on certainty 382

382. That is not to say that nothing in the world will in fact be able to convince me of anything else.

the problem here is the idea of being convinced –

if you are convinced of anything –

you have missed the point

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 381

381.  This “nothing in the world” is obviously an attitude which one hasn’t got towards everything one believes or is certain of.

yes – it is the attitude of ignorance and prejudice

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 380

380. I might go on: “Nothing in the world will convinces me of the opposite!” For me this fact is at the bottom of all knowledge. I shall give up other things but not this.

the argument is false from the start –

it is not a question of one certainty or another –

the ground of knowledge is uncertainty –

any proposition one operates with –

is open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 379

379.  I say with passion “I know that this is a foot” – but what does it mean?

yes –

you can say it with passion –

and perhaps the more passionate you are –

the greater the focus –

on the question –

what does it mean?

that is –

on the uncertainty –

of know

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 378

378. Knowledge in the end is based on acknowledgement.

to know is to acknowledge –

it is to respond –

to an assertion –

with affirmation – or denial –

ok –

that is all it comes to –

I agree –

but if so –

there is no need for the term –

‘knowledge’

all you really have here is logical actions –

assertion –

affirmation – denial –

that’s the basics –

if you want to wrap the package up –

and give a description –

like ‘knowledge’ –

all very well –

but it’s just packaging  -

presentation –

and in the end –

irrelevant

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 377

377. But this passion is after all something very rare, and there is no trace of it when I

talk of this foot in the ordinary way.

‘when I talk of this foot in the ordinary way’ –

yes – when I say – ‘this is my foot’ –

without the rhetorical baggage of –

‘I know’ –

I talk without pretense –

without deception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 376

17.3

376. I may claim with passion that I know that this (for example) is my foot.

yes – you may do this –

and to say this is just to emphasize the fact that the claim to knowledge –

is rhetorical

and once you see this –

it’s easy to see that if we are here talking about rhetorical use of language –

you can just as easily drop the ‘I know’ altogether –

‘this is my foot ‘ – will do 

and with passion?

perhaps a  tone of voice – or an exclamatory assertion accompanied with a stamp of the foot?

in short whatever you think might have the desired effect

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 375

375.  Here one must realise that complete absence of doubt at some point, even where we would say that legitimate doubt can exist, need not falsify a language-game. For there is also something like another arithmetic.

I believe that this admission must underlie any understanding of logic.

first up there is no ‘falsification’ of a language-game –

the language game is – uncertain

if you say that there is certainty – where doubt can exist –

then you are a fraud

and so this other ‘arithmetic’ is –

deception

and yes if you hold with certainty –

this deception will underlie your ‘understanding’ of logic –

and your logic will be –

worthless

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 374

374. We teach a child “that is your hand”, not “that is perhaps (or ‘probably’) your hand”. That is how a child learns the innumerable language-games that are concerned with his hand. An investigation or question ‘whether this is really a hand’ never occurs to him. Nor on the other hand, does he learn that he knows that this is hand.

                                                                                                                                    

here we show a child a language use

the learning of ‘innumerable language-games’ is more complex than the showing of a language usage –

for the child to learn language it must learn to deal with the uncertainty of application

the uncertainty of language usage –

that is to say the child must learn how to determine whether or not and how a language use functions in the circumstances in which it might be applied

without doubt – without questioning –

there will be no learning

and yes we may operate within a framework of accepted practices –

but when it come to making decisions in the face of uncertainty –

there are no rules

‘whether this is really a hand’ – may never occur to him –

but it has occurred to someone –

it is a question that can be asked –

and will be asked in the appropriate circumstance –

wherever and whenever that might be

Wittgenstein seems to think children don’t learn to doubt –

don’t learn to question –

does he really believe this?

children are shown doubt –

they learn to question

‘Nor on the other hand, does he learn that he knows that this is hand’

Wittgenstein is wrong here too

children learn the practice of knowing –

and even of certainty

so yes – they are also taught –

epistemological deception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 373

