'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Saturday, July 31, 2010

on certainty 570

570. “I know this is my name; among us any grown-up knows what his name is.”



this is pure rhetoric –

the attempt to persuade –

using the idea of the ‘authority’ of knowledge –

and the ‘authority’ of being a grown up –

to do so

the only authority is authorship –

claiming authorship of your assertions –

is irrelevant and unnecessary

claiming an authority beyond authorship –

is false and deceptive 


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 569

569. An inner experience cannot show me that I know something.

Hence, if in spite of that I say, “I know my name is …”, and yet it is obviously not an empirical proposition, 
– – –



the claim to know – as in a claim to certainty –

is false and pretentious –

and so no experience is relevant

if you drop this rhetorical baggage –

what you have is the basic uncorrupted assertion –

‘my name is ..’ –

if that proposition is made public –

it is testable

and therefore –

empirical


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Friday, July 30, 2010

on certainty 568

568. If one of my names were used only very rarely, then it might happen that I did not know it. It goes without saying that that I know my name, only because, like everyone else I use it over and over again.



if ‘knowing’ –

means anything here –

 it means only –

‘awareness of use’ –

which amounts to –

awareness of –

uncertainty


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 567


567. And now, is my knowledge that I am called L.W. of the same kind as knowledge that water boils at 100 degrees C? Of course, this question is wrongly put.



my knowledge that I am called …

is an assertion

that water boils at 100 degrees C

is an assertion –

and if it is understood that these assertions –

indeed any assertion –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

the question is not –

wrongly put

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority is rhetorical –

and its point is persuasion

it is a false claim to authority –

its ground is deception –

in or out of context

‘God’ – is the ultimate –

rhetorical devise


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Monday, July 26, 2010

on certainty 566

566. Nor does a child who learns my language-game (No 2)* learn to say “I know that this is called a ‘slab’”.

Now of course there is a language-game in which the child uses that sentence. This presupposes that the child is already capable of using the name as soon as he is given it. (As if someone were to tell me “this colour is called…”.) – Thus, if the child has learnt a language-game with building stones, one can say something like “ and this stone is called’…’, and in this way the original language-game has been expanded.



‘and this stone is called …’ –

is an expansion or perhaps more correctly – an explanation

of the original language-game

I think Wittgenstein wants to suggest that ‘I know’ is a further expansion?

naming – like any propositional action –

is essentially – uncertain

‘I know’ – if it is a claim of certainty –

does not expand the original language-game –

it corrupts it


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Sunday, July 25, 2010

on certainty 565

565. But here there isn’t yet any question of any ‘knowledge’ that this is called a “slab”, this “a  pillar”, etc.



even if this is called a ‘slab – this ‘a pillar’ –

there is no question of ‘knowledge’ –

what you have is naming –

and the only issue regarding any name – any mark or any sign –

is its utility –

that is a matter of circumstance –

and that is –

uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 564

564. A language-game: bringing building stones, reporting the number of available stones. The number is sometimes estimated, sometimes established by counting. Then the question arises “Do you believe there are as many stones as that?”, and the answer “I know there are – I’ve just counted them”. But here the “I know” could be dropped. If however, there are several ways of finding something out for sure, like counting, weighing, measuring the stack, then the statement “I know” can take the place of mentioning how I know.



whether it’s ‘I know’ – or how I know –

there will be no certainty –

there will be no ‘finding something out for sure’ –

any assertion we make – in any circumstance –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

what we use – what we operate with is –

uncertain propositions –

pretending ‘knowledge’ – as in certainty –

doesn’t change this fact –

all it does is load up the proposition –

with unnecessary and irrelevant baggage

and if the issue of ‘knowledge’ becomes the focus –

the actual proposition will be swamped –

in rhetorical rubbish –

and as result –

sabotaged


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Saturday, July 24, 2010

on certainty 563

563. One says, “I know that he is in pain” although one can produce no convincing grounds for this. – Is this the same as “I am sure that he…”? – No. “I am sure” tells you my subjective certainty. “I know” means that I who know it, and the person who doesn’t are separated by a difference in understanding. (Perhaps based on a difference in degree of experience.)

If I say “I know” in mathematics, then the justification for this is a proof.

If in these two cases instead of  “I know”, one says “you can rely on it” then the substantiation is of a different kind in each case.

