'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Tuesday, June 30, 2009

on certainty 47


47. This is how one calculates. Calculating is this. What we learn at school, for example. Forget this transcendent certainty, which is connected with your concept of spirit.



yes – calculating is this

the action of calculating –

there will be descriptions of the action – of this

but this

without description – is still calculating

without description  this

is unknown –

and in this –

lies the real beauty and power of mathematics –

mathematics shows us clearly –

that we can and do operate effectively –

without description –

without ‘knowledge’ –

in the unknown


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Monday, June 29, 2009

on certainty 46


46. But then can’t it be described how we satisfy ourselves of the reliability of a calculation? O yes! Yet no rule emerges when we do so. – But the most important thing is: The rule is not needed. Nothing is lacking. We do calculate according to a rule, and that is enough.



the calculation is a game of sign substitution –

where  x = y –

satisfying yourself of the reliability of a calculation –

is nothing more than accepting its terms –

and this you have to do –

if you are to play the game

if you don’t accept its terms –

you don’t play the game

and yes – you can question the game –

any aspect of it –

x = y – is a proposal for substitution –

it is not a rule –

and there is no rule underlying it –

no authority behind it –

what does underlie it is a practise –

a practise that is open to question –

open doubt


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 45


45. We got to know the nature of calculating by learning to calculate.



we learn by doing –

but we don’t get to know the nature of anything –

if by ‘know’ you mean – know with certainty

yes – we may develop – explanations – descriptions –

of what it is we do –

but there is no one account-

what we have is possible accounts –

and the value of any account –

is that it is useful to us – at the time –

in the circumstances that we do –what we do

point  being –

another account may be useful to us –

under different circumstances

I find it quite extraordinary –

that Wittgenstein – didn’t see this –

but I guess if he had –

he wouldn’t have written a book –

on certainty


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 44


44. If you demand a rule from which it follows that there can’t have been a miscalculation here, the answer is that we did not learn this through a rule, but by learning to calculate.



yes – if you follow the directive that is the calculation –

you will calculate

if you don’t – or you can’t –

it’s not that you miscalculate

you just don’t

calculate


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Sunday, June 28, 2009

on certainty 43


43. What sort of proposition is this: “We cannot have miscalculated in 12 x 12 = 144”? It must surely be a proposition of logic.

–But now, is it not the same, or doesn’t it come to the same, as the statement 12 x 12 = 144’



the claim – ‘we cannot have miscalculated in …’

is a rhetorical claim –

as is the follow up statement here –

‘it must surely be a proposition of logic’

12 x 12 = 144 –

is a game proposition –

if you follow the instruction that is 12 x 12 = 144 –

you play the game –

the game of sign substitution –

and presumably you do so –

because you have a use for it

and if you actually play the game –

you play it as it as directed –

you play – without question

the concepts behind the proposition –

behind the game –

have  been developed –

in a context of argument and dispute

the ground of any mathematical proposition –

is uncertainty


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Friday, June 26, 2009

on certainty 42


42. One can say “He believes it, but it isn’t so”, but not “He knows it, but it isn’t so”. Does this stem from the difference between the mental states of belief and of knowledge? No. – One may for example call “mental state” what is expressed by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures etc. It would thus be possible to speak of a mental state of conviction, and that may be the same whether it is knowledge or false belief. To think that different states must correspond to the words “believe” and “know” would be as if one believed that different people had to correspond.



all you need to say here is ‘it isn’t so’ –

claiming authority for the proposition – for the proposal –

be it the authority of belief – or the authority of knowledge –

is rhetoric –

and furthermore –

‘explaining’ the difference between –

the claim of belief and the claim of knowledge –

in terms of ‘mental states’ –

or indeed in other terms –

is just more rhetoric –

rhetoric –

on rhetoric


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Thursday, June 25, 2009

on certainty 41


41. “I know where I am feeling pain”, “I know that I feel it here” is as wrong as “I know that I am in pain”. But “I know where you touched my arm” is right.