373. Why is it supposed to be possible to have grounds for believing something if it isn’t possible to be certain?

yes –

there are no grounds to knowledge or belief –

what we have is assertion

and the underwriting – of assertion

these underwritings –

or secondary propositions –

are nothing more than rhetorical devices or props –

the point of which is to pretend a security –

for the primary assertion

and on the basis of this pretence

to persuade of the significance –

or importance

of the primary assertion

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 372

372. Only in certain cases is it possible to make an investigation “is that really a hand?” (or “my hand”). For “I doubt whether that is really my (or a) hand” makes no sense without some more precise determination. One cannot tell from these words alone whether any doubt at all is meant – nor what kind of doubt.

yes –

there may indeed be doubt –

as to whether any doubt –

or what kind of doubt –

is expressed

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 371

371. Doesn’t “I know that that’s a hand”, in Moore’s sense, mean the same, or more or less the same, as : I can make statements like “I have pain in this hand” or “this hand is weaker than the other” or “I once broke this hand”, and countless others, in a language-game where a doubt as to the existence of this hand does not come in?

we cannot know in advance –

what will or will not be questioned –

what will or will not be called into doubt

Moore’s claiming ‘to know’ –

is just ignorance

whether or not any description –

or any part of a description –

is called into question –

will depend on circumstance

i.e. there is the phenomenon of the phantom limb

the fact of it is –

any description can be called into question –

can be the subject of doubt

what exists is what is said to exist –

and what is said –

is open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 370

370. But more correctly: The fact that I use the word “hand” and all the other words in my sentence without a second thought, indeed that I should stand before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their meanings – shews that absence of doubt belongs to the language-game, that the question “How do I know…” drags out of the language game, or else does away with it.

so – ‘how do I know?’ – is not relevant –

this language-game – that Wittgenstein imagines –

is not one that exists in actuality –

yes – at times we use words – without a second thought –

but it doesn’t follow from this –

that their meaning is without question

and what is Wittgenstein to say of language users who question any claim to knowledge?

he can only say they are not playing his game –

but that’s ok –

for this game of his –

will not be anything anyone who actually uses language –

will recognize

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 369

16.3.51

369. If I wanted to doubt if this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting whether the word “hand” has any meaning? So that it is something that I seem to know after all.

any language use is open to question –

open to doubt

i.e. in certain contexts –  scientific – artistic – philosophic –

the appropriateness – the usefulness – of the description –

‘this is my hand’ –

or the appropriateness or usefulness of the word –

‘hand’ –

might be called into question

it would be unusual –

but you could question whether a word has any meaning

doing a crossword puzzle may raise this question

‘something that I seem to know after all’ –

‘seeming to know’ – is hardly being certain

if seeming to know –

is what ‘know’ amounts to –

to know is to be uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 368

368. If someone says he will recognize no experience as proof of the opposite, that is after all a decision. It is possible that he will act against it.

yes –

and the reason that it is possible that he will act against it –

is just that the ground of his decision – of any decision –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 367

367. Isn’t it the purpose of constructing a word like “know” analogously to “believe’ that the opprobrium attaches to the statement “I know” if the person who makes it is wrong?

As a result a mistake becomes something forbidden.

this notion of the mistake – is a red herring –

if you hold with the idea of certain knowledge –

there will be no mistakes –

how could there be if your knowledge is certain?

on the other hand –

if you hold with uncertainty –

there are no mistakes –

what you deal with is – uncertainties

the reality is uncertainty –

and therefore any so called ‘opprobrium’ –

is just rhetoric –

and – get your chops around this –

nothing is forbidden

NB

Wittgenstein presents ‘mistake’ as a key philosophical notion

when it is really just a term of common parlance –

that when analyzed is shown to have no philosophical basis at all

now either he really thinks he’s on to something –

or he is playing a disingenuous game –

the point of which is what?

