'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.



Friday, December 01, 2017

NOTICE: Publication of 'Feyerabend's Against Method'

Killer Press announces the publication of 'Feyerabend's Against Method' by Greg T. Charlton. This book is a critical study of Paul Feyerabend's 'Against Method'. It is a work in the philosophy of science. Published Decemeber 2017. ISBN: 978-0-9806987-3-2.

Monday, November 27, 2017

on parfit

what follows are some notes on derrick parfit’s moral theory

I have focused on and borrowed extensively from professor peter simger’s introduction to his book ‘does anything really matter: essays on parfit on objectivity’ – as the basis of my consideration –

singer’s introduction is superb

what follows is not a assessment or criticism of  singer’s views –

it is parfit’s ideas – as introduced by singer – that I consider here

the way I am proceeding here is I will quote from singer’s introduction – and follow that with my response to the text


‘Kantianism, contractualism, and rule consequentialism—are in fundamental agreement, identifying the same acts as wrong. Underlying and supporting this original and important argument, however, is another, more fundamental claim, also defended at considerable length: that there are objective moral truths, and other normative truths about what we have reasons to believe, and to want, and to do.’


that we have an action (a ‘wrong action’) – that is accounted for in terms of different theories is nothing remarkable

that underlying this concurrence of determination are objective moral truths – is one explanation

it is not the only one

i.e. it may be that as a matter of custom certain acts are regarded as wrong –

and all that kantianism – contractualism and rule consequentialism –  amount to is different explanations of customary behaviour

any explanation of any aspect of moral behaviour is a proposal

and logically speaking a proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

in the absence of explanation – of any explanatory proposal – an act is without description – and from an epistemological point of view – an unknown

we proposes to make known

the objective reality – the reality we propose in relation to – is the unknown

the unknown is silent

moral truths?

a true a moral proposition – is one that is affirmed – for whatever reason

a false proposition is one that is denied – and for whatever reason

our affirmations – our denials – and our reasons – are from a logical point of view – 

open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

our reality – our moral reality is the reality of propositional uncertainty

and it is this propositional uncertainty – this logical uncertainty – that has given rise to different moral theories and perspectives

and it is through the many and different moral theories and perspectives that we explore moral uncertainty –

the role of the moral philosopher is to critically investigate the various theories and perspectives that have been proposed –

and in so doing perhaps even to propose new and different accounts – that are open to question – open to doubt and are uncertain


‘Hume assumes, and we commonly believe, that morality must be able to influence what we do. Otherwise, we may wonder, what is its point? But Hume also held that reason alone cannot move us to action. Our wants and desires determine our ultimate goals, and the role of reason is limited to telling us how best to achieve these goals. Reason applies to means, not ends. Hence, Hume famously held, it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger, and equally not contrary to reason to choose my own total ruin to prevent a trivial harm to a stranger. Even acting contrary to one’s own interests—preferring “my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater” is, on Hume’s view, not contrary to reason. What it is rational for me to do depends on what I want. If Hume is right both in his assumption about the relation between morality and action, and about the role of reason in action, then there is an obvious problem for those who think that moral judgments can be objectively true. Moral judgments will only be able to influence our actions if they somehow connect with our desires, and my desires may differ from yours without either of us making a mistake. Wants and desires are neither true nor false. An objectively true moral judgment would have to be true for everyone, irrespective of what he or she most desires, but what reason for acting would it offer to those whose desires are not furthered by acting on it?’


morality must be able to influence what we do – otherwise what is the point?

the way I would put it is that every action we take has a moral dimension to it

we constantly question and decide what is right – what is wrong – what is good and what is bad

the moral question and the moral decision are entirely natural to human beings

such question – such decision is of our nature

what hume and others call ‘morality’ – is moral theory – of one kind or another

the question then is – do such theories of morality influence what we do?

what influences our moral decisions – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

for those who are exposed – in one way or another to moral theory –

it is likely that those theories will influence –

however they may not

whether they influence of not – is a purely contingent matter – a matter of circumstance –

moral theory – is one among any number of possible influences –

it is not necessary to have such an influence to make a moral decision

and whether or not – and to what extent moral theories influence people’s ethical decisions – is in fact an empirical matter

hume held that reason alone cannot move us to action?

