on certainty 536

536. Naturally, the child who is just learning to speak has not yet got the concept is called at all

‘the concept is called’ –

is an account or explanation of an action

that is to say –

it is a description of an action –

the action of naming

and yes – its application requires –

a degree of philosophic and linguistic sophistication –

that a child learning to speak –

does not have

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 535

535. The child knows what something is called if he can reply correctly to the question “what is that called?”

who determines what is correct?

someone other than the child

and what is their authority based on?

one way or another –

nothing other than –

it’s assertion

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 534

 534. But is it wrong to say: “A child that has mastered a language-game must know certain things”?

If instead of that one said “must be able to do certain things”, that would be a pleonasm, yet this is just what I want to counter the first sentence with. –But: “a child acquires knowledge of natural history”. That presupposes that it can ask what such and such a plant is called.

yes – so called knowledge presupposes questioning –

presupposes doubt

and the result of any questioning –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 533

533. Well, if it was correct to describe this state out of context, then it was just as correct to utter the words “that’s a tree” out of context. 

when Moore sat in front of a tree  and said ‘I know that’s a tree’ –

he was not speaking – out of context

‘his state at the time’ – was his context –

and by prefacing – ‘that’s a tree’ –

with ‘I know’ –

he makes clear that his state was –

delusional

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 532

532. So when Moore sat in front of tree and said “I know that that is a tree”, he was simply stating the truth about his state at the time.

[I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again: now her spectacles now her keys.]

if he was claiming to know – and being genuine – he was deluded –

if not deluded – and claiming to know – he was involved in deception

[doing philosophy is not mislaying what you have found and looking for it –

it is not knowing what you will find when you look]

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 531

531. But now isn’t it correct to describe my present state as follows: I know what this colour is called in English? And if that is correct, why then should I not describe my state with the corresponding words “I know etc.”?

 ‘I know’ –

adds nothing to the assertion

it might give the impression that you have an authority –

above and beyond authorship –

but that is just pretence

and logically irrelevant

the fact is you are just another language user –

you are the author of your statements –

of your usage –

that’s it

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 530

530. I may tell someone “this colour is called ‘red’ in English” (when for example I am teaching him English). In this case I should not say “I know that this colour…” – I would perhaps say that if I had just now learned it, or by contrast with another colour whose English name I am not familiar with.

if you are teaching English – all you need to say is –

‘this colour is called ‘red’ in English –

and you should add the qualification –

‘it really always depends on circumstance and context –

but you will get the hang of this –

as you get more familiar with using the language’

if you have just learnt it –

and you think telling someone this is relevant –

what you say is –‘I have just learnt it’

as to contrasting with another colour –

whose English name you are not familiar with –

if you want to do this – what you say is –

‘I am familiar with what this colour is called in English –

but not with what that colour is called’

‘I know’ – has no role to play –

it is irrelevant

greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 529

529. And one child, for example, will say, of another or of himself, that he already knows what such-and such is called.

children learn from adults –

they learn language use –

and they learn language deception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 528

528. And in spite of this: if someone asked me what the colour was called in German and I tell him, and now he asks me “are you sure?” – then I shall reply “I know it is; German is my mother tongue”. 

what the colour is called – is a question of usage –

and that is always an uncertain matter –

whether you describe that uncertain usage as ‘German’ or not –

is neither here nor there

and claiming certainty on the matter –

is just pretense –

German or not

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 527

527. An Englishman who calls this colour “red” is not ‘sure it is called “red” in English’.

A child who mastered the use of the word is not ‘sure that in his language this colour is called…’. Nor can one say of him that when he is learning to speak he learns that the colour is called that in English; nor yet: he knows this when he has learnt the use of the word.

that he is not sure it is called ‘red’ in English –

is really just to say he is not sure what this colour is called – in his language –

which is to say he recognizes that what a colour is called is an uncertain matter –

it is a question of context and within that context a  question of usage –

and in most cases a question of what is customary –

and of course there is no certainty to any of this

and yes – if a child has ‘mastered’ – a use of a word –

then that child recognizes the uncertainty of  its usage

‘English’ is a description of language use –

whether or not you are aware that your language is called ‘English’ –

is irrelevant to whether you can use it or not

‘knowing’ that your language is called ‘English’ –

is just about being able to use –

another uncertain description

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 526

16.4

526. If someone were to look at an English pillar-box and say “I am sure that it’s red”, we should have to suppose that he was colour-blind, or believe he had no mastery of English and knew the correct name for the colour in some other language.

