'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Thursday, July 30, 2009

on certainty 89


89. One would like to say: “Everything speaks for, and nothing against the earth’s having existed long before….”

Yet might not I believe the contrary after all? But the question is: What would the practical effect of this belief be? – Perhaps someone says: “That’s not the point. A belief is what it is whether it has any practical effects or not.” One thinks: It is the same adjustment of the human mind anyway.



a belief –

whether it has practical effects –

or not –

is uncertain

if it is held to be certain –

if it is not open to question –

not open to doubt –

to revision –

it is a prejudice


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Tuesday, July 28, 2009

on certainty 88


88. It may be for example that all enquiry on our part is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt, if they are ever formulated. They lie apart from the route travelled by the enquiry.



a proposition is a proposal –

it is by its nature open to question –

a proposition is that which can be doubted

any enquiry set to exclude propositions –

is not an enquiry into anything –

this whole business of ‘exempting’ propositions from doubt –

is no more than a smug and stupid attempt –

to avoid scrutiny

not worthy of anyone with a brain

‘if they are ever formulated’

well you can’t get anything more ridiculous than this –

the idea apparently is you exempt from doubt –

propositions that don’t exist –

‘they lie apart from the route travelled by the enquiry’

we’ve got an enquiry into nothing –

and lying along the road of this enquiry –

propositions – that don’t exist


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Monday, July 27, 2009

on certainty 87


87. Can’t an assertoric sentence, which was capable of functioning as an hypothesis, also be used as a foundation of research and action? I.e. can’t it simply be isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule? It simply gets assumed as a truism, never called in question, perhaps not even ever formulated.



any proposition can function as a foundation for research and action –

if by ‘foundation’ you mean – ‘starting point’ –

but if you mean a certainty – that which cannot be doubted 

there is no such foundation

a proposition can be isolated from doubt –

if you don’t think about it and never propose it to anyone

assuming a proposition is a truism –

if by ‘truism’ – is meant a proposition that cannot be dissented from –

there is no such proposition

a proposition that is never called into question –

is a proposition no one considers

and as to a proposition that is never formulated –

in that case –

there is no proposition


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Sunday, July 26, 2009

on certainty 86


86. Suppose I replaced Moore’s “I know” by “I am of an unshakeable conviction”?



if you do that –

you replace one piece of rhetoric –

with another

‘unshakeable conviction’ –

has no logical basis

any conviction is open to question –

open to doubt –

is shakeable

and if you hold to the idea –

of ‘unshakeable conviction’ –
                                                                                                                                
you are either a fraud –

or a fool


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 85


85. And what goes into someone’s knowing this? Knowledge of history, say? He must know what it means to say: the earth has already existed for such and such a length of time. For not any intelligent adult must know that. We see men building and demolishing houses, and are led to ask: “How long has this house been here?” But how does one come on the idea of asking this about a mountain, for example? And have all men the notion of the earth as a body, which may come into being and pass away? Why shouldn’t I think of the earth as flat, but extending without end in every direction (including depth)? But in that case one might still say “I know that this mountain existed long before my birth.” But suppose I met a man who didn’t believe that?



the point is that the claim to know is irrelevant –

we use propositions that we regard as useful –

and if others think as we do – so be it

much of what we do use –

we use because it is ‘commonly accepted’ –

and this just may be the source of its usefulness –

if I meet some one who has different beliefs –

uses different propositions –

again – so be it

any proposition put forward is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain –

the claim to know – to know with certainty –

is nothing more than rhetoric

and the problem with rhetoric

is that it crates  a smokescreen –

a smokescreen  to the truth –

the truth of straightforward – unadulterated –

assertion

assertion that stands or falls –

only on a yea or a nay

this is logical reality –

this is clarity


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Friday, July 24, 2009

on certainty 84


84. Moore says he knows that the earth existed long before his birth. And put like that it seems to be a personal statement about him, even if it is in addition a statement about the physical world. Now it is philosophically uninteresting whether Moore knows this or that, but it is interesting that, and how, it can be shown. If Moore had informed us that he knew the distance separating certain stars, we might conclude from that he had made some special investigations, and we shall want to know what they were. But Moore chose precisely a case in which we all seem to know the same as he, and without being able to say how. I believe e.g. that I know as much about this matter (the existence of the earth) as Moore does, and if he knows that it is as he says, then I know it too. For it isn’t, either, as if he has arrived at his proposition by pursuing some line of thought which, while it is open to me, I have not in fact pursued.



