on certainty 146

146.  We form the picture of the earth as a ball floating free in space and not altering essentially in a hundred years. I said “We form the picture etc.” and this picture now helps us in the judgments of various situations.

I may indeed calculate the dimensions of a bridge, sometimes calculate that here things are more in favour of a bridge than a ferry, etc. etc., - but somewhere I must begin with an assumption or a decision.

yes –

a picture may be of help to us in our judgments –

but who is to say what might be of use here?

anything could be

any assumption or decision we make –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 145

145.  One wants to say  “All my experiences shew that this is so”. But how do they do that? For that proposition to which they point itself belongs to a particular interpretation of them.

“That I regard this proposition as certainly true also characterizes my interpretation of experience.”

experience in the absence of interpretation –

is unknown

interpretation of experience –

is uncertain

to argue that anything in your experience is certain –

is to deny experience

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 144

144. The child learns to believe a  host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.

how is it that what is more or less liable to shift –

holds anything unshakeably fast?

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 143

143. I am told, for example, that someone climbed this mountain many years ago. Do I always enquire into the reliability of the teller of this story, and whether the mountain did exist years ago? A child learns there are reliable and unreliable informants much later than it learns facts which are told it. It doesn’t learn at all that the mountain has existed for a long time: that is, the question whether it is so doesn’t arise at all. It swallows this consequence down, so to speak, together with what it learns.

                                                                                                                                   

whatever is put to you –

whatever is proposed –

is open to question –

open to doubt

the so called ‘reliability’ of an informant –

is logically irrelevant –

and reliability  –

is really just about pretence –

a pretence that holds up –

when questions are not asked

do children ‘swallow down the consequence’?

hard to say –

some probably do get conned by the rhetoric –

however –

you will find children –

who question

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 142

142. It is not a single axiom that strikes me as obvious, it is rather a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.

if it’s not just a single axiom –

but a system of consequences and premises –

that is obvious –

what’s not obvious?

point being ‘obvious’ –

loses any value it has –

if in effect –

everything is obvious

and just how obvious –

are consequences and mutual support?

consequences have to be worked out?

because they are not obvious

and mutual support –

is a matter of argument –

argument is required –

when a matter is not obvious

and what is obvious?

that which is before you –

that has not been thought out –

or argued –

in short –

what you don’t know

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 141

141.When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)

says who?

Wittgenstein –

look – anyone can say –

that a particular proposition –

entails – whatever –

whatever it suits them to assume –

follows –

and yes you can call that –

‘a whole system’ –

if that’s what suits your purpose

the fact of it is though –

what follows from what –

logically speaking –

is uncertain –

arguments get advanced –

propositional constructions –

get  proposed –

and so on –

and the light dawns gradually –

that what you are dealing with –

is rhetoric

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 140

140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their connection with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to us.

being taught judgments –

and their connection with other judgments –

and a totality of judgments –

is not being taught judgment –

it is being taught not to judge –

it is being taught –

to accept the decrees –

of some supposed authority

the ground of judgement is uncertainty –

we ‘learn’ judgment –

by facing and dealing with uncertainty –

not by denying it

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 139

139.  Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.

a practice is what people do –

examples of it –

are what people do-

a ‘rule’ – is a description of practice –

it might be useful

any description will be uncertain –

hence – ‘loopholes’

any practice – deals with uncertainty –

and is in turn an example –

of it

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 138

138.  We don’t, for example arrive at any of them as a result of investigation.

There are e.g. historical investigations and investigations into the shape and also the age of the earth, but not into whether the earth has existed during the last hundred years. Of course many of us have information about this period from our parents and grandparents; but mayn’t they be wrong? – “Nonsense!” one will say. “How should all these people be wrong?” – But is that an argument? Is it not simply the rejection of an idea? And perhaps the determination of a concept? For if I speak of a possible mistake here, this changes the role of “mistake” and “truth” in our lives.

there are no mistakes –

there are uncertainties –

uncertain propositions –

used for whatever purpose –

in whatever context

the ‘truth’ –

is whatever proposition –

you give your assent to

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 137

137. Even if the most trustworthy of men assures me that he knows things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only that he believes he knows. That is why Moore’s assurance that he knows…does not interest us. The propositions, however which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of empirical judgments.

a proposition is used

‘assurance’ is rhetoric

as to ‘roles’ and ‘systems’ –

that’s a matter of how usage –

is described –

and that’s anyone’s call

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 136

136.  When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of empirical propositions.

 

when Moore says he knows such and such –

he is claiming an authority for his propositions

the only authority he has –

is authorship –

it is the same authority anyone has –

who asserts –

anything

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 135

135. But do we simply follow a principle that what has happened always will happen again (or something like it)? What does it mean to follow this principle? Do we really introduce it into our reasoning? Or is it merely the natural law which our inferring apparently follows? This latter it may be. It is not an item in our considerations.