the preface ‘I know’ – adds nothing to any assertion –

nothing except rhetoric –

best to drop it altogether

‘I know’ is a claim to authority –

the only authority is authorship –

any claim to an authority beyond authorship – is false –

if it has rhetorical effect –

that effect is based on deception

‘I am feeling pain’ –  ‘I feel it here’ – ‘I am in pain’ –

and ‘you touched my arm’ –

these statements are neither right or wrong –

how they are used –

how they function – how they are understood –

how they are evaluated –

is a question of circumstance

is a matter of uncertainty


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 40


40. Upon “I know that here is my hand” there may follow the question “How do you know?” and the answer to that presupposes that this can be known in that way. So, instead of “I know that here is my hand”, one might say “Here is my hand”, and then add how one knows.



dropping ‘I know’ is a good start –

the assertion is all that is required

adding how one knows –

is rhetoric


© greg t.charlton. 2009.

on certainty 39


39. This is how calculation is done, in such circumstances a calculation is treated as absolutely reliable, as certainly correct.



‘This is how a calculation is done’ –

is to say nothing about any supposed grounds or foundation

This is how a calculation is done’ –

is simply an instruction –

you follow it or you don’t –

saying it is ‘absolutely reliable’ and ‘certainly correct’ – etc

is really just ornamentation –

unnecessary and irrelevant –

rhetoric


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

on certainty 38


38. Knowledge in mathematics: Here one has to keep on reminding oneself of the unimportance of the ‘inner process’ or ‘state’ and ask “Why should it be important? What does it matter to me?” What is interesting is how we use mathematical propositions.



mathematics –

is designed as a tool –

and the action of the tool –

has no reference –

to inner process


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

on certainty 37


37. But is it an inadequate answer to the scepticism of the idealist, or the assurances of the realist, to say that “There are physical objects” is nonsense? For them after all it is nonsense. It would, however, be an answer to say: this assertion, or its opposite is a misfiring attempt to express what can’t be expressed like that. And that it does misfire can be shewn; but that isn’t the end of the matter. We need to realize that what presents itself to us as the first expression of a difficulty, or its solution, may as yet not be correctly expressed at all. Just as one who has a just censure of a picture to make will often at first offer the censure where it does not belong, and an investigation is needed in order to find the right point of attack for the critic.



the sceptic will have an open mind on the use of ‘there are physical objects’ –

and the realist – even given his preference for realism – should do the same –

be open and critical

‘a misfiring attempt to express what can’t be expressed like that’ –

if you have a definite view of reality –

and a definite view about what can expressed –

you can play the misfiring game –

but all that amounts to is pretense –

false claims of intellectual authority and superiority –

the real game – dealing with reality –

is dealing with uncertainty –

and for that you need an open mind –

and a brave heart

in reality there is no ‘misfiring’ –

what can be shown is possibility

possible ways of understanding –

possible ways of describing –

possible ways of evaluating –

none of which are certain –

all of which are valid

‘We need to realize that what presents itself to us as the first expression of a difficulty, or its solution, may as yet not be correctly expressed at all.’

if there is a difficulty with the proposition ‘there are physical objects’ –

it will be a difficulty of use in a particular context – for a particular user – or community of users

we can’t say in advance what such a difficulty would in fact be –

that really is an empirical matter

and yes the expression of a difficulty or its solution – is an uncertain matter –

it is not that there is a ‘correct’ expression –

at best there will be a functional expression – 

that those involved decide they can work with

and this decision will not be set in stone –

it will be uncertain

nevertheless it will be what is proceeded with –

what is acted on –

if there is a move forward

‘Just as one who has a just censure of a picture to make will often at first offer the censure where it does not belong, and an investigation is needed in order to find the right point of attack for the critic.’

a so called ‘just censure’ –

will be no more than someone’s view of how the picture ‘works’ –

the point being the picture is open to interpretation –

interpretation is an uncertain affair

there is no ‘right’ point of ‘attack’ –

there is just different points of view –

and the picture like the reality it pictures – is uncertain

as to ‘investigation’ –

yes one can argue one’s point of view –

and listen to the views of others and their arguments –

who’s to say what will come of a good discussion?