reason here means a proposal as to how to act

any such proposal may move us to act – or it may not

the reality is that we will act – one way or another – even if action here may mean the decision not to proceed with a course of action

what underlies any action in a philosophical sense – will be open to question – open to doubt – will be uncertain

our wants and desires determine our ultimate goals?

what we want and what we desire may well determine our goals

however it is quite possible that we may decide a course of action – that is against our wants and desires

that is we may i.e. decide a course of action that is based on a moral principle that we hold to

i.e. I may want to kill my enemy – desire his demise – but decide not to murder him – because I hold to the proposal that murder is wrong

as for ‘ultimate goals’ – they can change with the wind

‘ultimate goals’ – are proposals designed to give us some sense of direction – for the moment – or perhaps longer –

 we play the ultimate goal game – or just the goal game – for direction – order – and coherence

and we are quite adept at making necessary adjustments – and even radical revision – depending on the circumstances we have to deal with

reason applies to means not ends?

reason is the logical action of question and doubt – reason is the exploration of propositional uncertainty

means and ends – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

what is rational to me is to do what I want?

what I want is what I want –

if what I want is put to question – is put to doubt – is regarded as uncertain –

then what I want is rational

if it is not – then what I want – is not rational

if hume is right then there is a problem for those who believe moral judgments to be objectively true?

if by ‘objectively true’ – you mean a proposition – that is beyond question – beyond doubt – that is certain –

such a proposal defies logical reality – and is better termed a prejudice –

if your morality is based on prejudice – it is not rational – it is irrational and pretentious

moral judgments will only be able to influence our actions if they somehow connect with our desires?

our moral judgments are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

our desires are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

the ‘connection’ is propositional uncertainty

wants and desires are neither true nor false?

a true proposition is a proposition affirmed – a false proposition – a proposition denied

if a want or a desire is expressed – that is proposed – that proposal – that proposition

can be affirmed – can be denied –

an objectively moral judgment would have to be true for everyone – irrespective of what he or she most desires?

there is no ‘have to be true’ – the truth or falsity of a proposal – of a judgment –

is a matter of affirmation or denial

which is to say – it is an empirical issue

if as a matter of empirical fact it could be demonstrated that everyone affirmed a particular moral judgment at a particular time – then you could say that in effect you have an ‘objective moral judgment’ –

I would call it a freak event – and one not beyond question – and doubt

crudely put – ‘objectivity’ is a question of numbers

but what reason for acting would ‘an objectively moral judgment’ offer to those whose desires are not furthered by acting on it?

this objectively moral judgment is an authoritarian fiction –

nevertheless – if confronted with this fiction – what reasons for acting would such a fiction offer to those whose desires are not furthered by it?

the point is you can’t give a so called objective answer here –

first up – you have a proposal – fictional or not – to be considered

and yes this proposal conflicts with my desires –

if I am to consider it rationally – and to consider my desires rationally – that is subject both to question – and to doubt

who knows – I may end up deciding for  the proposal – and against what I desire?

one’s desires are not in a logical void – beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain

desires can change – can be changed – if you have reason to change them

and – one’s reasons too – are not set in stone –

if you are to deal rationally – your desires and your reasons – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘desires’ and ‘reasons’ – are really modes of propositional expression –

a ‘desire’ may be a reason – a ‘reason’ – a desire

what we are dealing with is proposals – propositions – regardless of the terms in which they are expressed – and regardless of how they are conceptually organized


‘Parfit’s critique of the forms of subjectivism that draw on Hume’s view of the limits of practical reason begins with a discussion of the role of reason in a situation relating to self-interest rather than morality. He asks us to imagine a man who cares, as most of us do, about what pleasures or pains he will experience in future, but with this difference: if they will happen on a future Tuesday, he doesn’t care about them at all. If he is contemplating what will happen to him on a Monday, a Wednesday, or any other day, he would much rather experience slight discomfort now than agony on that day; but if the agony will be on a future Tuesday, he doesn’t care about it, and so will choose it over slight discomfort now. This man is not under any illusion that pains on future Tuesdays are less painful than pains on other days, for he knows that when that future Tuesday becomes the present day, the agony will be as terrible as it is on a Monday or Wednesday. He also knows that—since it will then not be a future Tuesday—he will not be at all indifferent to the agony he then experiences. Nor does he believe in a strange deity who will reward him for his indifference to what will happen to him on future Tuesdays. He differs from us purely in what he desires.’