And substantiation comes to an end



‘although one can produce no convincing grounds for this –‘

yes – the claim to know – if it means certainty – is empty and deceptive

‘subjective’ – or ‘objective’ – if the claim is certainty –

it is false and pretentious

the difference that separates you and the person who doesn’t claim to know –

is pretence – you’re pretentious – he isn’t

a ‘proof’ in mathematics – is a language game –

best understood as – poetry

‘you can rely on it’ –

whether a reference to a statement about pain –

or a statement in mathematics –

is just rhetoric

and rhetoric is only ‘substantiated’ – if you can call it that –

by rhetoric

‘And the substantiation comes to an end’? –

I wonder –

is there an end to bullshit?


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Thursday, July 22, 2010

on certainty 562

562. At any rate it is important to imagine a language in which our concept of ‘knowledge’ does not exist.



if by imagining a language –

in which our concept of knowledge does exist –

Wittgenstein means a language without certainty –

you don’t have to imagine anything 

it’s what we have


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Tuesday, July 20, 2010

on certainty 561


561. “I know” and “You can rely on it”. But one cannot always substitute the latter for the former.


‘I know’ –

is a claim to an authority –

the only authority –

is authorship –

beyond that –

any claim to authority –

is rhetorical

‘you can rely on it’ –

is a claim to an authority –

and like ‘I know’

or any other such claim –

it’s only value –

is rhetorical

so given that both assertions –

are rhetorical –

they amount to the same thing –

hot air


© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 560


560. And the concept of knowing is coupled with that of the language-game.



knowing is dealing in uncertainty

the language-game is the game of uncertainty


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 559


559. You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).

It is there – like our life.



and like life –

open to interpretation – to description –

that is to say – uncertain

and in the absence of interpretation – of description –

unknown
 

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

Monday, July 19, 2010

on certainty 558

558. We say we know that water boils and does not freeze under such-and-such circumstances. Is it conceivable that we are wrong? Wouldn’t a mistake topple all judgment with it? More: what could stand if that were to fall? Might someone discover something that made us say “it was a mistake”?

What may happen in the future, however water may behave in the future, – we know that up to now it has behaved thus in innumerable instances.

This fact is fused into the foundations of our language game.

        
                                                                                                                       
there are no mistakes –

only uncertainties

there is nothing to topple –

but pretence

what may happen in the future is unknown

and we don’t know –

that up to now water has behaved thus –

presumably the ‘basis’ of any such assertion –

is observation reports –

‘innumerable’ as these might be –

they do not add up to a certainty


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Sunday, July 18, 2010

on certainty 557


557. A court-martial may well have to decide whether it was reasonable in such and such a situation to have assumed this or that with confidence (even though wrongly)
.


an assumption is uncertain –

it may be described in any number of ways –

‘reasonable’ is one possible description –

and what reasonable amounts to –

will be open to question


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 556


556. One doesn’t say: he is in a position to believe that.

But one does say: “It is reasonable to assume that in this situation” (or “to believe that”).



all one needs to do is say – that

underwriting your assertion with –

‘it is reasonable to assume that in this situation” (or “to believe that’)’

is to claim or suggest a ground to your assertion –

which is unnecessary – irrelevant – and pretentious

say what you have to say – and be done with it –

it’ll  stands or fall in the marketplace –

of assent and dissent


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 555

19.4
555. We can know that water boils when it is put over a fire. How do we know? Experience has taught us. I say “I know that I had breakfast this morning”; experience hasn’t taught me that. One also says “I know that he is in pain”. The language-game is different every time, we are sure every time, and people will agree with us that we are in a position to know every time. And that is why the propositions of physics are found in text-books for everyone.

If someone says he knows something, it must be something that, by general consent, he is in a position to know.