when Moore asserts ‘I know’ –

he is asserting an authority for his assertion –

the only authority he has –

is his authorship –

so – ‘I know …’ – comes to –

‘I am the author of this assertion’ –

therefore –

‘I know’ – is redundant and irrelevant –

it adds nothing of value –

to any assertion

if Moore or anyone else says –

‘the earth existed long before my birth’ –

that assertion –

like any assertion –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

and is uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 83


83. The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference.



a proposition is true –

if you give your assent to it

as to why you do that –

the so called ‘reasons’ –

for your assent –

that is speculation

and yes –

you can call that –

your ‘frame of reference’ –

if you like


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Thursday, July 23, 2009

on certainty 82


82. What counts as an adequate test of a statement belongs to logic. It belongs to the description of the language-game.



the adequate test of a statement –

will just be –

whatever it is decided –

is an adequate test

it is essentially a contingent matter –

really a question of circumstance –

and for that reason –

uncertain

if logic is a description –

of what you do –

of how you use statements –

yes –

the test – described –

belongs to logic –

bear in mind though –

logic –

as with any description –

or any framework of description –

any use of language –

is  open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 81


81. That is to say: If I make certain false statements, it becomes uncertain whether I understand them.



a false statement –

is one I dissent from

understanding –

of any statement –

true or false –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Wednesday, July 22, 2009

on certainty 80


80. The truth of my statements is the test of my understanding of these statements.



the truth of my statements –

why I assent to the propositions that I do –

is never beyond question –

never beyond doubt

no test is ever complete


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Tuesday, July 21, 2009

on certainty 79


79. That I am a man and not a woman can be verified, but if I were to say I was a woman, then tried to explain the error by saying I hadn’t checked the statement, the explanation would not be accepted.



whether a statement works or not –

is an uncertain matter –

if you make a statement –

that you think has no hope of working –

then you are fool

saying you didn’t check the statement –

will only confirm the fact

but who knows?

you might find acceptance anyway –

it really depends –

on who you are talking to


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Monday, July 20, 2009

on certainty 78



78. And can I give a reason why it isn’t?



why  isn’t there greater certainty –

as a result of more checking?

there is no certainty to begin with

and just by the by –

you are either certain or you are not –

‘greater certainty’ –

is just putting a spin on –

uncertainty


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 77


77. Perhaps I shall do a multiplication twice to make sure, or perhaps get someone else to work it over. But shall I work it over again twenty times, or get twenty people to go over it? And is that some sort of negligence? Would the certainty really be greater for being checked twenty times?



if you check a calculation –

what you are checking –

is whether you have performed it correctly –

and ‘correctly’ here means –

in terms of the rules that govern it

you can never be sure –

checking –

won’t deliver certainty


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Sunday, July 19, 2009

on certainty 76

76. Naturally, my aim must be to give the statements that one would like to make here, but cannot make significantly.



a statement is a sign –

if you make a statement -

you make it significantly

if you cannot make it –

significantly –

there is no statement


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 75


75. Would this be correct: If I merely believed wrongly that there is a table here in front of me, this might still be a mistake; but if I believe wrongly that I have seen this table, or one like it, every day for several months past, and have regularly used it, that isn’t a mistake?



once you realize –

that any point of view you operate with –

is uncertain –

the ‘mistake’ –

has no epistemological value


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Saturday, July 18, 2009

on certainty 74


74. Can we say: a mistake doesn’t only have a cause, it also has a ground? I.e. roughly: when someone makes a mistake, this can be fitted into what he knows aright.



if you are mistaken – 

the idea is you know it –

and know it for sure

otherwise –

what you are dealing with is –

an uncertainty –

not a mistake

as to what you know ‘aright’ –

all ‘knowledge’ –

is open to question –

open to doubt

if your ‘knowledge’ is genuine –

it is uncertain

the ‘mistake’ – doesn’t fit in –

it has no place –

in the epistemological context

it is a false concept

the point of it –

is to bolster –

the sham idea –

of certainty


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Friday, July 17, 2009

on certainty 73


73. But what is the difference between a mistake and a mental disturbance? Or what is the difference between my treating it as a mistake and my treating it as a mental disturbance?