‘If he is contemplating what will happen to him on a Monday, a Wednesday, or any other day, he would much rather experience slight discomfort now than agony on that day…’

he prefers a slight discomfort now – to an imagined future agony –

but isn’t this just effectively to accept the discomfort of now – supposing that things could be worse?

so all we have here is a psychological strategy for dealing with the discomfort of now

as to indifference –

can you be indifferent to the idea of a future pain?

parfit defines indifference as ‘not caring’ 

if you care about something – it must occupy thoughts

what this ‘not caring’ means here – is putting the idea of a future agony out of your mind

but if not considering it – is the argument for preferring – the discomfort of now –

then in preferring the discomfort of now – the future pain is necessarily a consideration –

either you drop the argument for preferring the discomfort of now –

and if that goes – so does the whole future tuesday scenario –

or you have to take the proposed future agony into consideration –

and there goes indifference

‘but if the agony will be on a future Tuesday, he doesn’t care about it, and so will choose it over slight discomfort now’

if he doesn’t care about it – that is doesn’t consider it – puts it out of his mind –

he can’t choose it –

if he does consider it – does care about it

he is not indifferent

so I think this notion of indifference is a pretence –

he pretends not to care – as a strategy for dealing with discomfort

perhaps for this future tuesday man – a useful pretence – but a pretence and self-deception nevertheless –

all we have here is a rather convoluted psychological strategy for dealing with discomfort –

much simpler and more straightforward to say – ‘it looks like I will have to put up with this’ –

or to ask yourself – ‘what can I do now to ease my discomfort?’

to be indifferent in a logical sense is to suspend judgment

the future tuesday man does not suspend judgment

he would prefer the discomfort of now to a future agony

this to make a judgment

‘he differs from us purely in what he desires’ –

does he really?

does anyone desire discomfort?

preferring discomfort now – to an imagined future agony –

is not desiring discomfort –

preferring a future agony – to the discomfort of now

is not desiring agony

preferring a future agony to the discomfort of now –

is an attempt to deny reality – deny the reality of the present discomfort

such an approach will have no effect at all on the discomfort of the present

it is pointless and irrelevant


‘Surely, Parfit claims, this man’s desires are irrational: “That some ordeal would be much more painful is a strong reason not to prefer it. That this ordeal would be on a future Tuesday is no reason to prefer it.” It is difficult to deny that such a man would be irrational, and the only possible source of this irrationality is his desires. But Hume’s approach leaves no room for desires to be rational or irrational. Hume’s followers may say that this a very odd set of desires to have, and that as far as we know no one has ever had this set of desires, but it remains conceivable that someone could have them, and that is enough to pose a problem for Hume’s view.’


parfit has confused desire with preference

that I would prefer to experience pain – now – or indeed in the future – is not to desire pain –

it is to say – if I am to experience pain – I have a preference for when I experience it

when it comes to the question of rationality however – desires and preferences are in the same boat

if you regard your desires – or your preferences – as open to question – open to doubt and uncertain – then you behave logically – you behave rationally

if on the other hand – you regard your desires or your preferences as beyond question – beyond doubt and certain – you behave illogically – and irrationally

in my view parfit’s future tuesday argument completely misses the point on the question of rationality

hume too fails on the issue of rationality –

he fails to see that desires – and reasons too – logically speaking – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

we behave rationally when we recognize and embrace the logic of moral uncertainty

where we operate without question and without doubt – with the pretence of certainty  – be it with regard to desires – preferences – or reasons – our moral propositions and our actions are irrational

if the future tuesday man holds his proposal – odd as it might be – open to question – open to doubt – and regards it as uncertain – he holds the proposal rationally –

if on the other hand he regards his proposal as beyond question – beyond doubt – and thus certain – he holds the proposal irrationally


