contact with agreed with this –

and he would continue to believe it –

until doubts were raised –

either by himself or others

so it is really just a question of what is put to you –

and whether it is challenged

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 281

281. I, L. W., believe, am sure, that my friend hasn’t sawdust in his body or in his head, even though I have no direct evidence of my senses to the contrary.  I am sure, by reason of what has been said to me, of what I have read, and of my experience. To have doubts about it would seem to me madness – of course, this is also in agreement with other people, but I agree with them.

your belief –

with or without so called evidence –

is uncertain –

and any so called evidence –

one way or the other –

is open to question –

open to doubt

what has been said to you –

what you have read –

and your experience –

none of this is certain

to have doubts about any belief –

is just to question that belief

you don’t know –

with any certainty –

that you are in agreement –

with others

there is always a question –

always a doubt –

even about madness

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 280

280. After he has seen this and this and heard that and that, he is not in a position to doubt whether…

it is just when you have seen this and heard that – and that –

that you are in position to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 279

 279. It is quite sure that motor cars don’t grow out of the earth. We feel that if someone could believe the contrary he could believe everything that we say is untrue, and could question everything that we hold to be sure.

But how does this one belief hang together with all the rest? We should like to say that someone who would believe that does not accept our whole system of verification.

This system is something that a human being acquires by means of observation and instruction. I intentionally do not say “learns”.

this is a demand for consistency

Wittgenstein assumes beliefs ‘hang together’ –

as an empirical hypothesis and a general rule –

I think he would be disappointed –

as an imperative –

pissing in the wind

Wittgenstein’s ‘system of verification’ –

is a construction –

that suits his purposes –

it doesn’t follow that it suits any one else’s

if it does –

he’s got a friend

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 278

 278. “I am comfortable that this is how things are.”

yes – you can be comfortable that this how things are –

but still ask questions – still have doubts –

have an open mind

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 277

277.  “I can’t help believing…”

yes you can

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 276

276. We believe, so to speak, that this great building exists, and then we see, now here, now there, one or another small corner of it.

this belief is not unlike any other – it is uncertain –

and we operate quite effectively with uncertain beliefs

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 275

275. If experience is the ground of our certainty, then naturally it is past experience.

And it isn’t for example just my experience, but other people’s, that I get my knowledge from.

Now one might say that it is experience again that leads us to give credence to others. But what experience makes me believe that the anatomy and physiology books don’t contain what is false? Though it is true that this trust is backed up by my own experience.

uncertainty is the ground of our experience

knowledge is uncertain – 

and it is not just my experience  –

but other people’s that I get my knowledge from

my experience is uncertain –

trust is an illusion

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 274

274. One such is that if someone’s arm is cut off it will not grow again. Another, if someone’s head is cut off he is dead and will never live again.

Experience can be said to teach us these propositions. However, it does not teach us them in isolation: rather, it teaches us a host of interdependent propositions. If they were isolated I might perhaps doubt them, for I have no experience relating to them.

whether taken in isolation –

or regarded as interdependent –

empirical propositions –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 273

273. But when does one say of something that it is certain?

For there can be dispute whether something is certain; I mean when something is objectively certain.

There are countless general empirical propositions that cannot count as certain for us.

if you say something is certain –

you’ve stopped thinking about it

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 272

272. I know = I am familiar with it as a certainty.

whatever the supposed ‘certainty’ is –

it will be open to question – open to doubt –

and therefore –

I know = I am familiar with it as an uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 271

 271.  What is a telling ground for something is not anything I decide.

isn’t this is just epistemological intimidation?

there is a telling ground  – an authority –

it’s not anything I decide – or you decide –

but we should bow to it ?

even though it has no connection to anything we decide –

and therefore anything we do –

or anything we know –

but it’s there?

I mean who is going to buy this rubbish?

the world’s moved on

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 270

270. “I have compelling grounds for my certitude.” These grounds make the certitude objective.

‘I have compelling grounds for my certitude.’ –

‘These grounds make the certitude objective’

these statements are blatant – unabashed exercises –

in rhetoric

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 269

269. Am I more certain that I have never been on the moon than that I have never been in Bulgaria? Why am I so sure? Well I know I have never been in the neighbourhood – for example I have never been in the Balkans.

if you are ‘more certain’ of one thing than another –

then you are not certain of either

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 268

268. “I know that this is a hand” – And what is a hand? – “Well, this, for example.”

first up –

you can drop the ‘I know ‘ –

it’s irrelevant –

‘this is a hand’ –

will do the job

‘and what is a hand?’

‘well this for example’ –

you see the question –

if there is a question –

will be – what is ‘this’?

and it’s the right question –

because ‘this’ –

refers to – the unknown

‘this’ –

is a logical place –

for description

© greg t. charlton. 2010.