it looks to me as if the idea is to con you into thinking –

there is something to the idea of certainty

‘mistake’ is the bait

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 366

366.  Suppose it were forbidden to say “I know” and only allowed to say “I believe I know”?

to say ‘I believe I know’ –

is to say I am uncertain –

about my so called knowledge

however –

if it is understood that any assertion made –

is uncertain –

‘I believe I know’ –

is irrelevant and unnecessary

  
© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 365

365. If someone replied: “I also know that it will never seem to me as if anything contradicted that knowledge”, – what could we gather from that, except that he himself had no doubt that it would never happen? –

if he had no doubt that it would never happen –

what we would gather from that –

is that he is a fool

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 364

364. One might also put the question: “If you know that that is your foot, – do you also know, or do you only believe, that no future experience will seem to contradict your knowledge?” (That is, that nothing will seem to you yourself to do so.)

any ‘knowledge’ you have –

will be uncertain

any belief you have regarding the future –

will be uncertain

what seems to be the case –

is not what is certain –

it is that which is uncertain –

that which is open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 363

363. And here it is difficult to find the transition from the exclamation one would like to make, to its consequences in what one does.

logically speaking –

there is no transition –

your proposition – exclamation or not –

you proposal –

exclamation or not –

is uncertain –

and in its consequence –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 362

362. But doesn’t it come out here that knowledge is related to a decision?

yes – our knowledge is uncertain –

our decisions are uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 361

361. But I might also say: It has been revealed to me by God that it is so. God has taught me that this is my foot. And therefore if anything happened that seemed to conflict with this knowledge I should have to regard that as deception.

Wittgenstein –

in going for the ‘God argument’ –

is at least coming clean on the fact –

that the argument for knowledge –

is an argument for authority

yes – there is authority –

the authority of authorship

however beyond authorship –

any claim to authority is false –

and there lies the deception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 360

360. I KNOW that this is my foot. I could not accept any experience as proof to the contrary. – That may be an exclamation; but what follows from it? At least that I shall act with a certainty that knows no doubt, in accordance with my belief.

the ‘I KNOW’ here – is an exclamation of refusal –

a refusal to budge from a position

he has no idea what experience may come his way –

he doesn’t know –

but he says he will not regard any experience –

as proof against his statement

the fact of it is –

there is no proof in experience –

and the experience that has led him to utter this exclamation –

is no proof of anything either –

like any experience –

it is open to question – open to doubt

in making his statement –

he is simply refusing to face uncertainty –

to deal with uncertainty –

to face experience

yes –  he will ‘act with a certainty’ –

the certainty that is –

stupidity

   

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 359

359.  But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

a conception – that is not to be evaluated –

is a prejudice

calling it ‘animal’ –

is a misconception –

animals –

are not prejudiced

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 358

358.  Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably thought as well)

the argument for certainty –

is essentially the attempt to close down thinking –

to put an end to critical activity

it is to argue for a form of life –

that is deceptive and delusional

such an argument is  –

stupid and immoral

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 357

357.  One might say: “ ‘I know’ express comfortable certainty, not the certainty that is still struggling.”

the certainty ‘that is still struggling’ –

is uncertainty –

although once you understand that all propositions are uncertain –

that all practices are uncertain –

there will be no struggle –

against uncertainty

‘comfortable certainty’ – is pretence –

and pretence based on –

not thinking

it’s an illusion – at best –

a delusion – at the worst

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 356

356.  My “mental state”, the ‘knowing”, gives me no guarantee of what will happen. But it consists in this, that I should not understand where a doubt could get a foothold nor where a further test was possible.

if your mental state – your knowing –

gives you no guarantee of what will happen –

then your mental state – your knowing is –

uncertain –

and if you understand this –

and run with it –

then of course you will see –

where a doubt could get a foothold –

and that a further test –

is always possible

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 355

355.  A mad doctor (perhaps) might ask me “Do you know what that is?” and I might reply “I know that it’s a chair; I recognise it, its always been in my room”. He says this, possibly, to test not my eyes but my ability to recognise things, to know their names and functions. What is in question here is a kind of knowing one’s way about. Now it would be wrong for me to say “I believe that it’s a chair” because that would express my readiness for my statement to be tested. While “I know that it…’ implies bewilderment if what I said is not confirmed.

