on certainty 211

211. Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts. (Every human being has parents.)

‘the scaffolding of our thoughts’ –

is what?

the rhetoric that we manufacture –

to pretend –

a solid background –

to our propositions –

our proposals

regardless of how we dress it up

‘our way of looking at things’ –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 210

210. Does my telephone call to New York strengthen my conviction that the earth exists?

Much seems to be fixed, and it is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted into an unused siding.

if your conviction is real –

there is no need to strengthen it –

no reason to

if on the other hand –

it is a pretense –

and hot air

then yes –

you will have to shore it up –

on a regular basis

hence –

phone a friend –

in New York

NB

good idea to shunt –

the rubbish –

conviction –

certainty –

and anything else –

that’s ‘fixed’ –

in an unused siding

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 209

209.  The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the starting point of belief for me.

who’s to say what the starting point of belief is?

it could be anything

yes – you can imagine you have the whole picture –

and give the existence of the earth –

a mention –

if that suits your purpose

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 208

208. I have a telephone conversation with New York. My friend tells me that his young trees have buds of such and such a kind. I am convinced that his tree is…And I am also convinced that the earth exists.

why?

why not just take what your friend says –

without all the baggage?

what you are convinced of –

is what you don’t question –

and in any case –

it is irrelevant  to the proposition –

put to you

like any baggage you carry –

it too –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 207

207. “Strange coincidence that every man whose skull has been opened had a brain!”

‘brain’ is a description –

without description – ‘brain’ – or any other –

what you find when you open a  man’s skull –

is the unknown

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 206

206. If someone asked us “but is that true?” we might say “yes” to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say “I can’t give you any grounds, but if you learn more you will think the same”.

If this didn’t come about, that would mean that he couldn’t for example learn history.

but is that true? –

I say – yes –

and if he demands grounds?

I say there are no grounds

all I can do is reassert my assent to the proposition –

in various ways –

and point out that my view is –

as with any view –

uncertain

I can say to him –

you might end up agreeing with me –

or you may take a different view

to say –

if you learn more you’ll think the same as me

or –

if you don’t agree with me  –

you can’t learn –

are good examples of –

egomania

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 205

205. If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false.

if the ground is neither true nor false –

it cannot be assented to or dissented from

therefore –

the ground – whatever it is –

it is not a proposition –

which is to say –

it cannot be asserted

and if so –

it has no value at all

the true is not what is grounded –

the true is what is assented to

why you assent –

to what you assent to -

is always a matter of speculation

if by ‘ground’ you mean

a basis in certainty -

‘the true’ –

is groundless

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 204

204. Giving grounds, however, justifying evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

giving grounds – justifying evidence –

comes to an end –

when you stop doing it

people act – with or without –

playing these ‘language games’

action shows –

these language games –

to be irrelevant –

where they are relevant –

is in the business of persuasion

these are games of rhetoric

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 203

203. [Everything* that we regard as evidence indicates that the earth already existed long before my birth. The Contrary hypothesis has nothing to confirm it at all.

If everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it, is it objectively certain? One can call it that. But does it necessarily agree with the world of facts? At the very least it shows us what “agreement” means. We find it difficult to imagine it to be false, but also difficult to make use of it.]

* Passage crossed out in MS.

What does this agreement consist in, if not in the fact that what is evidence in these language games speaks for our proposition? (Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus)

                                                                                                                                      

you can’t know if everything speaks for a proposition and nothing against it –

all you can know is what has been said for it – or against it

if you find it difficult to imagine it to be false –

your problem is imagination

Wittgenstein asks –

what does this agreement consist in?

his answer is –

‘that what is evidence in these language games speaks for our proposition’

if it speaks for the proposition –

then it is a reassertion of the proposition –

and its only value will be –

rhetorical

© greg t. charlton. 2009

on certainty 202

202. Moore’s certain propositions almost declare that we have a right to rely on evidence.

if Moore’s certain propositions declare –

or almost declare – whatever that means –

that we have a right to rely on certain evidence –

them what we then have from Moore –

is declaration –

and a declaration that we have a right to rely on evidence –

is just pure rhetoric

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 201

201. Suppose someone were to ask: “Is it really right for us to rely on the evidence of our memory (or our sense) as we do?”

isn’t it rather that we understand that memory and sense are unreliable –

and that we work with what we have?