first up there are no mistakes –

what we face at every turn is –

uncertainty

as to ‘mental disturbance’ –

it’s a description of someone’s behaviour –

which like any other description-

is open to question –

open to doubt

we should perhaps note here –

that it is a description

that has been used prejudicially

against those who are different –

by those who do not –

or cannot tolerate

difference


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 72


72. Not every false belief is this sort of mistake.



a false belief –

is a belief – you dissent from –

your dissent – like the belief itself –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain 

logically speaking there are no mistakes –

if you are certain there cannot be a mistake

if on the other hand –

you recognize that your belief is uncertain

what you face is uncertainties –

not mistakes

‘mistake’ is a commonly used word –

it’s a word you might use –

when you haven’t thought the matter through

once subjected to analysis –

the ‘mistake’ is shown to have no place –

in the epistemological debate –

concerning certainty and uncertainty

once subjected to analysis –

the ‘mistake’ –

disappears


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 71


71. If my friend were to imagine one day that he had been living for a long time in such and such a place, etc. etc., I should not call this a mistake, but rather a mental disturbance, perhaps a transient one.



who’s to know – what he had in mind –

when he said what he said?

who’s to know for sure?

the point is –

if you’re smart about it –

you go with what you think is the case –

but you keep an open mind

there is no question of his friend –

making a mistake –

or not making a mistake –

what he said is open to question –

is open to doubt –

is uncertain


NB


if you say –

someone is ‘mentally disturbed’ –

because they say something –

you don’t understand –

really all you are doing –

is labelling –

your own ignorance


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 70


70. For months I have lived at address A, I have read the name of the street and the number of the house countless times, have received countless letters and have given countless people the address. If I am wrong about it, the mistake is hardly less than if I were (wrongly) to believe I was writing Chinese and not German.



you have beliefs that you operate with –

and regardless of how strongly you hold to them –

they are open to question – open to doubt


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Thursday, July 16, 2009

on certainty 69


69. I should like to say: “If I am wrong about this, I have no guarantee that anything I say is true.” But others won’t say that about me, nor will I say it about other people.



yes – there are no guarantees –

and for this reason –

you can’t be wrong – or right

what you have to accept is –

uncertainty

and as to what others might say about you –

how would you know?

and if you think –

others have no guarantee for what they say –

why not make the point?


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Wednesday, July 15, 2009

on certainty 68


68. The question is: what is the logician to say here?



the logician would say 

that what we have 

in the above example –

is two different accounts –

of the one state of affairs

the logician would also say 

that what counts as true –

is what is assented to –

and that what counts as false –

is what is dissented from

and further –

the logician would say 

independent of any account –

the state of affairs –

is unknown

therefore –

any account offered –

is uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

on certainty 67


67. Could we imagine a man who keeps on making mistakes where we regard a mistake as ruled out, and in fact never encounter one?

E.g. he says he lives in such a such a place, is so and so old, comes from such and such a city, and he speaks with the same certainty (giving all the tokens of it) as I do, but he is wrong.

But what is his relation to his error? What am I to suppose?



there is no mistake here –

there is no error

what you have here is conflicting claims –

disagreement

unless one side folds and says – ‘yes you are right’ –

there is no resolution

I can continue to insist on my view of the matter –

argue the case

all that amounts to is –

rhetoric

despite what I may think –

there is nothing –

that guarantees

my point of view

and therefore –

it should be seen for what it is –

uncertain


© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 66


66. I make assertions about reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance. How does the degree of assurance come out? What consequences has it?

We may be dealing, for example, with the certainty of memory, or again of perception. I may be sure of something, but still know what test might convince me of error. I am, e.g. quite sure of the date of a battle, but if I should find a different date in a recognized work of history, I should alter my opinion, and this would not mean I lost all faith in judging.



yes –

you make assertions about reality –

there is no assurance –

for any assertion

any so called ‘assurance’ –

is rhetoric –

that is –

whatever means you employ –

to persuade yourself –

or others –

of the value –

of your assertion


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Monday, July 13, 2009

on certainty 65


65. When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of the words change.



conceptualizing –

is a way of describing usage

there is no fixed description –

therefore no fixed concepts

and meaning –

whether you have a change of usage or not –

is uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Sunday, July 12, 2009

on certainty 64


64. Compare the meaning of a word with the ‘function’ of an official. And ‘different meanings’ with ‘different functions’.



yes – that is the point

the function of a word –

is just what a word does –

and what it does 

is an open question –

‘meaning’ –

is this uncertainty


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 63


63. If we imagine the facts other than they are, certain language-games lose some of their importance, while others become important. And in this way there is an alteration – a gradual one – in the use of the vocabulary of a language.



the ‘facts’ are descriptions

in the absence of description –

there are no facts

so to ‘imagine the facts other than they are’ –

is to use different description

what we deal with descriptively –

is uncertainty

therefore we can expect –

descriptive change –

gradual –

or not


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Saturday, July 11, 2009

on certainty 62


62. That is why there exists a correspondence between the concepts ‘rule’ and ‘meaning’.



meaning is uncertain –

any so called ‘rule ‘ –

is uncertain

the real point of this concept of rule –

is not logical –

it’s rhetorical –

it is to create the impression –

of intellectual authority –

and that only serves the purpose of –

the fool –

or the fraud


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 61


61. …A meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it.

