on certainty 442

442. For may it not happen that I imagine myself to know something?

yes – that’s exactly what happens

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 441

441. In a court of law the assurance “I know…” on the part of a witness could convince no one. It must be shown that he was in a position to know.

Even the assurance “I know that that’s a hand”, said while someone looked at his own hand, could not be credible unless we knew the circumstances in which it was said. And if we do know them, it seems to be an assurance that the person speaking is normal in this respect.

the assurance ‘I know’ – is a claim to authority –

and it really should convince no-one

any ‘knowledge’ you have of circumstance –

will be uncertain

I think it probably is normal –

to claim to know –

but if so –

it’s normal to be pretentious –

and false

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 440

440. There is something universal here; not just something personal.

‘I know that behind this door is a landing and the stairway down to the ground floor’

the only value that the claim to know has – is rhetorical

breaking it up into ‘personal’ and ‘universal’ –

is really just about trying to establish –

different kinds of authority for the statement

the only actual authority the statement has –

is the authority of its authorship –

beyond that –

any claim to authority –

or any claim about the basis of some supposed authority –

is just pretense and deception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 439

439. Even the statement “I know that behind this door is a landing and the stairway down to the ground floor” only sounds so convincing because everyone takes it for granted that I know it.

that is to say no-one questions it

if that is the case –

on this view –

knowledge –

is what is not questioned –

and therefore

knowledge is –

ignorance

                                                                                                                            

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 438

438. It would not be enough to assure someone that I know what is going on in a certain place – without giving him grounds that satisfy him that I am in a position to know.

‘I know’ –

is a claim to an authority for an assertion –

the only authority is authorship

the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant

if the claim of authority –

is other than the claim of authorship –

it is logically false

such claims may have rhetorical effect –

however it is an effect –

based on deception

what you have with a statement of grounds –

is really no more than restatements –

of the original rhetorical claim –

more of the same

if you satisfy someone that you are in a position to know –

you’ve deceived them

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 437

437. I am inclined to say: “That cannot be false.” That is interesting; but what consequences has it?

truth and falsity –

are a matter of assent and dissent

any proposition –

can be assented to –

or dissented from

to say  a proposition –

cannot be false –

is stupid –

such a statement –

is ignorant in the extreme –

and characteristic of –

a bigot

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 436

436. Is God bound by our knowledge? Are a lot of our statements incapable of falsehood? For that is what we want to say.

our knowledge is uncertain –

therefore –

nothing is bound by it

the truth or falsity of a proposition –

is a matter of assent or dissent

any statement –

any proposition –

can be assented to –

or dissented from

and any act of assent or dissent –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 435

27.3.

435. One is often bewitched by a word. For example, by the word “know”.

the word ‘know’ –

is the natural home of pretense

take pretense out of ‘know’ –

and what you have is an empty shell

if you are ‘bewitched’ by pretense –

you are a fool

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 434

434. Now does experience teach us that in such-and-such circumstance people know this and that? Certainly, experience shews us that normally after so-and–so many days a man can find his way about a house he has been living in. Or even: experience teaches us that after such-and such a period of training a man’s judgment is to be trusted. He must, experience tells us, have learnt for so long in order to be able to make a correct prediction. But  –  –  –

experience without interpretation is empty

interpretation gives experience form and content

interpretation is uncertain –

experience is uncertain

what experience teaches us is uncertainty

any ‘knowledge’ we have –

is uncertain

you may interpret the data of experience in a certain way –

all to the good if it suits your purpose –

but there is no certainty here

does experience teach us trust?

experience teaches us the validity of different interpretations

a correct prediction – is what?

a projection based on accepted premises –

that delivers the goods –

or that is interpreted as doing so

yes we take action –

yes we make predictions –

but any action taken –

any prediction made –

presupposes –

uncertain premises

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 433

433.  So if I say to someone “I know that that’s a tree”, it is as if I told him “that’s a tree; you can absolutely rely on it; there is no doubt about it”. And a philosopher could only use the statement to show that this form of speech is actually used. But if his use of it is not to be merely an observation about English grammar, he must give the circumstances in which it functions.

such a statement will function –

in whatever circumstance –

pretense and deception –

have a chance

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 432

432. The utterance “I know…” can only have its meaning in connection with other evidence of my ‘knowing’.

to say ‘I know’ is to say –

‘I have an authority for this proposition’ –

the only authority you have –

is your authorship

and the only evidence you have –

of your authorship –

is your assertion

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 431

26.3.51

431. “I know that this room is on the second floor, that behind the door a short landing leads to the stairs, and so on.” One could imagine cases where I should come out with this, but they would be extremely rare. But on the other hand I shew this knowledge day in, day out by my actions and also in what I say.

