on certainty 176

176. Instead of “I know it” one may say in some cases “That’s how it is – rely upon it.” In some cases however “I learned it years and years ago”; and sometimes: “I’m sure it is so.”

different versions –

of the claim to authority –

the only real authority –

is the authority of authorship –

and there is no need to state –

that you are the author –

of your assertion –

it is irrelevant

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority –

is false and pretentious –

any such claim –

may have persuasive value –

however –

the ground of such persuasion –

is deception

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 175

175.  “I know it” I say to someone else; and here there is a justification. But there is none for my belief.

‘I know it’ I say to someone else –

is to just to try to persuade another –

of an authority –

you don’t have –

it’s an exercise in rhetoric

and deception

as to the belief –

Wittgenstein is right

there is no justification

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 174

174. I act with complete certainty. But this certainty is my own.

to pretend certainty –

is to engage in deception –

in this case –

self-deception

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 173

173. Is it maybe in my power what I believe? or what I unshakeably believe?

I believe that there is a chair over there. Can’t I be wrong? But, can  I believe that I am wrong? Or can I do so much as bring it under consideration? – And mightn’t I also hold fast to my belief whatever I learned later on?! But is my belief then grounded?

yes –

you can choose what you think about –

what you believe

‘unshakeable’ belief is a pretence –

the better you get at the pretence –

the more stupid you become

there is no right or wrong here –

what we deal with

in our perception and our description –

is uncertainty

belief –

is ‘grounded’ –

in uncertainty

© greg t. charlton

on certainty 172

172. Perhaps someone says “there must be some basic principle on which we accord credence”, but what can such a principle accomplish? Is it any more than a natural law of ‘taking for true’?

any ‘principle’ –

is open to question –

is open to doubt

is uncertain

what does it accomplish?

as much or as little –

as any proposal we put to use –

as to ‘natural law’ –

there are only propositions –

proposals

and a ‘law’ is only a law –

if you can con someone –

into obeying it

what we take for true –

are those propositions –

we give our assent to

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 171

171. A principal ground for Moore to assume that he never was on the moon is that no one ever was on the moon or could come there; and this we believe on grounds of what we learn.

what we learn is uncertain

the pretence of certainty –

is a delusion –

or a deception

Moore was either deluded –

or deceptive

© greg .t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 170

170. I believe what people transmit to me in a certain manner. In this way I believe geographical, chemical, historical facts etc. That is how I learn the sciences. Of course learning is based on believing.

If you have learnt that Mont Blanc is 4000 metres high, if you have looked it up on the map, you say you know it.

And can it now be said: we accord credence in this way because it has proved to pay?

‘of course learning is based on believing.’ –

belief is uncertain –

and learning –

is an exploration of uncertainty –

‘if you have looked up on a map, you say you know it’ –

what this means  –

is that you accept a supposed authority

‘we accord credence in this way because it has proved to pay’ –                  

if something works – it works –

‘according credence’ – saying you believe it –

is to pretend an authority for it –

the supposed authority of belief

is pretence –

unnecessary – irrelevant – and false

say what you have to say –

and spare yourself and others –

the rhetoric

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 169

169. One might think that there were propositions declaring chemistry is possible. And these would be propositions of a natural science. For what should they be supported by, if not by experience?

whether chemistry is possible or not –

would I think be –

an odd argument to witness –

but any claim is open to question –

open to doubt

as to what supports the propositions of chemistry –

if your argument is ‘experience’ –

then clearly –

the ‘support’ for the propositions of chemistry is –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 168

168.  But now, what part is played by the presupposition that a substance A always reacts to a substance B in the same way, given the same circumstances? Or is that part of the definition of a substance?

what part does such a presupposition play?

like any presupposition –

it will function as a basis for thought and action

it will provide a focus

even if it is part of the definition of a substance –

like any proposal –

it will be open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 167

167. It is clear that our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since one can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm of description.

Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with substances in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that takes place when there is burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He has got hold of a definite world- picture – not of course one that he invented: he learnt it as a child.  I would say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned.

yes – Lavoisier operated with norms – assumptions –

propositions – the truth of which – he assumed – for the purposes of his work –

Wittgenstein says he didn’t invent his world-picture – but learnt it as a child –

if so what he learnt was how to operate with propositions –

the ground of which is unknown

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 166

166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.

it’s not that difficult

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 165

165. One child might say to another: “I know that the earth is already hundreds of years old” and that would mean: I have learnt it.

what it means is –

‘I accept what someone has told me’

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 164

164. Doesn’t testing come to an end?

a test comes to an end when there is a decision to stop testing

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 163

163. Does anyone ever test whether this table remains in existence when no one is paying attention to it?

We check the story of Napoleon, but not whether all the reports about him are based on sense-deception, forgery and the like. For whenever we test anything, we are already presupposing something that is not tested. Now am I to say that the experiment which perhaps I make in order to test the truth of a proposition presupposes the truth of the proposition that the apparatus I believe I see is really there (and the like)?

‘this table remains in existence when no one is paying attention to it?’

if someone does test this proposition –

then they presuppose it –

in order to test it

.’Now am I to say that the experiment which perhaps I make in order to test the truth of a proposition presupposes the truth of the proposition that the apparatus I believe I see is really there (and the like)?’

yes –

we always operate with presuppositions –

and any presupposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 162

162. In general I take as a rule what I found in text books, of geography for example. Why? I say: All these facts have been confirmed a hundred times over. But how do I know that? What is my evidence for it? I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting. The propositions describing it are not all equally subject to testing.

