on certainty 267

267. “I don’t merely have the visual impression of a tree: I know that is a tree”. 

the basic assertion here is ‘that is a tree’

prefacing this assertion with ‘I know’ –

is to claim an authority for the assertion

the only authority for an assertion is authorship

and if you make the assertion –

then claiming authorship –

is irrelevant and unnecessary

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 266

266.  And here one would still have to say what are compelling grounds.

yes –

you can say whatever you like here –

in whatever way you like –

all you are doing is making assertions

with the idea of eliciting –

someone’s assent 

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 265

265.  But what does it say, beyond “I have never been to such a place, and have compelling grounds for believing that”?

all that needs to be said is – ‘I have never been to such a place’

and further should a question arise –

‘you can believe me or not’

‘compelling grounds’ is unnecessary and irrelevant

you have no compelling grounds –

all you have is rhetoric –

and that either works or it doesn’t

                                                                                                                             

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 264

264. I could imagine Moore being captured by a wild tribe, and their expressing the suspicion that he has come from somewhere between the earth and the moon. Moore tells them that he knows etc. but he can’t give them, the grounds for his certainty, because they have fantastic ideas of human ability to fly and know nothing of physics. This would be an occasion for making that statement.

Moore makes his assertions –

and because the natives will not be persuaded –

he has to face the fact that all he has is assertion –

and that all his authority amounts to –

is authorship

© greg t. charalton. 2010.

on certainty 263

263.The schoolboy believes his teachers and his schoolbooks.

perhaps he does – perhaps not

if the schoolboy doesn’t question –

the supposed ‘authority’ of his teachers –

of his schoolbooks –

he will grow up to be a fool

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 262

262. I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances and been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago, and therefore believed this. We might instruct him: the earth has long…etc. – We should be trying to give him our picture of the world.

This would happen through a kind of persuasion.

yes – persuasion is all this business of ‘knowledge’ is about

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 261

261. I cannot at present imagine a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the earth during the last 100 years.

a ‘reasonable’ doubt – is what?

one that is sanctioned – as reasonable

perhaps –

if Wittgenstein dropped this constraint –

of reasonableness –

and thought outside of this box –

he might imagine – a doubt?

but if not –

‘I cannot at present imagine….’ –

is fair enough –

it leaves the matter open –

as it should be

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 260

260. I would like to reserve the sentence “I know” for the case in which it is used in normal linguistic exchange.

what counts as ‘normal’ here – will be a fluid – uncertain matter –

but if Wittgenstein wants to exclude ‘I know’ – from philosophical usage –

there goes traditional epistemology – and I would say – a good thing too

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 259

259. Someone who doubted whether the earth had existed for one hundred years might have a scientific, or on the other hand a philosophical, doubt.



yes


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 258

258. I do not know how the sentence “I have a body” is to be used.

That doesn’t unconditionally apply to the proposition that I have always been on or near the surface of the earth.

if you don’t have a use for ‘I have a body’ –

don’t use it

and if you have a conditional use for the proposition –

‘I have always been on or near the surface of the earth’ –

use it –

when the conditions are right

as to knowledge –

your knowledge is uncertain –

so -

keep an open mind –

on propositions –

use –

and conditions

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 257

257. If someone said to me that he doubted whether he had a body I should take him to be a half-wit. But I shouldn’t know what it would mean to try and convince him that he had one. And if I had said something, and that had removed his doubt, I should not know how or why.

yes – face to face with not-knowing

© greg t.charlton. 2010

on certainty 256

256. On the other hand a language-game does change with time.

if a language game changes with time –

it is uncertain –

and so too – the conception –

‘language game’ –

which  is itself –

a language game

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 255

255.  Doubting has certain characteristic manifestations, but they are only characteristic of it in particular circumstances. If someone said that he doubted the existence of his hands, kept looking at them from all sides, tried to make sure it wasn’t all ‘done with mirrors’, etc. we should not be sure whether to call that doubting. We might describe this way of behaving as like the behaviour of doubt, but his game would not be ours.

so there is doubt about doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 254

254. Any ‘reasonable’ person behaves like this.

the question is –

can you know how people behave?

can you say with certainty ?

sure – you can take a punt –

we all do –

but there is no certainty in this

and what do you say –

when a different view is proposed?

as for ‘reasonableness’ –

isn’t that just –

a piece of rhetoric –

designed –

to make it look as if –

your view  has –

some basis to it –

other than –

your assertion of it?

