'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Sunday, May 31, 2009

on certainty 12


12. – For “I know” seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew”.



there are no guarantees –

and any ‘fact’ – is open to question –

open to doubt

if ‘I know’ is used to guarantee – what is ‘known’ – as a fact –

then in a logical sense –

‘I know’ is misused –

for ‘I know ‘ – so used is false and misleading

still the fact remains ‘I know’ is used in such a manner-

and what this shows is that the real function of ‘I know’ –

is rhetorical –

that is to say –

the point of it is persuasion –

a persuasion based on –

deception

‘I thought I knew’ –

is the realization that –

that if to know – is to be certain –

then –

‘I don’t know’


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Saturday, May 30, 2009

on certainty 11


11. We just do not know how specialized the use of “I know” is.



if we don’t know the specialized use of ‘I know’-

then there is no specialized use


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 10


10. I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face. – So I don’t know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense. Any more than the assertion “I am here”, which I might yet use at any moment, if the suitable occasion presented itself. – Then is “2 x 2 + 4” nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions? “2 x 2 = 4” is a true proposition of arithmetic – not “on particular occasions” nor “always” – but the spoken or written sentence “2 x 2 = 4” in Chinese might have a different meaning or be out and out nonsense, and from this is seen that it is only in use that a proposition has sense. And “I know that there’s a sick man lying here”, used in an unsuitable situation, seems not to be nonsense but rather seems matter-of-course, only because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it, and one thinks that the words “I know that…..” are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would be unintelligible.



we do imagine situations for use

and it is only in use – that a proposition has sense –

which is to say – function

but just what that sense is –

what it amounts to –

is an uncertain matter –

Wittgenstein says 2 x 2 = 4 – is a true proposition of arithmetic

yes – it’s a proposition of arithmetic –

and it is true – if it is assented to

‘I know that …’ – is a claim to an authority –

the only authority – is authorship

it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

to state that you are the author – of your assertion

if ‘I know’ is meant as an expression of certainty –

it is always out of place

a proposition is a proposal –

and the ground of any proposal –

is uncertainty

doubt is only unintelligible –

to those who do not think


NB


2 x 2 = 4 –

is a proposal for a sign game –

a game of sign substitution

the game is defined by the ‘=’ sign –

the operation to the left of the ‘=’ sign –

can be substituted for the sign to the right –

that’s the game –

if you play the game –

as it is designed to be played

you play it without question –

there are no questions in the game –

the equal sign is not a question mark

however this is not to say –

the game itself – is without question –

its terms – its operations – its concepts –

are all – uncertain

the propositions of mathematics 

are like any other proposition –

open to question –

open to doubt


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

on certainty 9


9. Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand – my own hand, that is?                                                                                                                                     


how do I make sure?

do I know how ‘to make sure’?

am I certain about how to make sure?

do I make sure?

no


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 8


8. The difference between the concept of ‘knowing’ and the concept of ‘being certain’ isn’t of any great importance at all, except where “I know” is meant to mean I can’t be wrong. In a law court, for example, “I am certain” could replace “I know” in every piece of testimony. We might even imagine its being forbidden to say “I know” there. [A passage in Wilhem Meister, where “you know” or “You knew” is used in the sense “You were certain”, the facts being different from what he knew.]



the facts being different from what he knew –

nevertheless he was certain

if so

certainty is either an irrelevancy –

a delusion –

or both

and once certainty has been dropped –

if we are to use the term ‘knowing’ –

it needs to understood as meaning –

being uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Monday, May 25, 2009

on certainty 7


7. My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on – I tell a friend e.g. “Take that chair over there”, “Shut the door’, etc. etc.



if I claim knowledge and certainty –

my life shows that I make these claims

it does not show that there is a basis to these claims

in fact the making of these claims –

invites – doubt

my life is an invitation –

to doubt


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Sunday, May 24, 2009

on certainty 6


6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. – For otherwise the expression “I know” gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed.



with ‘I know ..’ ‘I know …’  ‘I know …’

etc . etc. –

it is not that ‘I know’ gets misused –

it gets revealed

for what it is –

unnecessary and irrelevant

and the mental state –

revealed –

‘queer’ – ‘extremely important’ –

or otherwise

is pretentiousness –

and the basis of pretension –

is either deception –

or delusion


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Saturday, May 23, 2009

on certainty 5


5. Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition.



a proposition is false – if I dissent from it

what  I make count as determinants –

is the argument for my dissent


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Thursday, May 21, 2009

on certainty 4


4. “I know that I am a human being.” In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean “I know I have the organs of a human.” (E.g. a brain which, after all no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as “I know I have a brain”? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it is operated on.



doubt does not require grounds –

doubt is the questioning of grounds
 

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 3


3. If e.g. someone says “I don’t know if there is a hand here’ he might be told “Look closer”. – This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. It is one of its essential features.



when does he stop looking closer?

when he’s  found what?

knowledge?

any ‘satisfaction’ here –

is pretence

and yes – perhaps pretence –

just is one of the essential features –

of the language-game


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 2

2. From it seeming to me – or to everyone – to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.

What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it.



saying something seems to be the case –

is to regard it as uncertain

any proposal as to what is the case –

is open to question –

open to doubt


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Wednesday, May 20, 2009

on certainty 1


1. If you do know that here is one hand, we will grant you all the rest.

When one says that such and such a proposition can’t be proved, of course that does not mean that it can’t be derived from other propositions; any propositions can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself. (On this a curious remark by H. Newman.)



‘If you do know that here is one hand, we will grant you all the rest.’

if you are certain of one proposition  -

any derived from it – will be certain?

the question is can you be certain of any proposition?

certainty is what?

a claim to an authority that is beyond question –

first up the only authority you have is authorship –

secondly any proposition – any proposal – you put forward –

is open to question – open to doubt

the claim of certainty is at best no more than a rhetorical claim –

the point of which is to persuade – yourself – or others –

of an authority (beyond authorship) – that you don’t have –

it ‘s a false claim – based the in deception or ignorance

and yes – derivation – is really just a language game –

it guarantees nothing


© greg t. charlton. 2009.