‘Moreover, many people have attitudes that are somewhat like future Tuesday. Many people put off going to the dentist, for instance, even though they are well aware that doing so will mean more pain overall than if they were to go to the dentist now. At least in extreme cases, these desires also seem to be irrational. But subjectivists about reason cannot, it seems, say that they are. Similarly, subjectivists about reason cannot say that the fact that putting my hand in a flame will cause me agony is a reason not to put my hand in the flame. They must say that whether I now have a reason not to put my hand in the flame will depend on whether I now desire to avoid agony. Parfit thinks this is a mistake: desires do not give us reasons for acting. I may desire to experience agony, but that does not give me any reason to put my hand in the flame, since I have no reason to have this desire, and strong reason not to have it.’


a desire can be held rationally or irrationally – a reason can be held either rationally or irrationally

and by a ‘reason’ here – I mean a proposal – the point of which is to account for a proposed course of action –

if the ‘reason’ is held open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

it is held rationally

if it is not held open to question – it is not held rationally

the same is true of desires

as to the hand in the flame –

if the proposal to put your hand in a flame – is considered critically – put to question – put to doubt – and regarded as an uncertain proposal –

then that proposal is held rationally –

if it is not considered critically – the proposal is held irrationally

do I have reasons for my desires?

we can have accounts – explanations – that is reasons – for our desires

i.e. I may see my desire as a result of a current circumstance – I might explain it in terms of my biology – I might even explain in it terms of my upbringing –

I may have no account of why I desire a certain outcome

having reasons is about explanations – proposals to account for desires

there is no necessity here –

you can operate without having an account of what you do – or you can have an explanation

desires do not give us reasons for acting?

a desire may be  proposed as a reason for acting –

and here – as it were – the desire is becomes a reason – the desire functions as a reason


‘Parfit grants that, on his view, reasons may not motivate us. Whether something will motivate me to act in a certain way is, he says, a psychological fact, and quite distinct from the normative fact that I have a reason to act in that way. I may have a reason to do something without being motivated to do it. Since subjectivists deny that there are any objective, or object-given, reasons for acting, if Parfit is right that having a present desire for something does not give one a reason for acting, it would follow that on the subjectivist view we have no reasons for doing anything, and hence, though some things may matter to us, in a larger sense, nothing matters.’


a reason as an account of an action – and an explanation of an action –

can the way that I account for any proposed action – be a motivation for my action?

if I understand a proposed action as a good action – as the right thing to do –

might not my account of the proposed action – be a reason for doing it?

I would say it could be – that it might be –

on the other hand I don’t think it need be

I might act quite instinctively – without any reflection – without any consideration of whether the act is good – or any thought that it is the right thing to do

so I think we can be motivated by reasons – but that we are not necessarily motivated by reasons

motivation as a psychological fact?

yes – you can describe motivation as psychological

but having a reason – an account – an explanation for an act – is psychological

reasons do not exist in a non-psychological reality or dimension

yes – I may have a reason to do something – without being motivated to do it

but equally my reason may motivate me

having a present desire for acting does not give one reason for acting?

if I have a present desire for something and I think that having it would make me happy – yes – I may regard that desire as a reason to act

however it could also be said that – even though I have this reason – my happiness –

that reason may not cause me to act – that too is possible

the reality is that we cannot give a definitive – answer here

whether a reason does or does not cause me to act – will be a matter of circumstance –

it would follow that on the subjectivist view we have no reason for doing anything?

as a matter of fact people can and do give some account of their actions –

and so they have reasons for doing what they do

and by the same token – it is quite possible that someone may well say ‘I had no reason for doing it – but I did it just the same’

and hence that though some things may matter to us – in a larger sense nothing matters?

yes I suppose that ‘nothing’ by definition – does not matter

what matters to you is what you are concerned about

can anyone live without being concerned about something – about many things?