‘water boils when it is put over fire’

‘I had breakfast this morning’

‘he is in pain’

straight out assertions

prefacing these assertions with ‘I know’ –

does what?

burdens them with an irrelevance –

turns what are simple elegant statements –

into problematics

the claim of knowledge is a claim of authority –

the only authority you have is your authorship –

and if that is the case – no need to assert it –

and that is all ‘I know’ as a claim to authority – amounts to-

an assertion of authorship –

if your idea is that you have some other authority for your assertion –

you are engaging in pretence and deception

forget the rhetoric –

and simply make your assertions –

say what you have to say – clearly and simply –

without any rhetorical baggage

you assertions will have their day –

in the marketplace of assent and dissent –

claiming to know –

in the end – will have no effect –

one way or the other –

people will either agree or disagree –

most likely you will have a better run –

if you avoid pomposity and pretence

the logical reality is –

that any proposition you put forward –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

when Wittgenstein says ‘we are sure every time’

he shows himself to be either a con artist –

or a fool

the reason that the propositions of physics are found in texts books –

is not because they are certain –

but rather because the text book is a convenient  media –

for introducing students to physics –

and that means to uncertainty

if you are waiting for general consent –

for your knowledge – or your position to know –

you may as well through the towel in –

and just accept that your ‘knowledge’ – is uncertain

and without any authority –

but the fact of your assertion


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Wednesday, July 14, 2010

on certainty 554

554. In its language-game it is not presumptuous. There it has no higher position than, simply the human language game. For there it has its restricted application.

But as soon as I say this sentence outside its context, it appears in a false light. For then it is as if I wanted to insist that there are things that I know.  God himself can’t say anything to me about them.



it’s language-game is presumption

it’s context is rhetoric –

in or out of a rhetorical context –

it is false

the point of rhetoric –

is deception


© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 553

553. It is queer: if I say without any special occasion, “I know” – for example, “I know that I am now sitting in a chair”, this statement seems to me to be unjustified and presumptuous. But if I make the same statement where there is some need for it, then although I am not a jot more certain of its truth, it seems to me to be perfectly justified and everyday.



some need for it?

what need would that be I wonder?

would it be a need to pretend you have an authority you don’t have –

in order to t deceive someone –

perhaps even yourself?

that seems to be the idea –

for you are ‘not a jot more certain of its truth’ –

and yet you are prepared to claim –

‘justification’

and who knows you might be right –

pretense and deception –

might just be ‘everyday’?


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 552


552. Do I know that I am now sitting in a chair? – Don’t I know it?! In the present circumstances no one is going to say that I know this; but no more will he say, for example, that I am conscious. Nor will one normally say this of the passers-by in the street.

But now, even if one doesn’t say it, does that make it untrue??



the claim to knowledge is a claim to an authority –

yes you are the author of your statement –

but that is as far as your authority goes

if your claim to authority –

is just that you are the author of your statement –

then it is irrelevant

if you are claiming an authority beyond authorship –

then the claim is false


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 551


551. And if one does answer this question, one must do so according to generally accepted axioms. This is how something of this sort may be known.
 


‘generally accepted axioms’ –

that is generally accepted self-evident truths –

a self-evident proposition –

is one that is not open to question –

is not open to doubt

in fact there is no such proposition –

and to talk of self-evident propositions –

is to misuse and corrupt the notion of proposition

a proposition is a proposal –

any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt

as for truth –

truth is not a immanent property of any proposition

the truth value of a proposition –

is ‘determined’ – by our behaviour towards it –

if we assent to it – it is true –

if we dissent from it – it is false


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Sunday, July 11, 2010

on certainty 550


 18.4
550. If someone believes something, we needn’t always be able to answer the question ‘why he believes it’; but if he knows something, then the question “how does he know?” must be capable of being answered. 



there can always be an answer –

is Wittgenstein suggesting any answer will qualify for ‘knowledge’?

if so – he’s right


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 549

549. It would be wrong to say that I can only say “I know that there is a chair there” when there is a chair there. Of course it isn’t true unless there is, but I have a right to say this if I am sure there is chair there, even if I am wrong.

[Pretensions are a mortgage which burdens a philosopher’s capacity to think.]



so you can make claims to knowledge – even when you are wrong –

you have a ‘right’ to be sure – even if you are wrong –

and here is a perfect example of where pretension has burdened a philosopher’s capacity to think


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 548

548. A child must learn the use of colour words before it can ask for the name of a colour.



to learn the use of colour words – is to learn to name colours –

if a child asks for the name of a colour –

it does so because – it doesn’t know what the appropriate usage is –

or it is uncertain – as to the appropriate usage


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Saturday, July 10, 2010

on certainty 547

547. On cannot yet say to a child who is just beginning to speak and use the words “red” and “blue”: “Come on, you know what this colour is called!”