whether in fact such a principle is followed –

is an empirical question –

and any answer to it will be open to question –

open to doubt

what does it mean to follow such a principle?

you would have to ask those who claim to follow it –

see what they have too say

do we introduce it into our reasoning?

perhaps some people do

the idea of a natural law is just pretense –

an attempt to give an assertion –

an authority –

it doesn’t have

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 134

134. After putting a book in a drawer, I assume it is there, unless…. “Experience always proves me right. There is no well attested case of the book’s (simply) disappearing.” It has often happened that the book has never turned up again, although we thought we knew for certain where it was. – But experience does really teach that a book, say, does not vanish away. (E.g. gradually evaporate.) But is it this experience with books etc. that leads us to assume that such a book has not vanished away? Well, suppose we were to find that under particular novel circumstances books did vanish away. – Shouldn’t we alter our assumption? Can one give the lie to the effect of experience on our system of assumption?

can one say –

that the effect of experience on our system of assumption –

is false?

one’s experience is uncertain –

one’s assumptions are uncertain

there is no conflict

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 133

133. Under ordinary circumstances I do not satisfy myself that I have two hands by seeing how it looks. Why not? Has experience shown it to be unnecessary? Or (again): Have we in some way learnt a universal law of induction, and do we trust it here too? – But why should we have learnt one universal law first, and not the special one straight away?

I operate with assumptions –

which is to say I operate without knowing

when my assumptions are challenged –

they are revealed as uncertain

when my experience is challenged –

it is revealed as uncertain

induction is an argument to explain assumption –

to ground it in  immediate experience

once you see there is no ground to assumption –

induction is shown to be –

a useless argument

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 132

132. Men have judged that a king can make rain; we say this contradicts all experience. Today they judge that aeroplanes and radio and radio etc, are the means for closer contact of peoples and cultures.

what you have here is different judgments –

and that is all we ever have –

at any time –

different interpretations of a reality –

that in the absence of interpretation is –

unknown

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 131

131. No, experience is not the ground for our game of judging. Nor is it an outstanding success.

the ground of our judging –

is uncertainty

‘experience’ – is one description –

of uncertainty

the notion of ‘success’ here –

is rhetorical

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 130

130. But isn’t it experience that teaches us to judge like this, that is to say, that it is correct to judge like this? But how does experience teach us, then? We may derive it from experience, but experience does not direct us to derive anything from experience. If it is the ground of our judging like this, and not the cause, still we do not have a ground for seeing this in turn as a ground.

experience is uncertain –

in order to proceed –

in the face of uncertainty –

we make judgments –

we make decisions

the ‘ground’ of our judgments –

is uncertainty

our judgments –

are uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 129

129. This how I learned to judge; this I got to know as judgment.

‘this’ –

I learnt to describe –

as ‘judgment’

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 128

128. From a child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging.

which is to say –

the child –

or anyone else – for that matter –

can learn to do –

without description

that is to say –

without knowing

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 127

127. For how do I know that someone is in doubt? How do I know that he uses the words “I doubt it” as I do?

how do I know someone is in doubt?

I don’t –

if by ‘know ‘ here – you mean –

can I be sure?

how do I know that he uses the words ‘I doubt’ as I do?

I don’t –

if by ‘know ‘ – you mean –

can I be certain?

on these matters –

as with any other matter –

always –

doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2009

on certainty 126

126. I am no more certain of the meaning of my words than I am of certain judgments. Can I doubt that this colour is called “blue”?

(My) doubts form a system.

the colour –

may not be called ‘blue’

by all users

in all circumstances –

therefore –

doubt

‘(My) doubts form a system.’ –

‘system’ here is a description –

you can use this description –

in relation to (your) doubts –

bear in mind though –

that this description –

like any description –

is open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 125

125. If a blind man were to ask me “Have you got two hands?” I should not make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don’t know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn’t I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what? (Who decides what stands fast?)