If neither was the case we should not quite understand him.

what this example shows is just how irrelevant and frankly ridiculous the claim of surety  – is

we do understand him – because our language and our way of life is saturated with this rhetoric –

we have to deal with this rubbish all the time –and often when it is not so obviously vacuous

and if we are dealing effectively with it – we simply cancel it out of our considerations –

and indeed try and get others to see what a waste of breath it is

greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 525

525. What, then, does the case look like where someone really has a different relationship to the names of colours, for example, from us? Where, that is, there persists a slight doubt or a possibility of doubt in their use.

what does this look like?

it looks like a state of affairs –

where presumption and prejudice –

are defeated by difference

and where doubt makes obvious –

that the ground of our language use –

is uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 524

15.4

524. It is essential for our language-games (‘ordering and obeying’ for example) that no doubt appears at certain points, or is it enough if there is the feeling of being sure, admittedly with a slight breath of doubt?

That is, it is enough if I do not, as I do now, call something ‘black’, ‘green’, ‘red’, straight off, without any doubt at all interposing itself – but do I instead say “I am sure that that is red”, as one may say “I am sure that he will come today” (in other words with the ‘feeling of being sure’)?

The accompanying feeling is of course a matter of indifference to us, and equally we have no need to bother about the words “I am sure that” either. – What is important is whether they go with a difference in the practice of the language.

One might ask whether a person who spoke like this would always say “I am sure” on occasions where (for example) there is sureness in the reports we make (in an experiment, for example, we look through a tube and report the colour we see through it). If he does, our immediate inclination will be to check what he says. But if he proves to be perfectly reliable, one will say that his way of talking is merely a bit perverse, and does not affect the issue. One might for example suppose that he has read sceptical philosophers, become convinced that one can know nothing, and that is why he has adopted this way of speaking. Once we are used to it, it does not infect practice.

‘a slight breath of doubt’ –

there goes the neighbourhood

saying ‘I am sure’  –

is rhetoric –

the ‘feeling of being sure ‘ –

is logically irrelevant

any ‘report’ is open to question –

open to doubt

and saying someone is ‘reliable’ –

is just pretense

any observation –

as with any practice –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain –

and it is this uncertainty –

that is the source –

of the vitality –

and the creativity –

at the heart of any genuine –

language-game

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 523

523. And indeed no one misses doubt here; no one is surprised that we do not merely surmise the meaning of our words.

whether anyone misses doubt here or not – is not the issue

‘knowing the meaning of a word’ – is always a question of use

there may be convention here – but there is no certainty

and therefore any ‘knowledge’ here – is surmise

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 522

522. We say: if a child has mastered language – and hence its application – it must know the meaning of words. It must, for example, be able to attach the name of its colour to a white, black, red or blue object without the occurrence of any doubt.

there is no ‘mastering ‘ a language – there is just its use – effective or not

‘to know the meaning of words’ – is to be able use words according to an accepted practise

what counts as accepted practise – while it might be stable in certain contexts –

is never fixed – it is always at base – uncertain

you can attach a name – with the occurrence of doubt –

the world doesn’t end

and if you don’t doubt –

this doesn’t mean that  the use is beyond doubt –

only that you have not questioned what you are doing

children in my experience – if they are given a go –

are the best questioners –

the best doubters

greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 521

14.4

521. Moore’s mistake lies in this – countering the assertion that one cannot know that, by saying “I do know it”.

knowledge is uncertain –

if you understand this –

then there are no mistakes –

there is no right or wrong –

all you have is proposals –

proposals for dealing with the unknown

the question is one of circumstance –

whether a proposal works or not –

and here there is no certainty

we make decisions –

and our decisions – like our proposals –

are open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 520

13.4.

520. Moore has every right to say he knows there’s a tree there in front of him. Naturally he may be wrong (For it is not the same as the utterance “I believe there is a tree there.”) But whether he is right or wrong in this case is of no philosophical importance. If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know a thing, he can’t do it by assuring them that he knows this and that. For one need not believe him. If his opponents had asserted that one could not believe this and that, then he could have replied: “I believe it.”

even when you use rhetorical tricks –

like prefacing an assertion with ‘I know’ or ‘I believe’ –

the value of the assertion –

with or without this baggage –

is determined by assent or dissent 

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 519

519. Admittedly if you are obeying the order “Bring me a book”, you may have to check whether the thing you see over there really is a book, but then you do at least know what people mean by the term “book”; and if you don’t you can look it up, – but then you must know what some other word means. And the fact that a word means such-and-such, is used in such-and-such a way, is in turn an empirical fact, like the fact that what you see over there is a book.