Now what does someone gather from these actions and words of mine? Won’t it just be that I am sure of my ground? – From the fact that I have been living here for many weeks and have gone up and down the stairs every day he will gather that I know where my room is situated. – I shall give him the assurance “I know” when he does not already know things which would have compelled the conclusion that I knew.

  

                                                                                                                               

‘I show this knowledge’ –

is to say –

this is my interpretation of what I do

and my interpretation –

like any interpretation –

is uncertain

how do I know that it is how others interpret what I do?

I don’t

‘what does someone gather from these actions and words of mine?’

I don’t know

yes – I make certain assumptions here –

but that is all they are – assumptions

and my assumptions are uncertain

I can ask others what they gather from my actions –

and if I get an answer to this question –

I will have to interpret it

can I know that my interpretation is correct?

no

what I can know –

is that my interpretation –

is open to question –

open to doubt

if I give the assurance ‘I know’ –

what I am doing is claiming an authority –

for my assertion

the only authority is authorship –

and that I am the author of my assertion –

does not guarantee the assertion –

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority –

is rhetorical

does rhetoric show that I am sure of myself?

no –

but it does show –

that I am a fraud

nobody is compelled –

to any conclusion

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 430

430. I meet someone from Mars and he asks me “How many toes have human beings got? – I say “Ten. I’ll shew you”, and take my shoes off. Suppose he was surprised that I knew with such certainty, although I hadn’t looked at my toes – ought I to say: “We humans know how many toes we have whether we can see them or not”?

in expressing surprise here the Martian shows he has a better grasp of epistemology than Wittgenstein –

what Wittgenstein ought to say to the Martian is –

‘we humans pretend knowledge – pretend certainty – we do this when we don’t face reality – when we don’t deal with reality – if you want to understand human beings you need to understand pretence and deception’

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 429

23.3.51

429.  What reason have I, now, when I cannot see my toes, to assume that I have five toes on each foot?

Is it right to say that my reason is that previous experience has always taught me so? Am I more certain of previous experience than that I have ten toes?

That previous experience may very well be the cause of my present certitude; but is it its ground?

the assumption of five toes on each foot –

is like any assumption –

open to question –

open to doubt

what reason do I have for making the assumption?

who’s to say?

likely you find the assumption appropriate –

for a whole lot of reasons

if you think that previous experience has taught you so –

that may well be your ‘reason’

if you are certain about this assumption –

all that means is that you haven’t thought about it –

you are on this matter operating in ignorance

and if by ‘ground’ here  is meant certainty –

there is no ground

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 428

428. For suppose a person of normal behaviour assured us that he only believed his name was such-and-such, he believed he recognized the people he regularly lived with, he believed that he had hands and feet when he didn’t actually see them, and so on. Can we shew him it is not so far from the things he does (and says)?

by saying he believes –

rather than –

he knows with certainty –

he recognizes –

the uncertainty –

of what he does –

and the uncertainty –

of what he says

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 427

22.3.

427. We need to show that even if we never use the words “I know…”, his conduct exhibits the thing we are concerned with.

you can interpret his behaviour –

any way you like

there is no bar –

to a deluded interpretation

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 426

21.3.51

426. But how can we show someone that we know truths, not only about sense data but also about things? For after all it can’t be enough for someone to assure us that he knows.

Well, what must our starting point be if we are to show this?

any claim to know is a claim to an authority for an assertion –

the only authority –

is authorship –

the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant

so logically speaking –

there is no basis –

to the claim to know

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority for a proposition –

is rhetorical

and logically speaking –

deceptive

the claim to know sense data –

is rhetorical

the claim to know ‘about things’ –

is rhetorical

the claim to know –

is rhetorical

the only showing is assertion –

your showing can be logical –

or rhetorical

if logical –

it is non-rhetorical –

and if non-rhetorical –

it comes without the claim to know –

or any other –

assurance –

and is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 425

425. It would not be surmise and I might tell it to someone else with complete certainty, as something there is no doubt about. But does that mean that it is unconditionally the truth? May not the thing I recognize with complete certainty as the tree that I have seen here my whole life long – may not this be disclosed as something different? May it not confound me?

And nevertheless it was right, in the circumstances that give this sentence meaning, to say “I know (I do not surmise) that’s the tree”. To say that in strict truth I only believe it, would be wrong. It would be completely misleading to say: “I believe my name is L. W.” And this too is right: I cannot be making a mistake about it. But that does not mean that I am infallible about it.