For it is what we learn when the world is incorporated into our language.



a meaning of a word –

is an employment of it –

a use of it

its meaning / employment –

is always open to question –

open to doubt

the world in the absence of description –

is unknown

the world described –

is the world known

any description –

is uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Friday, July 10, 2009

on certainty 60


60. It is wrong to say that the ‘hypothesis’ that this is a bit of paper would be confirmed or disconfirmed by later experience, and that, in “I know that this is a bit of paper,” the “I know” either relates to such an hypothesis or to a logical determination.



this ‘hypothesis’ – will not be confirmed or disconfirmed –

it will be used or it won’t be used –

correct – the ‘I know’ – does not relate to the hypothesis –

and it is logically irrelevant to it

it’s only possible value is rhetorical


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Thursday, July 09, 2009

on certainty 59


59. ‘I know’ is here a logical insight. Only realism can’t be proved by means of it



‘I know’ –

has no logical function –

its function is rhetorical  

if it is an ‘insight’ –

it’s an insight into –

persuasion and deception


© greg t.charlton. 2009.

Wednesday, July 08, 2009

on certainty 58


58. If “I know etc.” is conceived as a grammatical proposition, of course the “I” cannot be important. And it properly means “there is no such thing as doubt in this case” or “The expression ‘I don’t know’ makes no sense in this case”. And of course it follows from this that “I know” makes no sense either.



yes – exactly


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Tuesday, July 07, 2009

on certainty 57

57. Now might not “I know, I am not just surmising, that here is my hand” be conceived as a proposition of grammar? Hence not temporally. –

But in that case isn’t it like this one: “I know, I am not just surmising, that I am seeing red”?

And isn’t the consequence “So there are physical objects” like: “So there are colours”



‘I know, I am not just surmising, that here is my hand’ –

if ‘I know’ means ‘I am certain’ –

then you have – ‘I am certain – I am not uncertain’ –

yes – ‘a proposition of grammar’–  if you like –

and in so far as it has no content – it is just a word game –

‘non-temporal’ – yes –

and irrelevant to anything that follows it

so – ‘here is my hand’ and ‘I am seeing red’ –

are alike in that ‘I know I am not surmising’ –

is of no consequence to either of them –

it’s irrelevant

‘And isn’t the consequence “So there are physical objects” like: “So there are colours”’ –

‘so there are physical objects’ – is a way of explaining ‘hand’ –

‘so there are colours’ – is a way of explaining ‘red’ –

in so far as the concepts of physical object and colour –

are explanatory concepts –

yes they are alike – but this is a similarity of use –

and their use – their actual – temporal use –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

we can go even further –

and put the whole concept of explanation –

to the question –

of what value is it?

again this is a question of circumstance and use –

can you imagine a circumstance –

in which it is of no use –

to explain?


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Monday, July 06, 2009

on certainty 56


56. So when one says: “Perhaps this planet doesn’t exist and the light-phenomenon arises in some other way”, then after all one needs an example of an object which does exist. This doesn’t exist, - as for example does….

Or are we to say that certainty is merely a constructed point to which some things approximate more, some less closely? No. Doubt gradually loses its sense. This language-game just is like that.

And everything descriptive of a language-game is part of logic.



outside of description – what exists – is unknown –

where a description – for one reason or another – doesn’t work –

then we need to come up with another description –

and put it to the test of utility

‘Doubt gradually loses its sense.’

yes – if you stop questioning – if you stop thinking

‘This language-game just is like that’ –

any use of language –

is a game of questioning –

is a game of doubt

‘And everything descriptive of a language-game is part of logic’

logic itself is a language game –

the point being –

there is no ground to description –

there is no end to it

any description – is open to question –

is open to further description –

always the question will be –

which description functions?

which description works?

the matter is always uncertain 


© greg t. charlton. 2009.