Therefore, in order for you to be able to carry out an order there must be some empirical fact about which you are not in doubt. But doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt.

But since a language-game is something that consists in the re-current procedures of the game in time, it seems impossible to say in any individual case that such-and-such must be beyond doubt if there is to be a language-game – though it is right enough to say that as a rule some empirical judgment or other must be beyond doubt.

an ‘empirical fact’ –

is always open to question –

is therefore uncertain

you don’t need certainty –

to carry out an order

doubt is the rational response –

to any claim of certainty

any rule you make –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 518

518. Could I imagine observing this in another person?

yes you could imagine this

greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 517

517. But might it not be possible for something to happen that threw me entirely off the rails? Evidence that made the most certain thing unacceptable to me? Or at any rate made me throw over my most fundamental judgments? (Whether rightly or wrongly is beside the point.)

yes – this is always possible –

but only if your life ‘runs on rails’ –

and you hold to ‘certain’ things –

and regard your judgments as ‘fundamental’

if you don’t live in such a conceptual straight-jacket –

and don’t follow blindly rules made by others –

if you aware of the uncertainties of existence –

and that the value of any judgment –

is determined by the circumstances

in which it is made –

you will not be thrown ‘entirely’ –

by anything that happens

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 516

516. If something happened (such as someone telling me something) calculated to make me doubtful of my own name, there would certainly also be something that made the grounds of these doubts themselves seem doubtful, and I could therefore decide to retain my old belief.

yes –

 you could decide to retain your old belief –

and that decision –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

 © greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 515

515. If my name is not L. W., how can I rely on what is meant by “true” and “false”?

what is ‘true’ is what you give your assent to –

for whatever reason you have

what is ‘false’ is what you dissent from –

for whatever reason you have

there is nothing to rely on –

I expect that I will continue for some time –

to be able to decide –

what I will proceed with –

and what I will not proceed with

but there is no certainty in this

and the expectation –

natural as it might be –

is in fact groundless

greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 514

514. This statement appeared to me fundamental; if it is false, what are true or false any more?!

if by ‘fundamental’ is meant –

that which is beyond question –

beyond doubt –

there is no fundamental

any statement is open to question –

open to doubt –

the ground of all propositional action –

is uncertainty

‘true’ is what you assent to –

for whatever reason

‘false’ is what you dissent from –

for whatever reason

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 513

513. What if something really unheard-of happened? – If I, say, saw houses gradually turning into steam without any obvious cause, if the cattle in the fields stood on their heads and laughed and spoke comprehensible words: if trees gradually changed into men and men into trees. Now was I right when I said before all these things happened “I know that that’s a house” etc., or simply “that’s a house” etc.?

forget about claiming to know –

that is just pretense and rhetoric

if ‘that’s a house’ – worked for you –

prior to the strange occurrences –

then you were right to use it –

however this is not to say that –

‘that’s a house’ –

was the only description –

you could have used –

there are any number of ways –

of describing any state of affairs

as to why you use  –

the description that you do?

any answer given –

will in any final sense be –

speculation

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 512

12.4

512. Isn’t the question this: “What if you had to change your opinion even on these most fundamental things?” And to that the answer seems to be: “You don’t have to change it. That is just what their being ‘fundamental’ is.”

if ‘fundamental’ is to mean –

beyond question –

beyond doubt

then what you are dealing with –

is not opinion

but rather prejudice –

and stupidity

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 511

511. And yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to a sureness, not to a knowing.

But don’t I take hold of a thing’s name like that, too?

well here we have a description of ‘this direct taking-hold’ –

as a ‘sureness’

this description –

like a thing’s name –

is open to question –

open to doubt

greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 510

510. If I say “Of course I know that that’s a towel” I am making an utterance. I have no thought of verification. For me it is an immediate utterance.

I don’t think of past or future. (And of course it is the same for Moore, too)

It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts.

if by ‘utterance’  Wittgenstein means – a use of language without any claim to knowledge –

then ‘Of course I know that that’s a towel’ – is not an utterance –

either that or ‘Of course I know’ – the claim of knowledge – is irrelevant to the utterance

if your ‘utterance’ is made – without a claim to knowledge –

it is nevertheless open to question – open to doubt –

even if you’re not

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 509

509.  I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say “can trust something”)

Wittgenstein didn’t say can trust –

because he realizes –

anything you trust is open to question –

open to doubt

and so his fallback position –

is pretense –

pretend you can trust –

and he tells us the language-game –

is only possible –

if we have this pretense

at this point –

you really have to question –

Wittgenstein’s philosophical integrity –

it looks like he is saying –

hey – we’ll run with the lie

the reality is –

you have the language-game –

language use –

with or without pretense

and this is just to say –

you can be honest in your dealings –

or false

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 508

508. What can I rely on?

nothing

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 507

507. “If this deceives me, what does ‘deceive’ mean anymore? 

authority is deception

you are deceived when you accept a claim of authority –

and you deceive when you claim authority

greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 506

506. “If my memory deceives me here it can deceive me anywhere.”

