on certainty 109

109. “An empirical proposition can be tested” (we say). But how? and through what?

what constitutes a ‘test’ –

will be decided –

by  whoever does the test

any so called ‘test’-

will be a decision to proceed –

in a certain manner

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 108

108. “But is there no objective truth? Isn’t it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon?” If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the questions “How did he overcome the force of gravity?” “How could he live without atmosphere?” and a thousand others which could not be answered. But suppose instead of all these answers we met the reply: “We don’t know how one gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once that they are there: and even you can’t explain everything.” We should feel ourselves intellectually very distant from someone who said this.

Wittgenstein says ‘If we are thinking within our system it is certain that no one has ever walked on the moon.’

the issue here is authority – the ‘system’ per se is irrelevant

Wittgenstein accepts the ‘authority’ of science circa 1950 on this matter

all this authority as such comes to – is its assertion –

and any argument for it – is no more than its reassertion 

when Wittgenstein speaks of reasonable people I assume he is talking about those who accept the authority of this science on such matters

anyone who has an entirely different view – i.e. a magical view of the nature of the physical world –

will be regarded by Wittgenstein and his reasonable people as being without any authority for their views

and Wittgenstein says –

‘we should feel intellectually very distant from someone who said this’ –

that is true – and it is a fair way of putting it

people do operate with different systems of thought

nevertheless they have this in common – that they believe in the authority of their system – of their ‘knowledge’

the question can always be asked –  what is your authority based on?

if someone decides to put an end to this line of questioning –

they are forced to accept that all they have is their assertion

and that this is all their ‘knowledge’ comes to

in the business of arguing for our beliefs we will propose if we have to – some authority  

this is really no more than a rhetorical move –

nevertheless it is a mainstay of propositional practice

it is however philosophically healthy to realize that whatever argument we put –

and however forcefully we put it –

and however useful and productive it may turn out to be –

it is no more than one of many ways of describing and interpreting the unknown –

the world we live in

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 107

107. Isn’t this altogether like the way one can instruct a child to believe in God, or that none exists, and it will accordingly be able to produce telling grounds for one or the other?

what Wittgenstein is on about here –

is indoctrination

you put a view –

and work on the kid –

until he adopts –

and can operate with –

this con – of ‘telling grounds’ –

and then you tell yourself –

that the job is done

the problem is –

you are just fooling yourself –

if not the kid

your assumption –

of authority

and everything that flows from it

i.e. your telling grounds

is delusional

and the fact remains –

that despite Wittgenstein’s hopes –

and indeed his efforts –

children can – and do –

think for themselves –

and there’s a fair chance –

somewhere along the way

they learn how to –

to pick a fraud

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 106

106. Suppose some adult had told a child that he had been on the moon. The child tells me the story, and I say it was only a joke, the man hadn’t been on the moon; no one has ever been on the moon; the moon is a long way off and it is impossible to climb up there or fly there. – If now the child insists, saying perhaps there is a way to get there which I don’t know, etc. what reply could I make to him? What reply could I make to the adults of a tribe who believe that people sometimes go to the moon (perhaps that is how they interpret their dreams), and who indeed grant that there are no ordinary means of climbing up to it or flying there? – But a child will not ordinarily stick to such a belief and will soon be convinced by what we tell him seriously.

if the child insists – what reply could I make to him?

what reply could I make to the adults of the tribe?

all you can do is state your case –

put forward your point of view

‘But a child will not ordinarily stick to such a belief and will soon be convinced by what I tell him seriously’

Wittgenstein makes clear here –

that the real issue is rhetoric –

‘by what I tell him seriously’ –

yes you can try the ‘serious trick’ –

and you might have a win –

but can you be sure?

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 105

105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.



either the argument ‘takes place already within a system’ –

and the argument then is a function or expression of the system

or the system ‘belongs to the essence of what we call an argument’

and the system then is a function and expression of the argument?

what’s it to be?


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 104

104. I am for example also convinced that the sun is not a hole in the vault of heaven.

the issue is not what you are convinced of –

it is that you are convinced – of anything –

what it means is that you have deluded yourself into thinking –

that you have an authority for your propositions –

when you have none at all –

and perhaps even –

that you have attempted to hoist this deception onto others

our propositions are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain –

if you are ‘convinced’ –

you are fool

© greg t.charlton. 2009

on certainty 103

103. And now if I were to say “It is my unshakable conviction that etc.”, this means in the present case too that I have not consciously arrived at the conviction by following a particular line of thought, but that it is anchored in all my questions and answers, so anchored that I cannot touch it.