I think not


‘Hence Parfit eschews any middle ground that would allow us to accept subjectivism but go on as if nothing much had changed. For him, if there are no ethical truths, nihilism awaits and his life has been wasted…’


as for nihilism –

human beings propose ethical truths –

as long as there are human beings – there will be ethical proposals that they affirm –

that one’s life has been wasted – it’s a fair enough proposal 

but again – if it is to be dealt with logically and rationally – it will be held open to question – open to doubt – and regarded as uncertain


‘Parfit rejects not only ethical subjectivism, but also ethical naturalism. To say that we have reason to reduce suffering, other things being equal, is to make a substantive normative claim that Parfit believes to be true, but it is not something that we can deduce from the meanings of moral terms like “good” or “ought.” Here Parfit agrees with Hume that we cannot deduce an “ought” from an “is,” meaning that no set of natural facts implies, on its own, any normative truths. We cannot identify normative truths with facts about the natural world, whether about our biological nature, about evolution, or about what we would approve of under some set of specified conditions, or any other causal or psychological fact.’


I can put the proposal – i.e. ‘I ought to do x’ – and I can also put the proposal ‘the grass is green’

yes these are different proposals –

and as hume has showed – these different proposals can be analysed in different terms

nevertheless – different as they are – they have the same logical properties – they are open to question – open to doubt – and as such – uncertain

yes – there are naturalistic and non-naturalistic accounts of moral propositions –

but any such account of propositions – as with the propositions themselves – is open to question

how we account for propositions – how we describe them – and how we explain them –  has I think to do with metaphysical preferences – if not prejudices

we develop different ways of understanding our propositions – we develop different ways of understanding the world –

and these different proposals in thought and language –  enrich us – enrich our world with propositional diversity

this diversity I would put is a natural response to propositional uncertainty


‘How then do we come to know normative truths? Like many of his objectivist predecessors—Richard Price in the eighteenth century, Henry Sidgwick in the nineteenth, and W. D. Ross in the early twentieth, Parfit is an intuitionist. “We have,” he writes, “intuitive abilities to respond to reasons and to recognize some normative truths.” But these intuitive abilities are not, for Parfit, some special quasi-sensory faculty, nor do we use them to discover some mysterious new realm of non-natural facts. Rather, we come to see that we have reasons for doing some things, in something like the way in which we come to see that two plus two equals four.’


how do we come to know normative truths?

how we come to know normative truths – is we propose them –

knowledge is proposal –

in the absence of proposal – what we face is the unknown –

we propose – to make known

as to the ground or basis of such proposals – this too is a matter of proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

parfit goes with a version of intuitionism

which to my mind amounts to saying that there is no basis to a normative proposal – but the proposal itself –

if that is what intuitionism comes down to – I have no argument

but if intuitionism is meant as a ground to an ethical proposal – that is beyond question – beyond doubt – that is certain – then intuitionism is a pretence –

‘we have reasons for doing some things – in something like the way we come to see that 2 + 2 = 4’

2 = 2 = 4 – is a rule governed sign-game – a language game

this is not good enough – it trivializes morality –

yes we propose reasons – and these reasons emerge out of our experience of moral uncertainty –

and are in fact uncertain themselves –

morality is this exploration of uncertainty –

it is the exploration of our lived propositional experience

it is not trivial


‘This rubs against the widely held metaphysical view that the world can be fully explained by reference to the kind of facts that are open to investigation by the natural sciences. Rejecting this view seems to open the way to believing in all kinds of spooky entities, and hence many non-religious philosophers have accepted metaphysical or ontological naturalism. Parfit does not defend non-natural religious beliefs, but argues that without irreducibly normative truths, nihilists would be right, for nothing would matter. It is, for example, an irreducibly normative claim that if we establish that the premises of a valid argument are true, then we have a decisive reason for believing the conclusion of the argument.’


the widely held view that the world can be fully explained by the natural sciences?

I presume that what is meant here is that we can in principle have a complete explanation –

logically speaking – any proposal – any explanation – is open –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

to hold that any matter is fully explained – is pretentious

even when we have decided for a proposal – or settled on a course of action –

if we behave logically  – we continue to question – continue to doubt –

what we investigate and what we explore is propositional uncertainty

to hold that any proposition is beyond question – that is certain – is to hold a prejudice

there is no sin in this – a good deal of human propositional action is the assertion of prejudice

my point is that such behaviour – is not logical

the world can be explained in any number of ways

and any proposal put will be open to question – open to doubt – and will be –

uncertain

without irreducibility of normative truth – the nihilists win the day?