And what does it mean to say such and such stands fast?

however you decide –

what is to be tested by what –

and whoever decides –

what stands fast –

there will always be doubt

a test is only as good as its assumptions –

and any assumption can be questioned –

in fact if you are interested in being sure –

then don’t question –

don’t test

the real point of testing –

is not establishing certainty –

but rather –

exploring uncertainty

what does it mean to say such and such stands fast?

what it means is that such and such –

is not questioned –

is not doubted –

is not put to the test

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 124

124. I want to say: We use judgments as principles of judgment.

you judge in the face of uncertainty –

that is you consider possibilities –

and make decisions –

decisions that are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

any so called ‘principle of judgment’ –

is another judgment –

a judgment regarding judgments

and like any judgment –

open to question –

open to doubt

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 123

123. Wherever I look, I find no ground for doubting that….

if by ‘a ground for doubting’ –

you mean that which cannot be doubted –

then there is no ground –

for any proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

and therefore

doubt is groundless

the issue is not where do you look?

but rather do you think?

do you question what is before you?

if you do –

you will see possibilities –

if you don’t –

you won’t

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 122

122. Doesn’t one need grounds for doubt?

the answer is – no

any so called ‘grounds for doubt’ –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 121

121. Can one say: “Where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either”?

yes – knowledge is uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 120

120. But if anyone were to doubt it, how would his doubt come out put in practice? And couldn’t we peacefully leave him to doubt it since it makes no difference at all?

‘how would his doubt come out put in practice?

who’s to say?

the doubt could come out as a philosophical argument –

and lead to an interesting discussion –

a different view of the world –

or a new insight into some state of affairs –

which might in turn –

lead to a new way of doing things

who’s to say?

and will it make any difference at all?

if a doubt is raised –

it will make a difference –

what that is – be it great or small –

will depend on the people involved –

and the circumstances –

in which it is raised

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 119

119. But can it also be said: Everything speaks for, and nothing against the table’s being there when no one sees it. For what does speak for it?

what speaks for it –

is whatever argument –

is advanced –

and any argument advanced –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

Wittgenstein asks –

is it the case that nothing speaks against it?

it depend who you listen to –

George Berkeley for one –

put up arguments –

that cast doubt on such a view

I make the assumption –

that the table is there when no one sees it

the assumption –

is uncertain and finally baseless –

but I use it

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 118

118. Now it would be correct to say: So far no-one has opened my skull to see whether there is a brain inside: but everything speaks for, and nothing against, its being what they would find.

if you opened up Wittgenstein’s skull –

in the absence of the description – ‘brain’ –

or any other description –

what you would  find –

is that which is not described –

and that which is not described –

is unknown

description – makes known

and so –

 whatever description you use –

is just what you will find

and further –

whatever description you do use –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 117

117.  Why is it not possible for me to doubt that I have never been on the moon? And how could I try to doubt it?

First and foremost, the supposition that perhaps I have been there could strike me as idle. Nothing would follow from it, nothing be explained by it. It would not tie in with anything in my life.

When I say “Nothing speaks for, everything against it,” this presupposes a principle of speaking for and against. That is, I must be able to say what would speak for it.

any proposition can be questioned –

doubt is always possible

how you go about doubting  -

depends on how flexible you are in your thinking –

and how imaginative you are

it might strike you as idle –

however put as a problem of physics –

it is anything but idle

and if you don’t make some kind of intellectual effort –

nothing will follow

nothing will be explained

nothing will tie in with your life

‘Nothing speaks for, everything against it’

is really a comment on the speaker –

not the proposition

(c) greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 116

116. Instead of “I know…”, couldn’t Moore have said: “It stands fast for me that…”? And further: “It stands fast for me and many others…”

if ‘it stands fast for me that’ –

means the ‘proposition’ – is beyond question –

beyond doubt –

then what you have here is not a proposition –

not a proposal –

but rather a prejudice

and to say –

‘it stands fast for me and many others …’ –

is to say many others –

hold this prejudice too

this may be so

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 115

115. If you try to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.

to doubt –

is to question

it would be hard work –

but logically speaking –

there is nothing to stop you –

questioning –

every proposition –

put to you

doubt –

presupposes –

uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 114

114. If you’re not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either.

this is quite true

however this does not mean that we cannot operate with ‘facts’ –

uncertain as they are –

we do

or that we cannot use words –

uncertain as their meaning is –

we do –

and I would say too –

that the uncertainty of facts –

and the uncertainty of the meaning of words –

is the real source –

of their utility

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 113

113. When someone is trying to teach us mathematics, he will not begin by assuring us that he knows that a + b = b + a

mathematical propositions are instructions –

instructions for games –

games of sign substitution –

nevertheless –

the propositions on which theses games are based –

are like any propositions – open to question –

open to doubt

and as Wittgenstein suggests –

because we are not dealing with knowledge here –

but rather game playing –

any claim to know mathematical propositions –

is obviously irrelevant –

and out of place

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 112

112. And isn’t that Moore wants to say, when he says he knows these things? – But is his knowing it really what is in question, and not rather that some of these propositions must be solid for us?

yes – his ‘knowing it’ – or anyone’s claim to ‘knowing it’ – is in question – as it should be

‘that some of these propositions must be solid for us’

why?

© greg t. charlton. 2009.