‘that’s the tree’ – is all that is required –

‘my name is …’ – is all that is required

if you preface these assertions with ‘I know’ or ‘I believe’ – etc. –

all you do is introduce irrelevancies – and create obfuscation

there just is no need –  whatever the circumstances

claims to knowledge – claims to certainty –

are claims of authority

the only logical authority you have – is authorship –

that’s it – that’s enough –

beyond that any claim to authority –

is nothing more than rhetoric

any proposition you put forward is a proposal –

and is therefore – logically speaking – uncertain

but this is no bar to use –

in fact uncertainty is the ground of use –

whether or not your proposal functions as you expect –

you can only wait and see

                                                                                                                                whatever the case –

you make assessments – you make decisions –

you make a call

Wittgenstein says –

‘I cannot possibly be making a mistake. But that does not mean that I am infallible about it’

this is just to say that being certain – is not –

being certain

look either you are – or you aren’t

the reality is –

that any proposition is uncertain –

in an uncertain world –

there are no mistakes

what we have is –

different conceptions –

different descriptions –

different proposals

and furthermore –

if you hold with certainty –

if you think your propositions are certain –

then there’s no space – for a mistake

point being –

the notion of the mistake –

has no role to play here –

it is philosophically useless

it is irrelevant –

to whatever position –

you take

it’s not in the picture

p.s.

perhaps Wittgenstein was trying to find a way –

of maintaining certainty –

and at the same time recognizing the skeptical position –

and the idea of the mistake –

became his compromise –

his third way

the fact is – it doesn’t work

and to even try it on –

suggests to me that Wittgenstein –

who is no fool –

and is as clever as a fox –

has simply lost –

his integrity –

or – which amounts to the same thing –

is just playing a game –

a language game –

of deception

why?

because he can –

and because it is what he thinks –

philosophy – and life –

amounts to

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 424

424. I say “I know p” either to assure people that I, too, know the truth p, or simply as an emphasis of |-p. One says, too, “I don’t believe I know it”. And one might also put it like this (for example) “That’s a tree. And that’s not just surmise.”

But what about this: “If I were to tell someone that that was a tree, that wouldn’t be just surmise.”  Isn’t this what Moore was trying to say?

yes – it could well be –

but the point is this –

stating that a proposition is not a surmise –

doesn’t make it any less a surmise

I think Moore wanted certainty –

and in the end came to the view –

that all he had to do was assert it –

and he managed to con a number of other idiots –

into sharing his delusion

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 423

423. Then why don’t I simply say with Moore “I know that I am in England”? Saying this is meaningful in particular circumstances, which I can imagine. But when I utter the sentence outside these circumstances, as an example to show that I know truths of this kind with certainty, then it strikes me as fishy. – Ought it to?

I am in England’ – may be meaningful in particular circumstances’ –

‘I know I am in England’ is not

to preface any statement with ‘I know’ –

is to claim an authority for that statement

the only authority is authorship –

and it is redundant and irrelevant –

to assert authorship of your statement

any claim to authority – beyond authorship –

in or out – of a particular circumstance –

is false and deceptive

the only value any such claim has –

is rhetorical

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 422

422.  So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism.

Here I am being thwarted by a kind of Weltanschauung.

a Weltanschauung –

a world view –

is in the end –

only a proposal –

a proposition –

and like any proposition –

any proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

you will only feel ‘thwarted’ –

if you have fallen for

the deception –

the delusion –

of certainty

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 421

421. I am in England. Everything around me tells me so; wherever and however I let my thoughts turn, they confirm this for me at once. – But might I not be shaken if things such as I don’t dream of at present were to happen?

yes – you would be shaken – anyone would be –

and it would be clear that all the bolstering you had given your propositions –

                                                                                                                              

your assertions –

with claims to knowledge – claims to certainty –

has come to nothing –

such claims might have given you a sense of security –

of foundation –

but ‘if such things as I don’t dream of at present were to happen’

those claims would be seen for what they really are –

illusory –

and what you are left with –

is what you started with –

uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 420

420. Even a proposition like this one, that I am now living in England, has these two sides: it is not a mistake – but on the other hand, what do I know of England? Can’t my judgment go all to pieces?

Would it not be possible that people came into my room and all declared the opposite? – even gave me ‘proofs’ of it, so that I suddenly stood there like a madman alone among people who all were normal, or a normal person alone among madmen? Might I not then suffer doubts about what at present seems at the furthest from remove from doubt?

the ground of any judgment – is uncertainty

and whether a judgment does or does not ‘go all to pieces’ –

will depend on circumstances

in the event of the madman scenario –

if you understand that all judgments are uncertain –

then you will see that you are all in the same boat

regardless of numbers –

and regardless of so called ‘proofs’

in the event of conflict –

what wins the day will be what people assent to

and of course –

you can always go it alone

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 419

419. If I say “I have never been in Asia Minor”, where do I get this knowledge from? I have not worked it out, no one told me; my memory tells me. – So I can’t be wrong about it? Is there a truth here that I know? – I cannot depart from this judgment without toppling all other judgments with it.