‘I have a world-picture.’ –

then presumably you can state it –

in the form of a proposition

is it true or false?

if you assent to it – it’s true –

and presumably you do –

if you ‘have’ it

the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting?

if by ‘substratum’ you mean –

that which is beyond question –

beyond doubt –

there is no such thing –

no such proposition

the actual substratum of enquiry and assertion –

is uncertainty

we use many different ‘pictures’ –

many different propositions –

all of which are open to question –

open to doubt

and the testing of any proposition –

is an exploration –

of uncertainty

all propositions – all proposals –

are equally subject –

to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 161

161.  I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human authority, and then I found some things confirmed or disconfirmed by my own experience.

authority = authorship

if it is put that human authority –

is anything other than –

human beings’ authorship of their propositions –

then what is being put –

is a deception

it may have rhetorical value –

but such a pretence –

has no logical significance

what is confirmed –

is what is assented to –

for whatever reason –

by whoever

if a proposition is disconfirmed –

it is dissented from –

for whatever reason –

by whoever

any act of assent or dissent –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

‘my own experience’ -

is open to question –

open to doubt

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 160

160. The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief.

doubt may come after belief –

and it may – just as equally – come before belief

before or after – it doesn’t matter –

you don’t learn if you don’t question

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 159

159. As children we learn facts; e.g., that every human being has a brain, and we take them on trust. I believe that there is an island, Australia, of such and such a shape, and so on and so on; I believe that I have great-grand parents and the people who gave themselves out as my parents really were my parents, etc. This belief may never have been expressed; even the thought that it was so, never thought.

to take a proposition on trust –

is to not question it  –  to not doubt it –

it is to be fooled –

or to fool yourself

if I haven’t thought it I can’t believe it –

but if I have thought it – and believe it –

my belief – expressed – or not –

useful as it may be in the circumstances –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 158

158. Can I make a mistake, for example, in thinking that the words of which this sentence is composed are English words whose meaning I know?

you can be unsure – not mistaken

any so called ‘mistake’ –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 157

157. Suppose a man could not remember whether he had always had five fingers or two hands? Should we understand him? Could we be sure of understanding him?

should we understand him?

perhaps

could we be sure of understanding him?

no

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 156

156. In order to make a mistake a man must already judge in conformity with mankind.

for a start –

there are no mistakes –

our propositions are –

uncertain

the idea of ‘judging in conformity with mankind’ –

is rubbish

the fact is you can’t know for sure –

whether your judgment –

is in conformity with anyone –

or not

and whether it is –

or not –

is irrelevant –

once you get beyond the façade –

of what others supposedly think –

what you face –

with any judgment –

is uncertainty –

and further –

any judgment you make –

will be –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 155

155. In certain circumstances a man cannot make a mistake. (“Can” here is used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore was to pronounce the opposite of those propositions he declares to be certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.

what we have is uncertain propositions

there are no mistakes

it doesn’t matter what Moore says one way or the other –

it’s his claim to certainty that is demented

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 154

154. There are cases such that, if someone gives signs of doubt where we do not doubt, we cannot confidently understand his signs as signs of doubt.

I.e.: if we are to understand his signs of doubt as such, he may give them only in particular cases and may not given them in others.

we cannot be sure –

of signs of doubt –

we cannot be sure –

of what any signs –

signify

the point being –

we operate in –

uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 153

153.  No one ever taught me that my hands don’t disappear when I am not paying attention to them. Nor can I be said to presuppose the truth of this proposition in my assertions etc., (as if they rested on it) while it only gets sense from the rest of our procedure of asserting.

a proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

if it is asserted

and if it is asserted –

its sense –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

if it is not asserted –

it’s not in the picture

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 152

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. The axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

yes you’ll figure out the propositions that work for you –

but there is no certainty here –

what works for you will be a function of circumstance –

and circumstance can and does change

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 151

151. I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is a part of our method of doubt and enquiry.

Moore doesn’t know what he says he knows –

but it ‘stands fast for him’ –

and what is it that stands fast for Moore?

ignorance and prejudice

there is ‘no method of doubt and enquiry’ –

if your basis is ignorance and prejudice –

all you will have is a sham method –

sophistry and rhetoric

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 150

150. How does one judge which is his right and which is his left hand? How do I know that my judgment will agree with someone else’s? How do I know that this colour is blue? If I don’t trust myself  here, why should I trust any else’s judgment? Is there a why? Must I not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not doubting: and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part judging.

how does one judge which is his right and which is his left hand?

what is regarded a ‘left’ and what is regarded as ‘right’ –

is just a matter of convention

the judgment here is to follow the convention

‘how do I know that my judgment will agree with someone else’s?

I don’t

how do I know that this colour is blue?

I don’t know that this colour is blue

I follow a convention of identifying this colour as ‘blue’ –

not because there is any certainty in the matter –

but rather because it is socially useful to do so –

and by the way –

you can be a stand-out if you want to –

there’s nothing to stop you –

if I don’t trust myself  here, why should I trust any else’s judgment?

in the absence of any certainty –

there is no basis for trust –

of my own judgments or anyone else’s judgment

‘trust’ – is not in the picture –

nevertheless I act –

it is not that ‘somewhere I must begin with not doubting’ –

the fact is we act in the face of uncertainty –

and the ground of any action we take – is uncertain

is there a why?

there is always a why 

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 149

149. My judgments themselves characterize the way I judge, characterize the nature of judgment.

judgment is a response to uncertainty

any judgment is uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 148

148. Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to get up from the chair? There is no why. I simply don’t. This is how I act.

yes – this is how I act –

and without knowing

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 147

147. The picture of the earth as a ball is a good picture, it proves itself everywhere, it is also a simple picture – in short, we work with it without doubting it.

the idea here –

is that certainty –

runs in the background of our actions –

and we work with it –

without doubting it

the problem is –

if you can’t doubt it –

you can’t know it

and if you can’t know it –

you can’t work with it

if you can’t work with it –

it has no value

© greg t. charlton. 2009.