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 200

200. Really “The proposition is either true or false” only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.

that’s exactly right –

the ‘ground’ for such a decision is  –

is whatever it is said to be

that is however the decision is underwritten –

by whoever underwrites it –

if indeed it is underwritten at all

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 199

199. The reason why the use of the expression “true or false” has something misleading about it is that it is like saying “it tallies with the facts or it doesn’t”, and the very thing that is in question is what “tallying” is here.

a proposition is true if you assent to it

false – if you dissent from it

as to the basis of your assent or dissent –

it is an open question

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 198

198. Rather we must first determine the role of deciding for or against a proposition.

if we decide for a proposition –

it is actionable – it’s live –

it is usable

if we decide against it –

we don’t act on it –

it’s dead weight –

it’s of no use

we drop it

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 197

197. It would be nonsense to say that we regard something as sure evidence because it is certainly true.

well it would be repetitive –

for to say you regard evidence –

 as ‘sure’ –

is to say you regard it –

as certainly true

the nonsense –

is in regarding anything –

any proposal –

as sure –

any proposition –

as certainly true

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 196

196. Sure evidence is what we accept as true, it is the evidence we go by in acting surely, acting without any doubt.

What we call “a mistake” plays a quite special part in our language games, and so too does what we regard as certain evidence.

there is no sure evidence – there is no certain evidence –

 all evidence is unsure – all evidence is uncertain

what we accept as true – is what we give our assent to –

for whatever reason

if we act surely – we act without thinking

what we call a ‘mistake’ –

has no ‘special’ role  in our language-games

in fact it really should be tossed out

if you hold with certainty – there can be no mistake

if on the other hand you hold with uncertainty –

there are no mistakes – only uncertainties

in ‘ordinary’ – unreflective  language –

it’s there –  but so what?

‘ordinary’ unreflective language –

is where philosophical analysis begins –

not where it ends

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 195

195. If I believe that I am sitting in my room when I am not, then I shall not be said to have made a mistake. But what is the essential difference between this case and a mistake?

if I say I am sitting in my room –

who’s to say I am not?

if someone says I am not –

what we have is a dispute –

a difference of opinion

the real point here is –

there are no mistakes –

but there are differences of opinion –

differences of opinion –

because the world we operate in –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 194

194. With the word ‘certain’ we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people. This is subjective certainty.

But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn’t mistake be logically excluded?`

you are either certain – or uncertain –

subjective / objective – are really irrelevant  characterizations

if you are certain – a ‘mistake’ – is not possible

and if you are uncertain – there are no mistakes –

what you have is uncertainties

the point being – this notion of the mistake –

has no role at all to play – in this debate

it’s a red herring

NB

let’s assume –

Wittgenstein wants to hold on to the idea of certainty –

but to have an out

the idea being you can be certain –

but yes – mistakes are possible

and this perhaps accords with a common usage

the thing is –

if you say you’ve made a mistake –

presumably you are certain about it –

and if so –

then you weren’t certain to start with –

so when are you certain?

can you be certain about this?

not if you allow mistakes

and so –

the idea of the mistake –

is shown to be an argument – against certainty

what you are actually left with is uncertainty –

and this notion of the mistake –

proves to be the result of either sloppy thinking –

or – assuming Wittgenstein is not a sloppy thinker –

philosophical fraud

perhaps by On Certainty –

Wittgenstein had given up on logic and truth –

and was in the business of just playing philosophical games

for what reason?

who’s to say?

perhaps his own perverse amusement

another other option is –

that Wittgenstein is actually arguing against certainty –

but if so –

then the ‘mistake’ – is an ‘uncertainty’

and the concept of the mistake –

is shown to be redundant and irrelevant

there is another possibility –

and that is that Wittgenstein –

was just elucidating the issue for us –

giving us food for thought –

the only problem with this view is –

he never seriously questions the notion of the mistake –

one can’t say that he ever explains it either –

he simply assumes its validity –

and plays with it

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 193

193. What does this mean: the truth of a proposition is certain?

a proposition is a proposal –

a proposal is uncertain

and so to say –

that the truth of a proposition is certain –

means that –

it is not a proposition

where you have the claim of certainty –

what you have –

is a statement masquerading –

as a proposition

or if you like –

a proposition –

that has been entirely corrupted –

by the way it is held –

by the way it is used

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 192

192. To be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end.

there is no justification –

there is simply argument from one proposition to another –

with the latter serving as an ‘authority’ –

for the former –

(the only ‘authority’ – is authorship)

this is just a language-game –

and it it’s name is –

rhetoric

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 191

191. Well if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it – is it then certainly true? One may designate it as such. – But does it certainly agree with reality, with the facts? – With this question you are already going round in a circle.

if everything speaks for it and nothing against it –

it’s not an hypothesis –

it’s a prejudice

and this it seems is what certainty comes down to for Wittgenstein –

prejudice

can an hypothesis certainly agree with reality – with the facts?

reality – is what?

a response to the unknown –

a proposal or set of proposals

the facts – are what?

proposals

so does one set of proposals agree with another?

that’s the basic question

and any answer here –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 190

190. What we call historical evidence points to the existence of the earth a long time before my birth; – the opposite hypothesis has nothing on its side.

you can’t say there’s nothing on its side –

unless it has actually  been put forward –

and argued for

there is nothing to stop someone doing this –

and if they did –

it would be interesting to see what their argument is –

and their evidence for it

as to the hypothesis –

that the earth existed a long time before my birth –

this hypothesis and the evidence for it –

like the opposite hypothesis and evidence –

is be open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 189

189. At some point one has to pass from explanation to mere description.

logically speaking –

so called ‘explanation’ – is description –

the idea that you can account for a proposition –

and give final account –

is pretentious and false –

such ‘explanation’ –

is just rhetoric

the point is –

if you divest ‘explanation’ of rhetoric –

what you get is description – plain and simple –

and furthermore –

any description is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t charlton. 2009.