‘do you know  what that is?’ –

the correct answer is –

no – but I can say what it is

what is in question here –

is one’s ability to see clearly –

and speak plainly –

one’s ability to avoid –

irrelevancy and deception

saying ‘I believe’ – like saying ‘I know’ –

is to corrupt a statement –

a proposition –

with unnecessary and irrelevant rhetoric

any statement is up for ‘testing’

and what is confirmation?

basically someone’s assent –

to your statement –

or reassertion of your statement –

in whatever form

once you see that you don’t know –

and accept this and deal with it –

bewilderment dissolves into –

clarity

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 354

354. Doubting and non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only if there is the second.

non-doubting behaviour –

is ignorant behaviour –

unlikely –

we’ll see the end of that

but doubting behaviour –

behaviour that is open and critical –

does not depend on –

stupidity –

what it depends on –

is understanding –

understanding that –

whatever we say or do –

is open to question –

is open to doubt

this understanding –

is quite natural –

but we are all victims –

to some extent –

of those who wish to control –

those who wish to play –

the authoritarian game –

it’s a game well entrenched –

in many forms –

in every culture

the only way to beat it –

is to not play it –

don’t bow –

question

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 353

353. But suppose he said “I want to make a logical observation”? – If a forester goes into a wood with his men and says “This tree has got to be cut down, and this one and this one” – what if he then observes “I know that that’s a tree? – But might not I say of the forester “He knows that that’s a tree – he doesn’t examine it, or order his men to examine it”?

if he says ‘I know that’s a tree’ –

he corrupts a straightforward assertion – ‘that’s a tree’ –

with irrelevant rhetoric –

and if you say –

‘he knows that that’s a tree’ –

you do the same

regardless of what is examined or not –

with or without rhetoric –

any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 352

352. If someone says, “I know that that’s a tree” I may answer: “Yes, that is a sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing?” Suppose he replies: “I just want to remind myself that I know things like that”? –

‘I know’ – is a claim to authority –

the only authority – is authorship –

if ‘I know’ is to have a logical function –

‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of’

is Wittgenstein seriously suggesting –

that you need to remind yourself –

that you are the author –

of your assertions?

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 351

351. Isn’t the question “Have these words a meaning?” similar to “Is that a tool” asked as one produces, say, a hammer? I say “Yes, it’s a hammer”. But what if the thing that any of us would take for a hammer were somewhere else a missile, for example, a conductor’s baton? Now make the application yourself.

have these words a meaning?

yes – but the matter is uncertain

is that a tool?

yes – but it’s application –

is open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 350

350.  “I know that that’s a tree” is something a philosopher might say to demonstrate to himself or someone else that he knows something that is not a mathematical or logical truth. Similarly, someone who was entertaining the idea that he was no use anymore might keep repeating to himself “I can still do this and this and this”. If such thoughts often possessed him one would not be surprised if he, apparently out of all context, spoke such a sentence out aloud. (But here I have already sketched a background, a surrounding, for this remark, that is to say given it context.) But if someone, in quite heterogeneous circumstances, called out with the most convincing mimicry: “Down with him!”, one might say of these words (and their tone) that they were a pattern that does indeed have familiar applications, but that in this case it was not even clear what language the man in question was speaking. I might make with my hand the movement I should make if I were holding a hand-saw and sawing through a plank; but would one have any right to call this movement sawing, out of all context? – (It might be something quite different!)