irreducibility – amounts to the end of question – the end of doubt – the claim of certainty

the argument for irreducibility – is the argument for prejudice

and to suggest that in the absence of prejudice – there is nothing –  nothing to be concerned about –

is for mine – plain ignorant – and quite preposterous

so called ‘normative proposals’ are made – are put in various forms – and acted upon – and this is as natural as sunshine –

this is an empirical reality –

and the logical reality is that any such proposal – or any proposal regarding its basis –

is uncertain

and it is this uncertainty that is the ground of our morality – of our freedom

the valid argument –

if we establish that the premises of a valid argument are true – then we have a decisive reason for believing the conclusion of the argument?

a proposal – a proposition – a premise is true – if it is affirmed –

and whatever argument is given – if an argument is given – for the affirmation –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the first premise

i.e. – all men are mortal
         john is a man
        ___

         john is mortal

the valid argument is a language game –

really a piece of poetry

the propositions of such an argument are open to question

we have a ‘decisive reason’ for believing the conclusion of the argument –

if we decide – to stop questioning and to suspend doubt


‘Thus Parfit challenges metaphysical naturalists: if the position you defend were true, he says, we could not have any reason to accept it, for there would be no such reasons. It still might be true, but the only position we have any reason to hold is that metaphysical naturalism is false.’


parfit’s argument – as I take it – is that moral naturalism is a form of reductionism –

and he argues that moral statements – are irreducible – therefore naturalism is false –

and so we have no reason to accept it – only reason – not to accept it

to my mind – not much of an ‘argument’ here – more in the line of an arrogant slap down

and what’s with – ‘it still might be true’?

there is no ‘might be true’ –

it is true – if it is affirmed – it is true – for whoever affirms it – when they affirm it – and for whatever reason they give

and indeed – it is false for those who reject it – when they reject it – and for whatever reason they give

and any such affirmation or rejection – and any reasons given for the affirmation or rejection – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

I think that whatever human beings do is natural – is in accordance with their nature –

and I don’t think there is any complete or final explanation of human nature –

the matter is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

as a matter of practice – I don’t hold to a non-natural – or spiritual conception of reality 

though I like to think I keep an open mind on the matter –

my ‘naturalism’ – is a vague materialism – for me it is more in the line of a working hypothesis –

I am sceptical of any explanation of the world – even of the view that I hold –

and I have no final – knock down explanation for why I hold this view

I have held different metaphysical views at different times

I regard any proposal – metaphysical or otherwise – to be from a logical point of view – uncertain

I try not to be philosophically prejudiced – but find from time to time that I am

as for what I know – it is just and only what I propose – or what is put to me that I affirm

and I don’t believe there is any basis to the propositions I entertain – but the uncertainty that I face and deal with

outside of any proposal – the world – my world – is unknown


‘Some will object that even if we accept Parfit’s arguments, it would be a pyrrhic victory for objectivism. He can overcome Hume’s objections only by rejecting the assumption that morality must be capable of moving us to action. And what is the point of an objective morality, if we are not motivated to act in accordance with the moral truths it contains? Parfit could respond, like Kant, that insofar as we are rational beings, we will respond to the reasons that morality offers. And if we are not, well, the truths of morality would remain true even if no one were to act on them.’


by ‘morality’ here – what we are talking about is those proposals that are put in response to moral issues

these proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain

moral propositions may move us to action – or they may not

‘the reasons that morality offers’ – are just and only those reasons proposed – by those who propose them – when they propose them

we behave rationally if we put these reasons to question – to doubt – if we explore their uncertainty

whether we act on them or not – is not rationally relevant

‘the truths of morality will remain true’?

all this can mean is that moral propositions have been put – are put – and will continue to be put –

however whether or not a moral proposition or set of propositions is affirmed – and by how many – and under what circumstances – is an empirical matter



© greg t. charlton. 2017.

Friday, August 19, 2016

NOTICE

The work previously published in this blog on Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Grammar' is being reviewed and edited.

The finished work will be published in book form by killer press in  May 2017:

'Wittgenstein's Philosophical Grammar'

by Greg T. Charlton.

ISBN: 978-0-9586687-0-5

Killer Press


(c) greg t. charlton. 2016