‘so anchored that I cannot touch it’ –

                                                `

all you have to do to ‘touch it’ –

is to think about it

and to think about it –

is to question it

‘unshakable conviction’ –

is rhetorical rubbish

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 102

102. Might I not believe that once, without knowing it perhaps in a state of unconsciousness, I was taken far away from the earth – that other people even know this, but do not mention it to me? But this would not fit into the rest of my convictions at all. Not that I could describe the system of these convictions. Yet my convictions do form a system, a structure.

if your convictions form a system –

and this system can’t be described –

what value does the term ‘system’ have?          

and if what determines your convictions –

is a system –

and ‘system’ here is without determination –

what determines your convictions?

and if your ‘convictions’ are not determined –

                                                                                                                                      

how can you speak of convictions?

the good news is –

if you want to believe –

you were taken far away from the earth –

that other people even know this –

but do not mention it to you –

the way is clear

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 101

101. Such a proposition might be e.g. “My body has never disappeared and reappeared again after an interval”

yes – you can make this assertion –

‘my body has never disappeared and reappeared again after an interval’ –

and as with any assertion –

it’s open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

if you claim to know this proposition  –

in the way that Moore claims to know –

you claim an authority for it –

the only authority – is authorship

authorship does not guarantee the proposition –

it’s irrelevant to the logical status of the proposition

and any claim of authority –

other than authorship –

is logically baseless

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 100

100. The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them.

‘if he knows them’

in claiming to know –

Moore claims an authority for his assertions –

his only authority is authorship –

and to state that you are the author of your assertions –

is unnecessary and irrelevant

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority is false

such a claim may have rhetorical value –

however the ground of any such rhetoric –

is delusion –

or deception

greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 99

99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

what we have here from Wittgenstein is poetry –

and I would suggest –

in the end –

that is all any description is –

poetry –

some kind of imaginative representation –

of that which is

independent of description –

is unknown

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 98

98. But if someone were to say “So logic too is empirical science” he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.

how a proposition is described – depends on how it is used –

there is no definite use – no definite description

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 97

97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

if it’s to Wittgenstein’s purpose to put forward this description of what goes on –

so be it –

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 96

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions. hardened, and hardened ones become fluid.

yes – you could imagine this

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 95

95. The propositions describing this world picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of the rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.

a set of propositions – may be described as a ‘world picture’ –

and this world picture may be described as ‘a kind of mythology’ –

and yes you may also describe your propositions as having a role – ‘like that of the rules of a game’ –

and of this then say – ‘this game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules’

there is no end to the possibilities of description here

and as there is no definite description of anything –

this description – this set of descriptions – is as good as any other –

for it is always just a question of what description or set of descriptions you find useful –

in whatever circumstances you are operating in

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 94

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish true and false.

you picture of the world is never stable – is never certain –

‘inherited background’ is an element of this uncertainty –

and is itself open to question – open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 93

93. The propositions presenting what Moore ‘knows’ are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary. E.g. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in close proximity to the earth – Once more I can speak of myself here instead of Moore. What could induce me to believe the opposite? Either a memory, or having been told. – Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.

‘everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction ….’

isn’t it just that what one sees and hears – is what one goes with –

until one sees and hears – something else?

if so – one’s ‘conviction’ is based on experience –

there is no guarantee that what you experience today –

will be what you experience tomorrow –

so – a ‘conviction’ is no more than a working hypothesis –

useful as far as it goes –

but not certain

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 92

92. However, we can ask: May someone have telling grounds for believing that the earth has only existed for a short time, say since his own birth? – Suppose we had always been told that, - would we have any good reason to doubt it? Men have believed that they could make rain; why should not a King be brought up to believe that the world began with him? And if Moore and this King were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say Moore could not convert the King to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the King would be brought to look at the world in a different way.

Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by its simplicity or symmetry, i.e. these are what induce one to go over to this point of view. One can then say something like: “That’s how it must be.”

yes –

the point here –

is just that the issue is persuasion –

that what we are dealing with –

in terms of what people believe –

is not logic – but rhetoric

and the reason is  –

reality – independent of our imaginings –

is unknown –

therefore –

any account we make of reality –

is uncertain

another way of putting it –

is just to say –

in response to our proposals –

the unknown –

is silent

© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 91

91. If Moore says he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant him that it has existed all that time, and also believe him when he says he is convinced of it. But has he also got the right ground for his conviction? For if not, after all he doesn’t know (Russell).

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

the ground of the proposition –

of any proposition –

is the unknown

if Moore is convinced –

he is certain –

and if he claims certainty –

he is either a fraud –

or a fool

any ‘knowledge’ we have –

is uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 90

90. “I know” has a primitive meaning similar to and related to “I see” (“wissen”, “videre”). And “I knew he was in the room, but he wasn’t in the room” is like “”I saw him in the room but he wasn’t there.” “I know” is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition (like “I believe”) but between me and a fact. So that the fact is taken into my consciousness. (Here is the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in the outer world is really known, but only what happens in the domain of what are called sense-data.) This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the consciousness. Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of this projection. And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies at the bottom of this presentation.

what lies at the bottom of this imagination –

and for that matter any imagination –

is the unknown

© greg t charlton. 2009.