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Monday, June 22, 2009

on certainty 36


36. “A is a physical object” is a piece of instruction which we give only to someone who doesn’t understand either what “A” means, or what “physical object’ means. Thus it is instruction about the use of words, and “physical object” is a logical concept. (Like colour, quantity,….) And that is why no such proposition as: “There are physical objects” can be formulated.

Yet we encounter such unsuccessful shots at every turn.



‘A is a physical object

is not a statement that makes any real sense –

outside of some context

when we consider it as Wittgenstein has presented it here –

we consider it is a candidate for sense

so we need to know the circumstance in which the statement is made –

in order for it to have sense

yes it could be an instruction about the use of words

and yes ‘physical object’ – in a certain context –

might be further described as a ‘logical concept’

the fact is – the proposition ‘there are physical objects’ –

can be formulated –

as Wittgenstein’s formulation of it here shows

the question is not of formulation – but use –

and just how it is to be used –

is not a certain matter –

and for that reason –

there will be no definite analysis

if you take the view that ‘there are physical objects’ –

is context independent –

then it will not be a shot –

at anything


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Sunday, June 21, 2009

on certainty 35


35. But can’t it be imagined that there should be no physical objects? I don’t know. And yet “there are physical objects” is nonsense. Is it supposed to be an empirical proposition?

And is this an empirical proposition: “there seems to be physical objects”? 



any description is first and foremost a response to the unknown –

the point of any such description is to provide a basis or ground for action –

if a description does this – it has function –

if it doesn’t it is of no use

can it be imagined that there are no physical objects?

is to ask could the description ‘there are no physical objects’ be of use?

this is an empirical question

and the description – ‘there seems to be physical objects’ –

again is that of use?

and if it is – it is an empirical proposition

if it is usable – it is testable

one thing is obvious –

these descriptions have a use for Wittgenstein –

right here

                                                                                                                                  
 © greg t. charlton. 2009.

Saturday, June 20, 2009

on certainty 34


34. If someone is taught to calculate, is he also taught that he can rely on a calculation of his teacher’s? But these explanations must after all sometime come to an end. Will he also be taught that he can trust his senses – since he is indeed told in many cases that in such and such a special case you cannot trust them? –

Rule and exception.



‘If someone is taught to calculate, is he also taught that he can rely on a calculation of his teacher’s?

being taught to rely on a calculation of the teacher –

is being taught to assume the teacher’s authority

‘But these explanations must after all sometime come to an end.’

they come to an end when people stop asking for them –

and most likely that will happen once they realise that all they are getting in these so called ‘explanations’ –

is just reassertions of the initial claim of authority –

and when they realise –

this claim to authority – is based on nothing –

nothing but – assertion

‘Will he also be taught that he can trust his senses – since he is indeed told in many cases that in such and such a special case you cannot trust them? –

the idea of trust here – is irrelevant

you operate with your senses –

and what the senses show you – display to you –

is uncertainty

and it is this uncertainty –

that is the source –

of all the power variety and beauty –

of sensuality

rule and exception?

a rule is just another uncertain proposition –

and likewise any ‘exception’ –

to any so called rule


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Friday, June 19, 2009

on certainty 33


33. Thus we expunge the sentences that don’t get us any further



a sentence may drop from use –

from favour

this is not to say that it might not have a rebirth –

in a different setting –

in different circumstances

the matter is uncertain

what sentences we use and when we use them –

is an open matter

in the propositional reality –

nothing gets expunged


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Thursday, June 18, 2009

on certainty 32


32. It’s not a matter of Moore’s knowing that there is a hand there, but rather we should not understand him if he were to say “Of course I may be wrong about this”.  We should ask “What is it like to make such a mistake as that?” – e.g. what’s it like to discover that it is a mistake?