‘Down with him!’ – 

and –

‘I might make with my hand the movement I should make if I were holding a hand-saw and sawing through a plank’

these actions – if they have no context – are unknown

and when we give context – to make known –

we have no way of knowing with certainty  –

that the context we provide –

is the context that others provide

we make assumptions –

and we work with our assumptions –

without knowing

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 349

349.  “I know that that’s a tree” – this may mean all sorts of things: I look at a plant that I take for a young beech and that someone else thinks is a black-currant. He says “that is a shrub”; I say it is a tree – We see something in the mist which one of us takes for a man, and the other says “I know that that’s a tree”. Someone wants to test my eyes etc. etc. –etc. etc. Each time ‘that’ which I declare to be a tree is of a different kind.

But what when we express ourselves more precisely? For example: “I know that that thing there is a tree, I can see it quite clearly.” – Let us even suppose that I made this remark in the context of a conversation (so that it was relevant when I made it); and I add “I mean these words as I did five minutes ago”. If I added, for example, that I had been thinking of my bad eyes again and it was a kind of sigh, then there would be nothing puzzling about my remark.

For how a sentence is meant can be expressed by an expansion of it and may therefore be made part of it.

‘Each time that which I declare to be a tree is of a different kind.’

what we have here is different descriptions applied to ‘that’

‘that’ – as such – without description –  is unknown

                                                                                                                                 

when we apply a description to ‘that’ –

what we do is propose a characterization –

the point of which is to enable us to act in relation to ‘that’ –

‘that’– does not determine its description –

and therefore the value of any description applied to ‘that’ –

will be a matter of its functionality –

in the circumstances to which it is applied

any so called ‘determination’ we make –

will be open to question – open to doubt –

and therefore will be uncertain

‘Let us even suppose that I made this remark in the context of a conversation (so that it was relevant when I made it); and I add “I mean these words as I did five minutes ago”.’

‘I meant these words as I did five minutes ago’ –

is really an attempt to guarantee the statement –

to give it an authority –

this underwriting is no more than – just another assertion –

the only authority is has – is its authorship

‘For how a sentence is meant can be expressed by an expansion of it and may therefore be made part of it.’

yes – you can expand a sentence –

and as interesting and as informative as that might be –

all you in fact do from a logical point of view –

is increase the domain of its uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 348

348. Just as the words “I am here” have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly, – and not because they are superfluous, but because their meaning is not determined by the situation, yet stands in need of such determination.

a sentence has a meaning – if someone has a use for it –

so an observer – if he has no use for it himself

can only ever speculate – as to meaning

others may give a sentence –

yes – the situation as such is – undetermined –

outside of any description – it is unknown

we make determination –

we give the ‘situation’ description –

in order to act – in order to proceed –

however any ‘determination’ we make –

any description we work with –

will be uncertain –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

we operate in uncertainty –

with uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 347

15.3.51

347. “I know that that’s a tree.” Why does it strike me as if I did not understand the sentence? though it is after all an extremely simple sentence of the most ordinary kind? It is as if I could not focus my mind on any meaning. Simply because I don’t look for the focus where the meaning is. As soon as I think of an everyday use of the sentence instead of a philosophical one, its meaning becomes clear and ordinary.

‘I know that that’s a tree’ –

perhaps you don’t understand the sentence –

because the ‘I know’ –

which could well be seen as the focus of the sentence –

is irrelevant

the claim of knowledge is a claim of authority –

the only authority is authorship –

claiming the authorship – of your sentence –

which is just what ‘I know’ amounts to –

is irrelevant

if ‘I know’ is to be a claim of authority –

other than the claim of authorship –

it is false

perhaps it has rhetorical effect –

if so that effect –

can only be based on deception

meaning is not a ghost in the syntax –

the meaning of the non-rhetorical sentence –

‘that is a tree’ –

is the use the sentence is put to –

be that a sentence of ‘an everyday use’ –

or one of a ‘philosophical use’

and yes – just what that amounts to –

how it is interpreted –

will be uncertain –

it will be a matter open to question –

open to doubt –

and never in any final sense –

resolved

© greg t. charlton. 2010.