If I don’t know that, how do I know if my words mean what I believe they mean?

memory is uncertain

there is no deception in uncertainty

do I know if my words mean what I believe they mean?

are my beliefs certain?

no

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 505

505. It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something.

‘nature’ is just one of the many names we have for the unknown

knowledge is our response to the unknown

we make knowledge – we put up proposals – propositions –

to negotiate the unknown

any proposal we put forward is uncertain –

and any description is open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 504

504. Whether I know something depends on whether the evidence backs me up or contradicts me. For to say one knows one has a pain means nothing.

‘evidence’ is nothing in a claim to know –

unless the claim to know –

is presupposed –

in the claim to evidence –

and the claim to know –

as a claim to an authority –

beyond authorship –

has no logical value –

it’s only value is rhetorical –

the point of evidence –

is persuasion –

‘evidence’ –

is rhetoric

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 503

503. I look at an object and say “That is a tree”, or “I know that that’s a tree”. –Now if I go nearer and it turns out that it isn’t, I may say “It wasn’t a tree after all” or alternatively I say “It was a tree but now it isn’t any longer”. But if all the others contradicted me, and said it never had been a tree, and if all the other evidences spoke against me – what good would it be to stick to my “I know”?

the ‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority for a proposition –

the only authority is authorship

therefore – ‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of …’

authorship does not guarantee a proposition –

and if you are the author of your proposition –

it is irrelevant and unnecessary to assert it

if you claim an authority – other than authorship –

your claim is false –

if it has rhetorical – persuasive effect –

it is an effect based on deception

so the real question is  – what good is ‘I know’ –

in any circumstance – in any usage?

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

whether or not  anyone agrees with it –

and prefacing it with ‘I know’ –

doesn’t alter this logical reality –

the reality of uncertainty

all it does is introduce an irrelevancy –

or a deception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 502

502. Could one say “I know the position of my hands with my eyes closed”, if the position I gave always or mostly contradicted the evidence of other people?

yes – you could make the claim –

but it would be an empty  rhetorical claim –

as with any other claim to know

as to the position of your hands with your eyes closed –

an uncertain matter –

and in fact as uncertain as –

any statement about the position of your hands –

with your eyes open

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 501

501. Am I getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it.

logic is description –

description of language use

there is no definite description

of any language use –

of any language practise

any description – any logic –

is limited – is uncertain

in the absence of –

description –

any practice is –

unknown

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 500

500. But it would also strike me as nonsense to say “I know that the law of induction is true”.

Imagine such a statement in a court of law! It would be more correct to say “I believe in the law of…” where ‘believe’ has nothing to do with surmising.

to say you know anything –

is nonsense –

but you can say –

‘the law of induction is true’ –

for this is just to give your assent to it –

for whatever reason

to say you ‘believe’ or that you ‘surmise’ –

is to recognize –

that the proposition in question –

and any response you have to it –

i.e. ‘true’ or ‘false’ –

is uncertain

these terms ‘believe’ and ‘surmise’ –

amount to the same thing –

and they really only have function –

in a context –

where you are responding to –

or battling –

claims of certainty

where uncertainty is understood –

they are irrelevant

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 499

499. I might also put it like this: the ‘law of induction’ can no more be grounded than certain particular propositions concerning the material of experience.

yes

the law of induction is–

in certain contexts –

a customary practise –

or a statement of –

a customary practice

any practice is an exercise in uncertainty –

the ground of any practice –

is the unknown

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 498

11.4

498. The queer thing is that even though I find it quite correct for someone to say “Rubbish!” and so brush aside the attempt to confuse him with doubts at bedrock, – nevertheless I hold it to be incorrect if he seeks to defend himself (using, e.g., the words “I know”).

‘I know ‘ is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

if you claim an authority beyond authorship –

your claim is false

and to claim authorship of your statements –

is unnecessary and irrelevant

‘I know is no defence against anything –

it’s only values is rhetorical –

logically speaking –

it is rubbish

© greg t. charlton. 2010.