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 253

253. At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded.

there is no well-founded belief –

all belief is unfounded –

which is to say –

all belief is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 252

252. But it isn’t just that I believe in this way that I have two hands, but that every reasonable person does.

believe whatever you want to believe –

your belief – if it works for you –

will work without the appeal to an ‘authority’ –

be that ‘reasonable people’ – or whatever

such an appeal is rhetorical –

it has no logical value

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 251

251. Doesn’t this mean: I shall proceed according to this belief unconditionally, and not let anything confuse me?

can you proceed unconditionally?

not in the real world –

the world of contingency –

the world of uncertainty

we should not be afraid of confusion –

it’s an indicator of philosophic health –

at the heart of any confusion –

is a question –

is a doubt –

an uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 250

250. My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I would produce in evidence for it.

That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it.

so evidence is irrelevant if you are certain

so the question –

what is your certainty based on?

nothing –

apparently

so it’s groundless –

and that makes your certainty-

a prejudice –

a claim that you hold –

and hold not to be –

open to question –

open to doubt

another name for this ‘certainty’ –

is ignorance

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 249

249. One gives oneself a false picture of doubt.

only if the picture one has –

is not open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 248

248. I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions.

And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.

how would you know?

how would you know what rock bottom is?

isn’t it rather that you have stopped asking questions –

stopped doubting the ground of your beliefs –

and that your ‘convictions’ – are as uncertain as they ever were?

‘foundation walls carried by the whole house’ –

nice poetic image –

and yes it might suit you to describe your beliefs in this way –

and it will fit well with your beliefs –

because it is as uncertain –

as any belief you operate with

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 247

247. What would it be like to doubt now that I have two hands? Why can’t I imagine it at all? What would I believe if I didn’t believe that? So far I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist.

to doubt is to question –

and whether you question of not –

will depend on what you are doing

here right now we are doing philosophy –

such a question makes sense in this context –

just ask Wittgenstein –

he raised the question

and as for there being no system –

you don’t need a system –

to ask a question

© greg. t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 246

246. “Here I have arrived at a foundation of all my beliefs.” This position I will hold!” But isn’t that, precisely, only because I am completely convinced of it? What is ‘being completely convinced’ like?

if I have arrived at the foundation of all my beliefs –

I have just stopped asking questions –

I have stopped thinking

what is ‘being completely convinced’ like?

it’s ‘like’  being stupid

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 245

245.  To whom does one say he knows something? To himself or someone else. If he says it to himself, how is it distinguished from the assertion that he is sure that things are like that? There is no subjective sureness that I know something. The certainty is subjective but not the knowledge. So if I say “I know that I have two hands”, and that is not supposed to express just my subjective certainty, I must be able to satisfy myself that I am right. But I can’t do that, for my having two hands is not less certain before I have looked at them than afterwards. But I could say: “That I have two hands is an irreversible belief.” That would express the fact that I am not ready to let something count as disproof of this proposition.

‘that I have two hands is an irreversible belief’ –

but how can you know that this is true – that this belief is irreversible?

surely such a statement is no more than rhetoric – pretense?

a propositions is a proposal – it is by its nature – uncertain

there is no proof or disproof

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 244

244. If someone says “I have a body”, he can be asked “Who is speaking here with this mouth?”

the answer will be –

‘I am’

now do we have a mystery here?

the nature of the ‘I’?

the relation of the ‘I’ to the ‘body’?

yes we can go down that path

the really interesting thing is that –

we make a statement like ‘I have a body’ –

and operate with it –

without knowing with any certainty –

what we are talking about –

and it seems we are understood

language on such a view –

simply marks the unknown –

the unknown we operate in –

dare I say –

without any difficulty?

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 243

243. One says “I know” when one is ready to give compelling grounds. “I know” relates to a possibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come to light, assuming that he is convinced of it

But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes.

look –

‘compelling grounds’ is whatever one thinks will be persuasive –

so what we are talking about here is rhetoric

and being ‘convinced of it’ –

is just about ‘talking yourself into it’ –

persuading yourself –

or at least giving the impression –

that you are persuaded

saying you believe –

is to pretend an authority for your statement –

and that supposed ‘authority’ – is your belief –

it’s not as strong as the pretence of knowledge –

but like ‘I know’ – ‘I believe’ –

is a rhetorical devise

here is how it is if you drop the rhetorical baggage –

you say what you have to say –

others will agree with you –

or they won’t

your statement will be acted on –

or it won’t –

it’ll be useful –

or not

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 242

242. Mustn’t we say at every turn : “I believe this with certainty”?

no – what you do is –

you just make your statement –

that is all that is required

the preface ’I believe’ –

is logically irrelevant –

it’s value is rhetorical

as for certainty –

all assertions –

rhetorical or not –

are open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 241

241. Isn’t this an hypothesis, which, as I believe, is again and again completely confirmed?

what this is – is an hypothesis –

that is uncertain

and is –

again and again –

restated

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 240

240. What is the belief that all human beings have parents based on? On experience. And how can I base this sure belief on my experience? Well, I base it not only on the fact that I have known parents of certain people but on everything that I have learnt about the sexual life of human beings and their anatomy and physiology: also on what I have heard and seen of animals. But then is that really a proof?

experience is uncertain –

and so we have uncertain knowledge –

and no proof

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 239

239.  I believe that every human being has two parents; but Catholics only believe that Jesus had a human mother. And other people might believe that there are human beings with no parents, and give no credence at all to the contrary evidence. Catholics believe as well that in certain circumstances a wafer completely changes its nature, and at the same time that all evidence proves the contrary. And so if Moore said “I know that this is wine and not blood”, Catholics would contradict him.

in so far as Moore and the Catholics make claims of certainty –

they are both barking up the wrong tree

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 238

238.  I might therefore interrogate someone who said that the earth did not exist before his birth, in order to find out which of my convictions he was at odds with. And then it might be that he was contradicting my fundamental attitudes, and if that were how it was, I should have to put up with it.