yes – for a child to be able to deal with –

‘come on, you know what this colour is called!’ –

it must already have been inducted into –

the deception that is knowledge


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Thursday, July 08, 2010

on certainty 546

546. I should say “I know what this colour is called” if e.g. what is in question is shades of colour whose name not every-body knows.



all you need to say here is –

‘this colour is called …’

and your statement here –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

will be uncertain –

and this will be the case –

regardless of anyone else’s opinion –

on the matter –

or whether in fact there is any other opinion –

on the matter

prefacing your statement with –

‘I know’ –

if ‘I know’ is a claim to certainty –

is to corrupt your proposition –

and to be involved in –

logical deception


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 545

17.4
545.  “A child knows which colour is meant by the word “blue”. What he knows here is not at all simple.



a child can apply the word ‘blue’ –

and before learning to doubt –

before recognizing uncertainty –

the application is – without knowing

Wittgenstein says –

‘what he knows here is not at all simple’

if he has learnt to question

to deal with uncertainty –

yes there is complexity in this


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Tuesday, July 06, 2010

on certainty 544

544. Of course I may truthfully say “I know what this colour is called in English”, at the same time as I point (for example) to the colour of fresh blood. But - - -



what you can say is –

‘this colour is called  … in English’

and doing so –

is just an exercise in uncertainty –

for whatever you might say here –

is open to question –

open to doubt

pointing to the colour of fresh blood –

tells no one – anything –

effectively all that does is identify –

what is not said –

which is to say –

what is not known

as to the claim to knowledge –

any such claim is an assertion of an authority

the only actual authority –

is authorship –

and it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

to assert that that you assert

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority –

is false


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 543


543. A child can learn the names of people long before he can say in any form whatever: “I know this one’s name; I don’t know that one yet.”



yes – the deception of ‘I know’ – comes later –

as does ‘I don’t know’ –

the argument against this deception


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Saturday, July 03, 2010

on certainty 542


542. “I can’t describe this flower if I don’t know that this colour is called ‘red’.”



first up –

not every functional and useful description of ‘this flower’

will refer to its colour

secondly –

in my language community – yes the colour is called ‘red’ –

in other language communities – or in different contexts within a language community –

it may have – and will have –

different names

the only knowledge here –

is the knowledge of usage –

of practise –

and this – as is obvious –

is an uncertain matter

finally –

outside of any circumstance of use –

the colour has no name –

it is an unknown


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 541

541. “He only knows what this person is called – not yet what that person is called”. That is something one cannot, strictly speaking, say of someone who simply has not yet got the concept of people’s having names.



to say ‘he knows what this person is called’ –

is to say that in the act of naming this person –

there is knowledge involved

now if we are just talking about performing the act of naming –

there is no need to preface this with ‘he knows’

if he performs the act – he performs the act –

end of story

the claim of knowledge – as i.e. the claim of certainty –

is irrelevant –

and if it is taken seriously –

it means he has an authority for the act of naming

the only authority is authorship –

yes – he is the author of his act –

and it is irrelevant to state this

beyond authorship any claim to authority –

makes no sense –

it is unnecessary rhetorical baggage

does the person have the concept of naming

when he names?

if he doesn’t it is because he has not applied –

the description ‘naming’

to his action

if he applies this description –

the answer is –

yes


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 540


540. A dog might learn to run to N at the call “N”, and to “M” at the call “M” – but would it mean that he knows what these people are called?



is the dog capable of describing its actions?

is it capable of deluding itself?

I think not –

and perhaps for this reason –

the dog is regarded –

as man’s best friend


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 539

539. Does it go for knowing as it does for collecting?



yes – knowing could well be described as –

the collection of uncertain descriptions


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Thursday, July 01, 2010

on certainty 538

538. The child, I should like to say, learns to react in such-and-such a way, and in so reacting it doesn’t so far know anything. Knowing only begins at a latter level.



to know  – is to describe –

to use description

any description –

any use of any description –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 537


537. Can one say of one who hasn’t this concept that he knows what such-and such is called? 



‘one who hasn’t got this concept’ –

comes down to –

one who doesn’t use this description –

does not apply it to his actions

can we say of such a one –

that he doesn’t know –

what such and such is called?

if that’s what ‘know’ –

amounts to for you –

yes you can say that

and in that case –

you would have to get used to the fact –

that someone who doesn’t know

nevertheless –

makes the call


© greg t. charlton. 2010.