‘I have never been in Asia Minor’

what you have here is an assertion –

not knowledge –

and the further assertion –

that ‘my memory tells me’

Wittgenstein goes from this to saying –

‘so I can’t be wrong’ –

to say this – is to say – ‘I am certain’

memory is not certain –

his statement is neither –

right or wrong –

it is uncertain –

it is open to question –

open to doubt

he then says –

‘I cannot depart from this judgment without toppling all other judgments with it’

yes – if he regards the ground of judgment to be – certain

the reason for judgment is uncertainty –

it is decision in the face of uncertainty

and any judgment made – will be uncertain –

hopefully useful –

but nevertheless uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 418

418. Is my understanding only blindness to my own lack of understanding? It often seems to me.

to understand –

is to recognize –

and to deal with –

uncertainty

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 417

21.3

417. “I know that for the last month I have had a bath everyday.” What am I remembering? Each day and the bath each morning? No. I know that I bathed each day and I do not derive that from some other immediate datum. Similarly I say “I felt a pain in my arm” without this locality coming into my consciousness in any other way (such as by means of an image).

the assertion – ‘for the last month I have had a bath every day’ –

is just that – an assertion –

it is open to question – open to doubt –

open to revision

Wittgenstein prefaces this assertion with ‘I know’ –

in so doing he corrupts the assertion –

‘I know that for the last month I have gad a bath every day’

is the attempt to render the proposition –

beyond question – beyond doubt

what we have here –

is propositional vandalism

‘I felt a pain in my arm’

is an assertion – like any other assertion –

open to question – open to doubt –

open to revision

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 416

416. And have we an example of this in, say, the proposition that I have been living in this room for weeks past, that my memory does not deceive me in this?

–        “certain beyond all reasonable doubt” –

yes – you can choose any proposition –

and make that a foundation for your thinking –

for practical purposes this might be a useful thing to do –

but only if you recognize –

that your thinking is not based on certainty –

that in fact it’s ground is uncertainty

another way of putting it might be to say –

don’t take yourself –or your thoughts –

too seriously

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 415

415. And in fact, isn’t the use of the word “know” as a pre-eminently philosophical word altogether wrong? If “know” has this interest, why not “being certain”? Apparently because it would be too subjective. But isn’t “know” just as subjective? Isn’t one simply misled by the grammatical peculiarity that “p” follows from “I know p”?

“I believe I know” would not need to express a lesser degree of certainty. – True, but one isn’t trying to express even the greatest subjective certainty, but rather that certain propositions seem to underlie all questions and all thinking.

a proposition – is a proposal –

a proposal is uncertain

it is just this uncertainty –

that is the ground of  –

all thinking and questioning

any proposition put forward –

as underlying –

all questions and thinking –

will itself be open to question –

open to doubt –

will be uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 414

414. But on the other hand: how do I know that is my hand? Do I even here know exactly what it means to say it is my hand? – When I say “how do I know?” I do not mean that I have the least doubt of it. What we have here is a foundation for all my action. But it seems to me that it is wrongly expressed by the words “I know”.

‘I know’ –

as the foundation of all my action –

but wrongly expressed by ‘I know’

so the idea is – this foundation –

whatever it is –

is unexpressed

this is mysticism –

not logic

perhaps Wittgenstein recognizes

that any proposal he might put forward –

for a foundation –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain –

and this is just what he doesn’t want –

despite being logically compelled –

to this conclusion –

so he plays the mystical hand

we can only see this as –

pathetic

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 413

413. For suppose you were guiding a blind man’s hand, and as you were guiding it along yours you said “this is my hand”; if he then said “are you sure?” or “do you know it is?”, it would take very special circumstances for that to make sense.

the blind man is asking you for an authority for your assertion –

not only is he blind – he’s deluded as well

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 412

412. Anyone who is unable to imagine a case in which one might say “I know that this is my hand” (and such cases are certainly rare) might say that these words were nonsense. True, he might also say “Of course I know – how could I not know?” – but then he would possibly be taking the sentence ‘This is my hand” as an explanation of the words “my hand”.

the point is that in any situation the preface ‘I know’ –

is irrelevant and misleading –

it is just a false claim to authority –

whether you can imagine the sentence –

or not

‘this is my hand’ – may well give context – explanation –

to a use of the words ‘my hand’ –

even so

and any use of language –

any explanation of use –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 411

411. If I say “we assume that the world has existed for many years past” (or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that we should assume such a thing. But in the entire system of our language games it belongs to the foundations. The assumption one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore naturally of thought.

and the assumption – like any assumption – is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 410

20.3.

410. Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it. 

a proposition – be it a ‘bit’ of a system – or the proposition that is the system – has two possible values – true or false

and this means you can assent to it – or you can dissent from it –

you act on it – or you don’t act on it

what we deal with is propositions –

not knowledge –

and our propositions are uncertain –

be they in an ‘enormous system’ –

or not

© greg t. charlton. 2010.