on certainty 188

188. It strikes me as if someone who doubts the existence of the earth at that time is impugning the nature of all historical evidence. And I cannot say of this latter that it is definitely correct.

yes – historical evidence – is uncertain –

and the proposition – that the earth existed at this time –

is uncertain

any proposition we operate with –

is uncertain

if you say that one proposition implies another –

then you are saying –

one uncertain proposition –

implies another –

and by the way there is nothing definite –

about implication

in propositional reality –

we operate in – and with –

uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 187

187. “Do you know that the earth existed then?” – “Of course I know that. I have it from someone who certainly knows all about it.”

this makes it perfectly clear –

that the ground of ‘knowledge’ –

is a supposed authority –

and all that amounts to –

is someone’s assertion –

or rhetoric –                                                                                                                                  

and someone else’s –

gullibility

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 186

186. “I might suppose that Napoleon never existed, and it is a fable, but not that the earth did not exist 150 years ago.”

what do I ‘know’ here?

what I have been told –

the latest scientific theory –

do I have cause to doubt it?

right at this minute?

no

is it doubtable?

yes 

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 185

185. It might strike me as ridiculous to want to doubt the existence of Napoleon; but if someone doubted the existence of the earth 150 years ago, perhaps I should be more willing to listen, for now he is doubting our whole system of evidence. It does not strike me as if this system were more certain than a certainty within it.

whether you are talking about –

a simple proposition –

or a ‘system’ – of propositions

the proposition is a proposal –

and the proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 184

184. “It is certain that we didn’t arrive on this planet from another one hundred years ago. “ Well it’s as certain as such things are. 

‘as certain as such things are’ –

means in reality the matter is uncertain

what this show that the claim of certainty –

can only be regarded as –

an exercise in rhetoric

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 183

183. “It is certain that after the battle of Austerlitz Napoleon… Well, in that case it’s surely certain that the earth existed then.”

‘that after the battle of Austerlitz Napoleon …’ –

it is a conjecture –

the existence of the earth then –

is conjecture

and yes – implication too –

is conjecture

a conjecture is not a certainty –

a conjecture is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 182

182. The more primitive idea is that the earth never had a beginning. No child has reason to ask himself how long the earth existed, because all change takes place on it. If what is called the earth really came into existence at some time – which is hard enough to picture – then one naturally assumes the beginning as having been an inconceivably long time ago.

‘naturally assumes’?

what does this amount to?

whatever any says –

it amounts to

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 181

181. Suppose Moore had said “I swear…” instead of “I know…”

                                                                                                                                   

‘I swear…’ would in some ways have more intellectual integrity

we could ask – ‘you swear on what?

meaning what is the authority you are appealing to?

perhaps that is why Moore didn’t say ‘I swear…’ –

he would have to reveal what it is that he thinks is the ground of his authority

and then of course the matter would be open to dispute –

where’s the authority?

perhaps he would end up reverting to ‘I know’ –

and saying –

‘well I know – because I know’

this would be a good outcome

because it would have made clear –

that the ‘authority’ that Moore appeals to –

doesn’t exist

that his ‘authority’ –

is no more than his assertion 

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 180

180. Or again “I believe…” is an ‘expression’, but not “I know…”

if you see that all propositions are uncertain –

then both ‘I know’ and ‘I believe’ –

are logically unnecessary –

and the only value they have –

is rhetorical

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 179

179. It would be correct to say: “I believe…” has subjective truth; but “I know…” not.

all propositions are uncertain –

the subjective-objective distinction  –

is a throw back to authoritarian –

and delusional epistemology

 

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 178

178. The wrong use made by Moore of the proposition “I know” lies in his regarding it as an utterance as little subject to doubt as “I am in pain”. And since from “I know it is so” there follows “It is so” then the latter cannot be doubted either.

‘I am in pain’ – may be a good description –

of your state of being –

at a certain time and place

but it is not the only possible description –

and in any case who’s to say for certain –

what it means?

the point being –

this assertion – like any assertion –

is open to question –

open to doubt

‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority –

the only authority – is authorship

to claim authorship of your assertion –

is irrelevant and unnecessary

‘I know’ – is irrelevant and unnecessary

it might have a use in persuasion –

but that is rhetoric not logic

‘I know it is so’ –

without the useless preface – ‘I know’ –

comes down to – ‘it is so’

‘it is so’ – is just another assertion

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 177

177. What I know, I believe.

look all that is required –

is that you say what you have to say –

and others can give their assent –

or they can dissent

‘I know’ and ‘I believe’ – and the like –

are just rhetorical devises

and their function is – at best –

persuasion

© greg t. charlton. 2009.