if you understand that any proposition –

is open to question – open to doubt

then you see – that what you are dealing with –

is uncertainty

and so – to claim the certainty – 

of being right – or wrong – mistaken or not –

is to be false – and deceptive

and while such claims –

may have rhetorical impact –

any such impact –

comes at the cost –

of logical integrity


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

on certainty 31


31. The propositions which one comes back to again and again as if bewitched – these I should like to expunge from philosophical language.



all propositions are a response to the unknown –

it is not propositions per se that we come back to time and again –

but the object of these propositions –

the unknown –

and it cannot be anything but –

bewitching


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

on certainty 30


30. When someone has made sure of something, he says: “Yes, the calculation is right”, but he did not infer from his condition of certainty. One does not infer how things are from one’s own certainty.

Certainty is as it were a tone of voice in which one declares how things are, but one does not infer from the tone of voice that one is justified.



yes –‘a tone of voice’ – effectively – just rhetoric

what is justification?

your claim of authority – for your proposition

and your authority?

if it is anything more than your authorship

it is false and deceptive

the claim of justification – like that of certainty

is rhetorical 


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Monday, June 15, 2009

on certainty 29


29. Practice in the use of a rule also shews what is a mistake in its employment



practice in the use of a rule –

will show that despite any rhetoric –

of correct use or mistaken use –

the rule is nothing more than a proposal –

and it’s application – is uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2009

Sunday, June 14, 2009

on certainty 28


28. What is ‘learning a rule’? – This.

What is ‘making a mistake in applying it’? – This. And what is pointed to here is something indeterminate.



yes – and this – could amount anything –

that is to say –

this could be described in any number of ways

‘making a mistake in applying it’ –

the use of any proposition – 

so called ‘rule’ – or not –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

saying you’ve got it right –

or that you’ve got it wrong –

that there is a mistake –

or that there is no mistake –

may have rhetorical impact –

but logically speaking –

such claims are baseless


© greg t. charlon. 2009.

Saturday, June 13, 2009

on certainty 27


27. If, however, one wanted to give something like a rule here, then it would contain the expression “in normal circumstances”. And we recognize normal circumstances but cannot precisely describe them. At most, we can describe a range of abnormal ones.



the idea here is –

if you wanted to rule out a mistake –

in the employment of the rules of calculation –

you would say a mistake is ruled out –

‘in normal circumstances’

there will be no mistake –

in any circumstance –

there are no mistakes in an uncertain reality –

anything we do – any decision we make –

is open to question –

is open to doubt


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Friday, June 12, 2009

on certainty 26

26. But can it be seen from a rule what circumstances logically exclude a mistake in the employment of rules of calculation?

What use is a rule here? Mightn’t we (in turn) go wrong in applying it?



a rule will not determine circumstance –

any so called ‘rule’ is a product of circumstance –

and like circumstance – uncertain

a mistake in the employment of the rules of calculation?

there are no mistakes – in an uncertain reality

any action we take  – is open to question –

open to doubt 


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Thursday, June 11, 2009

on certainty 25


25. One may be wrong even about “there being a hand here”. Only in particular circumstances is it impossible. – “Even in a calculation one can be wrong – only in certain circumstances one can’t.”



it is not a matter of being right or wrong –

the ground of any proposition is uncertainty

you proceed with a proposition –  or you don’t –

and any decision you make here –

is like the proposition itself –

open to question – open to doubt

the calculation is a game – a game of sign substitution –

if you play the game – you play it as designed –

the only question is – do you have a use for it?

which is just to ask – do you need to calculate?

if you don’t – you won’t play –

if you do – you will

the propositions on which the game is based –

logically speaking –

are no different to any other proposition –

they are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

on certainty 24


24. The idealist’s question would be something like: “What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?” (And to that the answer can’t be: I know that they exist.) But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt be like?, and I don’t understand this straight off.