Similarly if he said he had at some time been on the moon.

what you have here –

is different views

if you want to load up with rhetoric –

and talk of ‘conviction’

and what is ‘fundamental’ –

fair enough

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 237

237. If I say “an hour ago this table didn’t exist”, I probably mean it was only made latter on.

If I say “this mountain didn’t exist then”, I presumably mean that it was only formed later on – perhaps by a volcano.

If  I say “this mountain didn’t exist half an hour ago”, that is such a strange statement that it is not clear what I mean. Whether for example I mean something untrue but scientific. Perhaps you think that the statement that the mountain didn’t exist then is quite clear, however one conceives the context. But suppose someone said “This mountain didn’t exist a minute ago, but an exactly similar one did instead”. Only the accustomed context allows what is meant to come through clearly.

the meaning of any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 236

236. If someone said “The earth has not long been …” what would he be impugning? Do I know?

Would it have to be what is called a scientific belief? Might it not be a mystical one? Is there any absolute necessity for him to be contradicting historical facts? or even geographical ones?

do I know what he would be impugning? – no

would it have to be a scientific belief? – no

might it not be a mystical one? – yes

is he necessarily –

contradicting historical and geographical facts? –

no

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 235

235. And that something stands fast for me is not grounded in my stupidity or credulity.

yes it is

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 234

234. I believe that I have forebears, that every human being has them. I believe that there are various cities, and, quite generally, in the main facts of geography and history. I believe that the earth is a body on whose surface we move and that it no more suddenly disappears or the like than any other solid body: this table, this house, this tree etc. If I wanted to doubt the existence of the earth long before my birth, I should have to doubt all sorts of things that stand fast for me.

Wittgenstein has all these beliefs –

and they all function for him

to doubt is to question 

it does not follow –

that if he were to question these beliefs –

to doubt them –

they would cease to function for him

in fact recognizing  –

the intrinsic uncertainty of his belief system –

may just give him –

a deeper understanding of his reality

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 233

233. If a child asked whether the world was already there before my birth, I should answer him that the earth did not begin with my birth, but that it existed long, long before. And I should have the feeling of saying something funny. Rather as if the child had asked me if such and such a mountain were higher than a tall house that it had seen. In answering the question I should have to be imparting a picture of the world to the person who asked it.

If I do answer the question with certainty, what gives me this certainty?

I would say to the child that I don’t know

I would say other people believe that the earth existed before I was born –

and I am happy to accept what they say

I would mention that there are various theories about the age of the earth and about its origins –

but that no one can say for sure what the situation is –

I would tell the child there are scientific theories and religious views on this matter

I would also tell the child that it is to its advantage to understand these various accounts of the earth –

and the various pictures of the world that people have proposed

and that it should make up its own mind on these matters –

and keep an open mind

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 232

232.  “We could doubt every one of these facts, but we could not doubt them all.”

Wouldn’t it more correct to say: “we do not doubt them all”.

Our not doubting them all is simply our manner of judging, and therefore of acting.

we can regard all so called facts as uncertain –

and operate quite effectively with these uncertain facts

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 231

231. If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago, I should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what would not.

perhaps their point is –

that what you count as evidence –

is not conclusive –

is not certain

given that no scientific evidence is –

how hard is that to understand?

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 230

230. We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement “I know…” For it is not a question of mental processes and mental states.

And that is how one must decide whether something is knowledge or not.

any statement can function as knowledge –

if it has a use –

and if it is held open to question

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 229

229. Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings.

meaning –

is uncertain

accounting for it –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 228

228. “In such circumstances, people do not say ‘Perhaps we’ve all forgotten’, and the like, but rather they assume that…”

whatever they assume –

it is open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 227

227. “Is that something that one can forget?”

yes –

but if it is forgotten –

you can’t say-

‘I have forgotten it’-

for to say this –

you would have to remember ‘it’ –

or something of it

if it’s actually forgotten –

it doesn’t present –

it’s not there

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 226

226. Can I give the supposition that I have ever been on the moon any serious consideration at all?

it’s not about giving serious consideration –

it’s about use

do you have a use for the proposition?

if you do –

you will use it –

if not –

you won’t

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 225

 225. What I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions.

whether it’s one proposition –

or a nest –

‘holding fast’ –

amounts to –

not questioning –

not doubting

it amounts to –

being ignorant

© greg t. charlton. 2010.