the idealist doesn’t doubt the existence of his hands –

he doubts the materialist description of his hands

his hands as such – in the absence of any description –

are unknown


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Tuesday, June 09, 2009

on certainty 23


23. If I don’t know whether someone has two hands (say whether they have been amputated or not) I shall believe his assurance that he has two hands, if he is trustworthy. And if he says he knows it, that can only signify to me that he has been able to make sure, and hence that his arms are e.g. not still concealed by coverings and bandages, etc. etc. My believing the trustworthy man stems from my admitting that it is possible for him to make sure. But someone who says that perhaps there are no physical objects makes no such admissions.



someone’s assurance – is really their rhetoric

and saying someone is ‘trustworthy’ – is saying you believe their rhetoric –

you’ve fallen in

if he says he knows it – that is a claim to an authority

which if it means anything more than his authorship

is false and deceptive –

is rhetoric

and ‘making sure’ – is what?

reasserting his claim – in some other terms –

in short – rhetoric

all anyone one needs to do is state their case –

make their statement 

and leave it at that

loading it up with assurances – claims to knowledge etc-

is unnecessary and misleading

their  proposition is like any other –

uncertain

you can run with it – or not

and whatever reason you have for your assent or dissent –

that too –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

someone who says perhaps there are no physical objects –

is someone who calls into question – the description ‘physical object’ –

and yes –

if you are questioning a description – in this case – a world view –

you will not be engaged in –

rhetoric


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Monday, June 08, 2009

on certainty 22


22. It would surely be remarkable if we had to believe the reliable person who says “I can’t be wrong”; or who says “I am not wrong”.



you don’t have to believe anyone –

about anything –

it wouldn’t be ‘remarkable’ – if you did –

it would just be –

mindless and stupid

if you think someone is ‘reliable’ –

you’re been conned

the game is never reliable –

so why they players?

anyone who claims certainty –

is either a fool –

or they’re trying to fool you –

don’t be fooled


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Sunday, June 07, 2009

on certainty 21


21. Moore’s concept really comes down to this: the concept ‘know’ is analogous to the concepts ‘believe’, ‘surmise’, ‘doubt’, ‘be convinced’ in that the statement “I know…..” can’t be a mistake. And if that is so, then there can be an inference from such an utterance to the truth of an assertion. And here the form “I thought I knew” is being overlooked. – But if this latter is inadmissible, then a mistake in the assertion must be logically impossible too. And anyone who is acquainted with the language-game must realize this – an assurance from a reliable man that he knows cannot contribute anything.



if every assertion is uncertain –

then the concept of a ‘mistake ‘ – is irrelevant

yes the claim ‘to know’ – contributes nothing –

whether from a ‘reliable man’ or not –

unless rhetoric is regarded as a contribution


© greg t. charlton. 2010.

Saturday, June 06, 2009

on certainty 20


20. “Doubting the existence of the external world” does not mean for example doubting the existence of a planet, which later observations prove to exist. – Or does Moore want to say that here is his hand is different in kind from knowing the existence of the planet Saturn? Otherwise it would be possible to point out the discovery of the planet Saturn to the doubters and say that its existence has been proved, and hence the existence of the external world as well.



reality –

before any account –

any description –

is unknown

we put forward different accounts –

different descriptions

i.e. materialism  and idealism –

to make known

any knowledge here –

is uncertain

the question is not –

which account is true –

which is false?

but how –

and in what circumstances –

any account –

is useful to us?


© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 19


19. The statement “I know that here is a hand” may then be continued: “for it is my hand that I’m looking at”. Then a reasonable man will not doubt that I know. – Nor will the idealist; rather he will say that he was not dealing with the practical doubt which is being dismissed, but there is a further doubt behind that one. – That this is an illusion has to be shewn in a different way.



‘for it is my hand that I am looking at ‘ –

is really just a piece of rhetoric –

as indeed – is the claim to ‘know’ –

if you drop all the rhetoric here –

all the persuasion –

what you have is the basic statement –

‘here is my hand’ –

the statement is not certain –

it is open to question – it is open to doubt –

but at least it is honest –

and it comes without –

irrelevant and misleading baggage

the claim –‘that this is an illusion’ –

really just focuses our attention –

on the fact that reality –

can be and is –

variously described –

and understood


© greg t. charlton. 2009.